Why Syria Is Not Libya

Many commentators have raised the apparent inconsistency between the Obama administration’s participation in a multilateral intervention in Libya’s civil war and the lack of any comparable undertaking—so far, at least—in Syria. Inconsistency in international relations is nothing new (or necessarily alarming), yet the issue is worth examining. While there are striking similarities, especially on a moral level, that weigh in favor of humanitarian intervention, there are also a number of differences of a practical nature that are worth noting.

The differences begin with the nature of the regimes and the civil conflicts that those regimes encountered. Remember, while we tend to think of dictators as individual tyrants standing opposed to a unified mass of oppressed citizens, all regimes, including dictatorial regimes, have a social base of support of some kind. (Otherwise, where would they find the henchmen to suppress the rest of the population?) In the case of Qaddafi’s Libya, that was a coalition of three traditional Arab tribes based in western Libya. His strongest opposition tended to be based in the tribes of eastern Libya, which had been identified with the royal regime overthrown by Qaddafi in 1969. While it would be an exaggeration to suggest that all politics in Libya is tribal, tribes play a large role. This has been true despite Qaddafi’s initial intention of establishing a revolutionary state that would overcome old tribal loyalties. Ironically, the revolutionary effort to eliminate all the more modern independent civic institutions in society actually strengthened the influence of traditional tribal leaders.

Libya, like many regimes in the region, was undergoing economic and political stress in the spring of 2011. When the Arab Spring arrived there and the regime responded by opening fire with antiaircraft guns on crowds of unarmed protesters, Qaddafi’s coalition cracked, and the regime appeared to be coming apart. The cabinet and the army split, largely along tribal lines. At least part of the largest western tribe withdrew its support from the regime. The rebellion quickly spread and, although pockets of resistance emerged throughout the country, it concentrated its greatest force in the east, especially the city of Benghazi. Whole army units that had been recruited among the eastern tribes joined the rebels. They were joined by the ministers of justice and the interior. The minister of justice became the president of a new alternative government.*

In Syria, Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist government, although a self-described secular socialist regime, relies on the support of religious minorities, especially Assad’s own group, the Alawites (‘Alawī), who constitute about 10 percent of the population. An offshoot of Shiism, the Alawites had long been oppressed and disdained by Sunnis, who do not consider them true Muslims. The Assad regime has allowed them to acquire positions of wealth and authority. Alawites now dominate the government and especially the military officer corps. They are both appreciative and fearful of the retribution they could face if majority rule should come to Syria. When confronted with rebellion, the government and military high command rallied around the regime. It is questionable whether they would permit Assad to quit if he wanted to. The rebels in Syria, while incredibly dedicated and persistent, are scattered and disunited and control no territory. The self-styled Free Syrian Army consists of small, uncoordinated groups of defectors from the armed forces, mostly Sunni enlisted men. An alternative government modeled on that of the Libyan rebels exists primarily outside the borders of the country and has few links to the rebels within.

In Libya, in March 2011, the rebellion was coming to a crisis point. The pro-Qaddafi elements of the army had reconstituted themselves and were advancing on Benghazi. The Obama administration was interested in doing “something positive” to help the rebels overthrow a dictatorial regime. And if it was going to do something, it would have to do it soon, before the impending fall of the rebel stronghold made the issue moot. Yet, it appears there were real limits on what it was willing to do. In light of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the administration wanted to keep U.S. costs and risks at a minimum. At the same time, it wanted to do something effective; it was not interested in symbolic gestures that would not improve the situation, might prove counterproductive, or could even drag the United States into a quagmire. It was clearly for this reason that the administration rejected the initial proposal to initiate a “no-fly zone” over Libya. That would have merely prevented Qaddafi from using aircraft to attack the rebels, something that he was neither doing to any substantial degree nor needed to do to win the struggle. Rather, the administration substituted a plan (still called a “no-fly zone” in much of the press coverage) that permitted U.S. and allied aircraft to strike at military columns on the ground in the name of protecting civilian populations. Since the rebels had their own army and controlled at least some territory, this proved to be enough to turn the tables in a ground war that was fought by Libyans themselves.

Diplomacy bolstered this plan. European members of NATO who were more enthusiastic than the United States about intervening were encouraged to provide most of the air power (after the United States did much of the initial “softening up”). The Arab League was persuaded to endorse intervention in the name of protecting civilians, an unprecedented move by a group that had always been more concerned with issues of sovereignty than with issues of legitimacy, governance, or human rights. That endorsement made it easier to persuade Russia and China to abstain in the UN Security Council rather than veto the operation. It also made it harder for Qaddafi to rally support by crying neocolonialism.

In Syria, the situation is different, although it continues to evolve. The regime has not yet split in any major way. Neither is it as diplomatically isolated as Libya; it retains support from Iran and at least some diplomatic cover from Russia and China. The Arab League, Russia and China felt burned by the way the Libyan intervention escalated and have refused to endorse a similar operation. The Arab League has shifted its position, moving to open condemnation of the Assad regime and calls for an Arab peacekeeping force, but it has not yet endorsed Western military intervention. The rebels do not control a significant amount of territory, although they have occasionally gained temporary predominance in individual villages and urban neighborhoods. There is still really no one for an outside country to help without putting its own troops on the ground. To initiate air strikes against Syrian forces on the Libyan model would mean bombing the same neighborhoods that the international community condemns Assad for bombing. I suspect White House officials are probably a little gun-shy as well. They did not set out to be serial interventionists, and Libya (although incredibly quick when you consider the possibilities) took longer and ran up against more pro-Qaddafi resistance than they had anticipated. (Remember, it was going to be “days, not weeks.”) These factors militate against finding a solution that is effective while minimizing costs and risks.

The most recent proposals call for providing arms (and perhaps advisers) to the rebels, although they are not organized and no one really knows who they are. The rebels would presumably be based in a neighboring country, such as Turkey or Jordan, or in as yet nonexistent liberated zones. This, however, could produce a prolonged civil war capable of destabilizing a strategic portion of the Middle East. The creation of another Iraq is precisely the outcome to be avoided. Others have called for the creation of humanitarian corridors to permit supplies and aid to civilians. Such measures, however, did not leave a glowing legacy when they were attempted before, in Bosnia. One of these proposals may yet be implemented, and may even work in the end, but it is important to examine the implications and assess the potential downside of the options being considered. Marching boldly ahead on the basis of a false analogy rarely works out well.

Want to read more? Try:

“Debating U.S. Options in Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 21, 2012.

Marc Lynch, Pressure, Not War: A Pragmatic and Principled Policy toward Syria, Policy Brief (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, February 2012).

*The interior minister was a more complicated case. He declared himself the leader of the new rebel army as that army was still taking shape. While tolerated as an easterner, however, he had been the head of Qaddafi’s police force and prison system and his presence was an offense to many of the dissidents gathering in Benghazi. He and his proper role remained a point of contention within the rebel forces until he was finally assassinated by an official delegation sent to detain him.