Nagging Cracks in U.S.-Russia Relations

Events of this past November revealed more cracks in U.S. -Russia relations that seemed propitious just several months ago. To start with, on November 22, the U.S. announced the decision to cease its obligations under The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), referring to information sharing and mutual inspections with Russia. The decision came as a delayed countermeasure to Russia’s unilateral suspension of its own obligations under the same Treaty in 2007.

Just a day after the U.S. announcement, Russian President Medvedev responded with his own “if-then” stipulation by mentioning that Russia could possibly opt out from the START Treaty, if the United States continues its ambitious ballistic missile plan in Europe. Moscow has repeatedly expressed its discontent with the development of the missile defense project in Europe, accusing the West of excluding Russia from participating in the decision making process. This is especially sensitive since Moscow perceives the radar installations in Poland, Romania and Turkey as a direct threat to its nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Finally, few days after a Pakistani decision to close a supply route for U.S. troops, the Russian Envoy to NATO threatened to suspend Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which serves as a critical component to U.S. operations in Afghanistan as it allows the transportation of almost fifty percent of all non-lethal goods to U.S. troops. Consequently, a shut down of the alternative route could seriously undermine U.S. military capacity and put U.S. troops in a vulnerable position. By pointing out at the vital role Russia plays in U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan, Moscow shows that it is entitled to have an equal say in security matters.

All of the above-mentioned events carry an important message: although an attempt to improve the relations between Russia and the United States might have had a good start, as long as their positions on the preexisting matters are not reconciled, a meaningful cooperation is hardly possible. That said, the split over Georgia, Moldova, and the ballistic missile defense in Europe continues to persist and define Russian and U.S. policies towards each other, much as any attempt to address them unilaterally only exacerbates the situation.

Let’s go back to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. It was signed on November 19, 1990 establishing equal limitation on armed forces that NATO and Warsaw Pact member-countries could deploy between Atlantic Ocean and Ural Mountains. For several years it served as a guarantee of security and control over the overwhelming amount of Russian military weaponry.

Consequently, the lack of a similar security agreement, especially the one regarding nuclear weapons, relaxes limitations and allows the parties more room in their defense planning. All that leads to growing uncertainty, distrust and risk of escalation that would keep the parties uneasy and suspicious of each other’s actions. In the absence of an agreed structure or a system for minimizing perceived threats, old concerns will persist and grow as will the rhetoric that accompanies these types of ‘Tit-for-Tat’ actions.

By not renewing the CFE Treaty obligation, Russia demonstrated that it has not reconsidered its position in the neighborhood, neither has it overcome its disagreement with NATO’s eastward expansion. Russia chose to unilaterally suspend its participation in the Treaty in 2007, which allowed to keep its troops in Transdniestria and Abkhazia, breakaway Republics of Moldova and Georgia.

Finally, while the United States turns its attention to the Asia Pacific region, it seems that Russia is gradually slipping from U.S. foreign policy agenda. At the same time Russia looks for ways to emphasize its critical role for the success of the U.S. foreign policy goals and to establish a status of an equal partner on security matters.