Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Rumbling of Wardrums

What is “enriching uranium”?

Uranium appears naturally in two forms (actually more forms than that in trace amounts, but we need not concern ourselves with the rest); the two are uranium with an atomic weight of 238 and that with an atomic weight of 235. It is U235 (or, more properly, ²³⁵U) that explodes; U238 is much more stable. Any natural uranium ore contains about 99.3% U238 and 0.7% U235. In order to be used as fuel for a nuclear power plant, uranium must be “enriched” to the point that it is 3%–5% U235. This is referred to as low-enriched uranium (LEU). Once it reaches about 20% U235 or above, it is considered highly enriched uranium (HEU). Weapons-grade uranium is generally 90% U235 or higher. One enrichment method, the one used by Iran, involves “converting” the uranium into uranium hexafluoride gas (UF₆), spinning the gas in centrifuges to concentrate the U235, and then converting it back into the form of a metal. (The less concentrated portion, called “tailings” or depleted uranium, is discarded as low-level radioactive waste.)

Most of the enriched uranium inIran’s stockpile is low-enriched uranium. When newspaper reports state that Iran has enough uranium to produce X number of bombs, they generally mean that it has enough low-enriched uranium to reprocess into weapons-grade uranium sufficient to produce X number of bombs (if they reprocessed it into weapons-grade uranium, which they have not yet done). The amount needed for a bomb actually varies depending on the technique being used and the bomb design.

More recently,Iran has reprocessed part of its low-enriched stockpile into highly enriched uranium, or more precisely uranium that is about 19.75% U235. This is appropriate for running the Tehran Research Reactor, which produces radioactive isotopes for medical purposes. A legitimate cause for concern is that highly enriched uranium could also be used as a base for further processing into weapons-grade uranium. The amount of work required to enrich uranium diminishes as one moves up the scale. It requires far more work to move from 0.7% to 20% than it does to move from 20% to 90%.

What is Iran not doing?

So, if the enrichment process is continuing, what is it that Iranstopped doing in 2003? When the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate* on Iran stated, with “high confidence,” that Iran had halted its “nuclear weapons program,” it meant “Iran’s nuclear weapons design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civilian work related to conversion and enrichment.” Thus, the distinction focuses on work directed at designing and building an actual bomb or secret efforts to convert and enrich uranium. When the International Atomic Energy Agency complains that Iran has failed to answer questions about its weaponization program, it is generally referring to the pre-2003 program and suspicions or accusations about later activities. It is fair to note that this weaponization work is relatively easy in comparison to the enrichment process and could be renewed at a later time, when and if a stockpile of weapons-grade uranium is available.

With regard to secret enrichment, Iran was, in fact, caught in September 2009 building an undeclared nuclear-enrichment facility, the Fordow plan, under a mountain near the city of Qom, but the facility was still in the early stages of construction and the Iranians claimed that they had intended to declare it before it went into operation. Work continued, and the facility is currently coming to completion.

A number of U.S. political figures and commentators rejected the intelligence community’s assessment that work had stopped on design and weaponization. From the time the 2007 NIE was published, they have been anticipating its revocation. The basis for their objection, however, is simply the assumption that Iran would not have stopped. In that, it is similar to the assumption in 2002 that Iraq must have weapons of mass destruction because that is what Iraq would do. James Risen, writing in the New York Times, recently revealed that the intelligence community did have second thoughts around 2010, owing to new evidence, but it ultimately decided that the contradictory evidence was unpersuasive and reconfirmed its 2007 assessment.

If we know this much, what is it that we do not know?

Often, the hardest part of intelligence work is not determining what the target is doing now, but assessing what they intend to do next. Spy satellites cannot read intentions. As Risen points out, part of the difficulty in assessing Iranian plans is that we do not have people on the ground. Another part is that the Iranian political system is not the monolith that people sometimes imagine. Rather, it features complex and unclear lines of authority with a host of competing power centers that sometimes work at cross purposes. Different factions or power centers may have different intentions but lack the ability to put them through on their own.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for example, is not officially in charge of the military; the faqih, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is. Ahmadinejad was once viewed as close to the ayatollah, but they appear to have grown farther apart over the years and to have become competitors. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad is a veteran of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, retains many personal connections to that branch of the military, and has placed other IRGC veterans in government positions once held by clerics.

So, how much influence does that give Ahmadinejad over military decisions, and what would he do with that influence? It’s hard to say. In late 2009 Ahmadinejad appeared to be the Iranian leader most interested in negotiating a deal that on having another country process and hold Iran’s uranium. It is at least worth noting that Khamenei has repeatedly referred to nuclear weapons as un-Islamic and haram (forbidden). Could he mean that as a ruse in order to gain time? It’s hard to say. The Iranians could later say that the threat of superior force from foreign powers compelled them to lie in the name of the higher cause of preserving the Islamic revolution. On the other hand, ayatollahs tend to take religious matters fairly seriously.

What is Israel’s position?

People will say that Israeldis agrees with the U.S. intelligence assessment, but that is not entirely true. Mossad,Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, largely agrees with the U.S. view on the basic facts and on the status of the Iranian nuclear program. It is Prime Minister Benjamin (Binyamin) Netanyahu and his Likud party who disagree most vehemently. The issue has come to a head in recent weeks as the Fordow enrichment plant has neared completion. Netanyahu believes that the facility’s location in a mountain will make it virtually impossible to bomb and, therefore, Iran will believe that it can act with impunity once the facility is operational. (Not that Iran would have a bomb, even then.) Thus, Netanyahu believes the facility should be destroyed soon in order to prevent that possibility.

Israel’s own nuclear stance is one of carefully crafted ambiguity combined with carefully strained credulity. Israeli officials always assert that Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, and they always refuse to explain what they mean by “introduce.” It is generally recognized that Israel either already has nuclear weapons or is one twist of the screwdriver away from final assembly. Tacitly permitting the perception that it has nuclear arms without openly acknowledging it (for open acknowledgment might force the hand of adversaries who are content to let the matter ride for now) is the basis of Israel’s deterrence policy.

Is Iran rational?

In an interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated his belief that Iran is a rational actor. The statement set off a degree of controversy. One television pundit, for example, asserted thatIrancannot be rational because it is doing “horrific things” in Syria. Others pointed to Iran’s approval of suicide bombers or to Admadinejad’s stated intention to wipe Israel off the map (although it is not clear that he ever actually said that). These points, however, do not address the question of rationality. The key question here is whether the Iranian regime would freely initiate a nuclear exchange in which Iran, its regime, and its people would ultimately be destroyed. There is no reason to assume that this is the case. In cases in which Iran has endured great suffering, as in its war with Iraq, the intention was to save the regime, not to sacrifice it. More realistic concerns are that a nuclear-armed Iran might be more aggressive in other, nonnuclear areas because of the belief that nuclear weapons would deter retaliation against it, but not that it would initiate unprovoked nuclear strikes against other countries.

It is worth noting that the very same arguments for not permitting Iran to acquire nuclear weapons today were made about Stalin’s Russia in the 1940s and Mao’s China in the 1960s. Both countries acquired the bomb in the end, and neither of them used it. Now they are used as examples of the sort of rational countries that Iran allegedly does not resemble.

So what is it that Iran wants?

Once again, the short answer is, it’s hard to say. It is quite possible that the various factions in the Iranian government have not yet come to an agreement as to what their final goal is, but several options are available. It is possible—if not especially likely—that Iran simply wants to produce electricity in nuclear power plants, does not want to depend on unreliable foreign powers to provide the fuel, and simply does not like being told what it can and cannot do. In terms of domestic politics, defying foreign powers is often a winning strategy. (Incidentally, the democratic opposition also supports the nuclear program.) Iran may also seek nuclear weapons as a deterrent, or it may be content to acquire the capacity to produce them if necessary or to keep them in a semi-assembled state, not unlike the Israeli stance. It would not be the first time in international politics that an adversary served as a model.

Does Iran need a deterrent?

To answer this it is necessary to look at the situation from Iran’s perspective—something that is rarely done. Revolutionary regimes may or may not seek to export their revolution to other countries, especially in their early days, but they almost always assume the outside world is hostile to them. Their purpose, after all, is to overturn a certain order, either in one country or in several, and the world’s major powers are generally defenders of the established order. Revolutionary actions by the regime and counterrevolutionary actions by other powers are likely to feed on each other. The Iranian regime, after coming to power in 1979, voiced its support for the Shiite majority in Iraq. In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, setting off a devastating war that would last eight years and forge long-lasting interpretations of the outside world. (And remember, Iranian leaders—or just about any other leaders—are not going to say, well we started it by supporting the Shiites so we deserved what we got.) When Iran managed to stop Iraq’s advance and then started pushing Iraqi forces back, several Arab countries, the United States, and others began providing aid toIraqto help it stop Iran’s advance. They saw that as necessary to prevent the spread of instability and revolution.Iran will have seen it as the world ganging up on it.

More recently, Iran sees a world in which outside powers, especially Israel and the United States, assert that Iran has aggressive intentions and seek to impose economic sanctions against it. Many Israeli and U.S. leaders repeatedly assert that it may be necessary to bomb Iran to prevent it from achieving its alleged goals. To the Israelis and Americans who say this, this position has been forced on them by the actions and presumed intentions of Iran. Iran will not see it that way. Indeed, the same process works at the individual level; psychologists call it the “fundamental attribution error.” Knowing that we are the good guys, we tend to view our own hostile (or otherwise undesirable) actions as forced upon us by circumstances, which may often be true. The hostile actions of others (especially those of adversaries), however, are automatically assumed to represent their natural disposition. When they do make concessions, the concessions are assumed to have been forced on them by circumstances.

Thus, the Israelis and Americans see a hostile Iran seeking nuclear weapons with aggressive intent. The Iranians will see aggressive Israelis and Americans groping for any excuse to bomb them. If they believe the Israelis and Americans want to bomb them regardless of what they do, then they may well believe that they need a nuclear deterrent to prevent that from happening. From their perspective, this lesson has been reinforced by other events in the world. After all, Iraq and Libya gave up their nuclear programs (although the Americans “claimed” not to believe it in the Iraqi case). The Libyans were even offered an end to sanctions and hostilities in return for denouncing nuclear weapons. Both regimes were then overthrown. North Korea, on the other hand, persisted with its nuclear program. The North Korean regime survives to this day.

To say that it is necessary to understand Iran’s perspective is not to say that Iran is necessarily right or justified in what it does. But it does highlight the mistakes that can result if we interpret Iran’s actions while assuming that they share our views and assumptions. None of this proves that Iran intends to do one thing or another, but it can remind us that we should not jump to conclusions based on scanty or ambiguous evidence. We should at least make an effort to resolve issues diplomatically before taking precipitous action. A diplomatic reconciliation between the United States and Iran would not be easy and cannot be achieved in a single all-or-nothing effort, as was attempted in autumn 2009. There is a legacy of entrenched hostility and mistrust, and domestic politics in both countries militates against it. War, however, can be started with relative ease and can just as easily proceed in directions that neither side anticipated or intended.

*The declassified “Key Judgments” of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate of Iran’s nuclear program can also  be found in Scott C. Monje, The Central Intelligence Agency: A Documentary History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008), pp. 383–386.