Saudi Foreign Policy Rendered Redundant

Nobody doubts that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is an important country in the world.  Various observers cite different reasons, approvingly and disapprovingly. First of all, as a major producer of oil, the Kingdom has accumulated a considerable wealth that has provided decent essential services for its citizens at home and bought loyalty throughout the world. Furthermore, being a major producer of energy has made Riyadh a powerful voice in the capitals of major energy consumers including that of the United States. Thirdly, as a stable, though autocratic, country in a tumultuous region, the Kingdom has succeeded in gaining the trust of Western countries. Although Saudi Arabia has a partly discontented civil society, it remains stable. The Kingdom, however, is much more than the sum total of its wealth, influence and stability in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia has been a key exporter of extremists who believe in civil obedience at home and jihad overseas. Dr. Madawi Al-Rasheed observes that “while eradicating the threat of militants inside the country, Saudi Arabia has succeeded in turning jihadist effervescence abroad.” Moreover, a Turkish daily charged that “Riyadh does not hesitate to fight the Salafist version of al-Qaeda on its own soil while supporting them elsewhere. All it wants is for those weapons not to be turned against itself.” Furthermore, Bruce Riedel, a scholar and a former senior official in the CIA and on the White House National Security Council maintains that Saudi’s supply of weapons to the Syrian opposition benefited Al-Qaeda.

The Kingdom views its actions partly as counter to what it views to be Shi’ite expansionism in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia considers itself the protector of Sunni Islam; therefore, it uses its resources to counter the so-called “Shi’ite Crescent” comprised of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Lebanese Hezbollah.

Saudi’s foreign policy in the Middle East is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the Kingdom is not the protector of the Sunnis in the region and does not speak for them. In fact, there is a heated rivalry underway in Sunni countries. Secondly, Saudi policy of demonizing Iran and the Shi’ites may cease to have its intended impact as President Rouhani’s charm offensive gathers momentum and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, and Russia + Germany) works towards a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran. The upshot of such an agreement could be reconciliation between Iran (Saudi’s strategic rival) and the U.S. (Saudis’ partner and ally).

KSA is the protector of the two most holy cities in the Muslim world, Mecca and Medina; therefore, it plays an influential role in the Islamic world, hosting millions of pilgrims throughout the year. However, in the past few years a new challenge has emerged for the Saudis: Qatar’s assertive foreign policy and its ambitions to be the champion of Arab grievances.

One of the major sources of contention between Qatar and Saudi Arabia is the former’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the region particularly in Egypt and Syria. The Brothers had called for Islamic unity (Shi’ite and Sunni) before they took power in Egypt. This undermined the sectarian nature of Saudi Arabia foreign policy as the Kingdom projects an image of the protectorate of Sunni Islam against Shi’a Iran.

In the past few years, a network of pro-Brotherhood media platforms, think tanks and intellectual forums have been established in Qatar. Saudis are concerned about the ties between Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist Sahwa movement in the Kingdom, which today represents the main internal opposition to the Saudi ruling family.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also in disagreement on whether they should back the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Qatar, along with Turkey, has tried to make the Brotherhood the forefront of their future influence in Syria following a potential overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad. However, the Kingdom supports other groups. Riyadh wants Qatar to give up its plan to support the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria because it would become a source of strength for the Saudi Sahwa movement.

The Saudis seem to have also been very worried about a potential rapprochement between Iran and the United States. Some observers have suggested that if Iran and the U.S. finally resolve their differences, the United States might shift towards Iran and withdraw its unrelenting support from its long-time Arab ally.  This will not happen in the foreseeable future.

It is true that the Saudi ruling family depends on the United States for its national security needs. However, the United States will not abandon the Kingdom as Americans are interested in a more stable Middle East. To achieve more stability in the region and contain the strengthening of one group, the U.S. would like to see a balance-of-power between the Sunni countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Shi’ite Iran and its allies.

One of the outcomes of the so-called Arab Spring has been the rise of radical Sunni extremist forces funded and supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. On December 11, 2013, The New York Times reported that both countries had refused American requests not to arm rebel militias in Syria, particularly those with an extremist religious agenda.

This obviously irritates the Americans; however, they cannot force the Kingdom to toe their line. The United States seems to be interested in a balance-of-power between Iran, Syria and Iraq and Iran’s proxy the Lebanese Hezbollah, and Sunni Arab countries.

The United States considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization and it will, at least publicly, exert all kinds of pressure on Iran to stop funding the group. The militia cannot survive without Iran’s support. Unlike the Saudis, the United States can live with a Shi’ite Iraq politically closed to Iran. Americans understand Iran’s concern about its Western neighbor. The memories of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran runs deep in the Iranian psyche.

In Syria, another major concern for Saudis, the United States and the international community have changed their focus from removing Bashar Al-Assad, the lethal tyrant, to defeating Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamists that are partly funded by the Saudis. It is in the United States’ interest, therefore, to support Iran with its Shi’ite agenda as a counter weight to the growing threat of Sunni radicalism throughout the Middle East.

Saudi foreign policy is sectarian. It relies on an image of being the guardian of Sunni Muslims throughout the world and on being the counter weight to Iran’s Shi’ite agenda. The inter-rivalry amongst Sunni Muslims has shattered Saudis’ purported leading role in the Sunni world. Furthermore, there is an attempt by the United States to counter Sunni radicalism.  For that, the Americans can find a partner in Iran. This is not a political infidelity. It is about the United States being concerned about its own interests rather than those of Saudi Arabia.

The United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will remain partners in issues that are in their mutual interests. However, in the new Middle East, Saudis will have to reckon with an emerging Sunni power, Qatar, which has an active foreign policy often at the expense of the Kingdom’s. Iran, on the other hand, has a new president who is determined to enhance cooperation with the Kingdom. Iran’s foreign minister also wrote an op-ed in the Asharq Al-Awsat lamenting a zero-sum mentality in the Middle East and calling for cooperation on common interests and shared objectives.

The Saudis clearly do not trust the Iranians, a sentiment that is reciprocated by Tehran. However, the alternative to cooperation is the continuation of the horrifying sectarianism that is being raged throughout the region and is claiming innocent Shi’ite and Sunni lives.

Geopolitical rivalry is an inescapable fact in international relations. To project it in a religious and sectarian light does not guarantee a success for those who initiate it. The KSA needs to seriously re-evaluate its sectarian foreign policy because it has failed to achieve its objectives. The whole world is now concerned about those radical Sunni jihadists that are  funded and used as a political tool by the Kingdom. It is time for the moderate elements within the Saudi ruling family to reclaim a moderate foreign policy that narrows the division between Shi’ite and Sunnis rather than exacerbates and widens it.