Will Ukraine’s Euromaidan Democrats Eventually Prevail?

A recent Forum of Democratic Forces may have finally started the process of formation of a broad pro-reform coalition of largely untainted anti-corruption fighters.

On 11^th January 2019, Kyiv hosted a congress of various pro-reformist grouping that together announced their support for the presidential candidacy of former Minister of Defense Anatoliy Hrytsenko. In fact, the meeting was largely an event of Hrytsenko’s party “Civil Position” that managed to gather a number of similarly oriented micro-parties which decided to come out as public backers of Hrytsenko’s bid. They included the Civil Movement “Wave,” Civil Movement “Home-Country,” European Party of Ukraine, and Political Force “Alternative” – small organizations of whom even many Ukrainians may have never heard of. In addition, a number of prominent MP’s from the well-known inter-factional group “Euro-Optimists,” including Svitlana Zalishchuk, Serhiy Leshchenko and Mustafa Nayem, demonstratively joined the congress. The latter gave a speech welcoming the unification congress, and calling for an even broader coalition of pro-reform politicians.

In fact, Nayem touched upon the crucial question of the entire enterprise: Will the new alliance become eventually broad enough to exert real political influence, on Ukraine’s future domestic and foreign affairs? Nayem called explicitly upon L’viv mayor Andriy Sadovyi and the lead singer of the popular group “Elza’s Ocean” Sviatoslav Vakarchuk to join the coalition, in support of Hrytsenko’s presidential bid. For a number of reasons, Nayem’s appeal may have more political meaning and practical significance for the autumn 2019 parliamentary elections than for the presidential ones this spring. This has to do with both, Hrytsenko relatively low chances of becoming president in April, and the constitutional division of real power in Ukraine.

To be sure, Hrytsenko would, perhaps, be the ideal choice for President of Ukraine, from among all the candidates currently running. National defense, state security and foreign affairs are the main prerogatives of the Ukrainian presidency while social and economic matters are largely in the hands of the Prime-Minister elected by parliament. A former military officer and experienced politician, Hrytsenko would be well-prepared for the particular tasks of the President.

 Moreover, his Civil Position party has official observer status with the European Parliament’s liberal ALDE group. His team includes a number of internationally well-connected politicians who could, in particular, help him to deepen Ukraine’s relations to the West. Hrytsenko is one of the few – also outside Ukraine – known politicians with an untainted reputation, and image of a resolute anti-corruption fighter. He and his team would probably be very welcome as Ukraine’s new leadership, in the EU and North America.

Alas, it looks – as of late January 2019 – a far a shot for him to actually gain the presidency. This is not the least because of Hrytsenko’s very standing as a no-nonsense corruption-cleanser. In as far as Ukraine’s presidential elections will, to significant degree, be decided by the amount of money each candidate can invest, Hrytsenko is at a disadvantage. He cannot count on much support from Ukraine’s oligarchs, as he is not willing to offer anything for exchange. Even if he manages to enter the second round of the presidential elections in April 2019, Ukraine’s oligarchic clans would probably mobilize against him, out of sheer fear, during the campaign for the second round. Most likely, he will not even make it into the second round, as he may be neither financially nor rhetorically strong enough to prevail against his, in both regards, more potent competitors Petro Poroshenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

Still, his candidacy and the rallying of reputable forces around Hrytsenko and his party Civil Position are important for Ukraine and its integration with the West. That is because the unification process that the January forum started offers a chance to create an appealing list and powerful force, for the October 2017 parliamentary elections. In 2014, Hrytsenko’s Civil Position too formed a coalition with the small, but reputed Democratic Alliance. Yet, this political couple eventually proved too weak to pass the 5% barrier and thus did not gain a faction in the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council, Ukraine’s one-chamber parliament). One hopes that this autumn, things will be different, and that the new alliance that Hrytsenko is now assembling will be far broader. Ideally, this should push his list, in October 2017, over or even far over 5%.

In such a case, the new Rada would not only gain a – particularly, for Ukraine’s Western partners – important player who could be relied upon, with regard to pushing through economic as well as judicial reforms, implementing the Association Agreement with the EU, and further advancing Ukraine’s ongoing decentralization. A strong showing of Hrytsenko’s list in autumn could offer the opportunity of his group being included in Ukraine’s new coalition government. Hrytsenko himself as well as such well-respected veteran democrats as Viktor Chumak, Mykola Tomenko or Taras Stetskiv might, in a best-case scenario, obtain ministerial portfolios or other relevant positions within Ukraine’s legislature and executive.

In order to achieve this result, however, Ukraine’s pro-democratic forces will have to further coalesce, team up and consolidate. The field of not only the presidential, but also of the parliamentary elections will be crowded. Most likely, Tymoshenko, Poroshenko and Zelenskiy will propose their own lists, and invest considerable resources into their electoral campaign. In addition, the Oleh Liashko’s notoriously populist Radical Party, Ukraine’s far right groups, and, at least, one successor organization of the Party of Regions will probably make strong bids, in the parliamentary elections. There are, however, only 100% to be divided, and 5% need to be passed. As a result, there may be not enough political space and urban educated electorate for even two (not to mention more) pro-democratic anti-oligarchic groups to make it into the parliament. In a worst-case scenario, two or more similarly oriented parties could divide Ukraine’s anti-oligarchic electorate, and thereby leave all of these groups, below the entry barrier for the parliament.

It will thus be imperative for the various Euromaidan groups to show political wisdom, electoral pragmatism and strategic foresight, in order to make it jointly over 5%, in October. One the one hand, Hrytsenko and his team will have to be inviting, tolerant and generous, when forming a joint list with other interested groupings. On the other hand, these other groupings will need to be realistic, modest and oriented towards the common good. The famous proverb “When two Ukrainians get together, there will be three hetmans (chieftains)” is an apt warning. If the various more or less potent groups and electorally strong personalities, within the anti-oligarchic spectrum, cannot get their act together, they could eventually all lose in autumn.

There may be even a Western role in the preparation process and electoral campaign. Many of the relevant leaders of the groupings mentioned above are frequent guests in Western embassies and capitals. Ukraine’s European and American partners should tell their friends in Kyiv, L’viv and other places, in no uncertain terms, that they need to act constructively during the consolidation of Ukraine’s anti-oligarchic forces. Those who break out of the currently shaping alliance and decide to make their own competing bits, or who behave unhelpfully within a broadening coalition should be warned that they may later face consequences for any divisive conduct.

Official sanctions might be a bit too much. But it could help if Western diplomats, activists and politicians make clear to their interlocutors that invitations to embassy receptions in Kyiv, and political gatherings in EU capitals – not to mention other benefits – may occur less frequently for those found to be guilty of splitting the pro-reform vote, hindering political alliance formation, and thus weakening the anti-oligarchic forces in Ukraine’s future parliament. The stakes are high in Ukraine’s upcoming elections, and so should Western attention for them be.