GailForce: Afghanistan Violence Levels

Last week the UN published a report that made headlines around the world called: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security. Headlines screamed, “UN says 39% jump in violence in 2011”. As fate would have it the day of the announcement I was scheduled to participate in a Department of Defense sponsored Bloggers Roundtable with Major General Walter M. Golden Jr., Deputy Commander for Police, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). The topic was “The Four Afghan National Police Pillars”.

I will give a detailed rundown of the General’s comments on the Afghan Police as well as on another Bloggers Roundtable on Afghanistan I participated in with Major General Peter Fuller, Deputy Commander, NTM-A next week. For this Blog I’d like to focus on what General Golden had to say when I asked him about the UN report. My intent is to get past the media hype and provide you with the best information I could find on the topic. This is too important a topic to handle with sound bites. First here’s a paragraph from the UN report itself:

“There were fewer security incidents in July (2,605) and August (2,306) than in
June (2,626). As at the end of August, the average monthly number of incidents for
2011 was 2,108, up 39 per cent compared with the same period in 2010. Armed
clashes and improvised explosive devices continued to constitute the majority of
incidents. The south and south-east of the country, particularly around the city of
Kandahar, continued to be the focus of military activity and accounted for
approximately two thirds of total security incidents.”

Here’s General Golden’s response to my question:

“The first observation that I would make is that ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) also tracks the violence statistics. And they and the United Nations are meeting and getting together to try to reconcile their numbers, because ISAF’s numbers tell a little different story than the United Nations’. that being said, and as I said before, I certainly agree that the Taliban has made an attempt, particularly in the last couple of months, as we’ve approached a couple of key events on their calendar. The first key event that I mentioned before was the first tranche of transition in Afghanistan. The second key event is that we’re approaching the end of the traditional fighting season in Afghanistan.

And so you can make an argument that the Taliban has not been very successful this fighting season, and so they’re doing their very best to try to go out, you know, with a bang instead of a whimper. And that’s important for a couple of reasons. Perhaps the reason that’s most important is that without that type of success, they probably will not have a large amount of luck recruiting this winter to take up the fight again next year during the fighting season. And we’ve — and we’ve seen some indicators of that, you know, just from some of the traffic that’s been in the media about some of the low- level fighters, you know, not appreciating the fact that many of the Taliban leaders are in safe sanctuary in Pakistan while they’re directing them in some of these attacks that are not very successful but result in great losses to the Taliban fighters who are at the lower level here in Afghanistan.

From a — from a training perspective — I mean, I think what we’re doing from a training perspective is absolutely essential. It’s essential because — and it really goes beyond the police. I mean, it’s the police and the army and what we categorize as the Afghan national security forces. But their training into a professional, competent, sustainable and enduring force is absolutely critical for them to gain the confidence of the people here in Afghanistan that they’re able to counter the Taliban and that the Taliban is not able to regain a foothold in this country.”

On 29 September ISAF held a press conference on the violence statistics. They stated their bottom line was:

“UN and ISAF security data differs in category, collection coverage and magnitude. These differences have resulted in varying conclusions about the security situation in Afghanistan….Overall, the data provided in the UN report is different in certain categories than the ISAF data… Security Incidents are all enemy action (i.e. enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire i.e. mortar, rocket and artillery, Surface to Air Fire and Explosive Hazard events to include Executed Attacks (i.e. IED explosion, mine strike) and Potential or Attempted Attacks (i.e. IEDs, mine found & cleared, premature IED detonations, IED turn-ins) which are not included.

Security incidents do not include Friendly Action Incidents such as direct fire and indirect fire that are initiated by friendly forces. Enemy-Initiated Attacks are all enemy action (i.e. enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface to air fire) and Explosive Hazard Events to include executed attacks only (i.e. IED Explosions and mine strikes). Potential or attempted Attacks (i.e. IEDs/Mine Found & Cleared, Premature IED Detonations, IED Turn-ins) are not included….Only IEDs that actually exploded in an attack are taken into account. The primary method of attack for high profile attacks are Person-borne IED (PBIED), Suicide-borne IED (SVBIED) and Vehicle-borne IED (VBIED). .. Complex Attack is an attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon systems (i.e. indirect fire and direct fire, IED and surface to air fire) against one or more targets. Complex attacks differ from coordinated attacks due to the lack of any indication of a long term planning process or prior preparation. Coordinated Attack is an attack that exhibits deliberate planning conducted by multiple hostile elements, against one or more targets from multiple locations. A coordinated attack may involve any number of weapon systems. Key difference between complex and coordinated is that a coordinated attack requires the indication of insurgent long term planning. High-profile Attacks are defined as Explosive Hazard event types, where only IED explosions were taken into account. We do not consider IED found & cleared or premature detonations. Only IEDs that actually exploded in an attack are taken into account. The primary method of attack for high profile attacks are Person-borne IED (PBIED), Suicide-borne IED (SVBIED) and Vehicle-borne IED (VBIED)…Over 200,000 human collectors report into the ISAF system… Intelligence reports, including human intelligence, signal intelligence, and other technological assets, are included in total ISAF data. ISAF collaborates with other local and regional sources for additional data”.

I’ll conclude with some of the statistics provided during the ISAF press conference:

“For the period January through August 2011, enemy-initiated attacks are 2% lower than the same period in 2010. From June through August 2011, enemy-initiated attacks were 17% lower than the same period in 2010. In 2011, each of the months of May, June, July and August showed fewer enemy-initiated attacks than the same months in 2010. Prior to May 2011, enemy-initiated attacks had been higher than the same month the previous year since at least 2007. For the period January through August 2011, over 85% of civilian casualties were due to insurgent actions. Over 70% of insurgent-caused casualties are caused by IEDs. ISAF-caused civilian deaths increased from 152 by only 2% for the period from January through August 2011 when compared to the same period in 2010 despite an additional 10,000 to 25,000 Coalition forces in 2011 compared to 2010. Insurgent-caused civilian deaths increased from 807 by 1% for the same period of time.

Civilian deaths caused by air strikes increased by 18% from January through August 2011 compared to the same period of 2010 (from 57 to 67). For the months of June through August the numbers of civilian deaths caused by air strikes have decreased by 1 (from 12 to 11) in 2011 compared to 2010.

Violence in Kabul is less than 1% of nationwide violence, while Kabul holds nearly 20% of the population of Afghanistan. Regional Command Southwest has shown notable, sustained improvement in security. Enemy-initiated attacks reported from June through August 2011 were 39% lower compared to the same period last year. Regional Command South is showing emerging success and some improvement in security. Enemy-initiated attacks reported during the period June through August 2011 were 12% lower than the same period in 2010. Regional Command East continues to present a challenging security situation, and enemy-initiated attacks during the June through August time period were 17% higher than the same period in 2010. Some of this increase in violence is due to ANSF/ISAF clearing operations as well as insurgent support emanating from Pakistan. Regional Commands North, West, and Capital together comprise less than 8% of nationwide violence”.

As always my views and perspectives are my own.