GailForce: Afghanistan Update, the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Last week while out shopping, I ran into a fellow Vet.  As we chatted, the subject of media coverage of wars came up.  He had served in Vietnam and we both found it interesting that media coverage of that conflict was pretty extensive and covered almost nightly.  In contrast the war inAfghanistanis not covered to the same extent in mainstream media.  We were concerned that in this presidential election year with so much on the line, the public would not be very well informed. This brings me to the topic of my blog.

Last week I participated in a Department of Defense sponsored Bloggers Roundtable with Maj. Gen. John A. Toolan Jr. who has recently completed a year-long deployment in charge of the Regional Command (Southwest) team in support of NATO and ISAF efforts to protect the Afghan people, develop the Afghan National Security Force capabilities, and support improved governance and economic development throughout Afghanistan’s Helmand and Nimroz provinces.  The Roundtable topic was: Accomplishments, Challenges and Sacrifices of Marines and Coalition Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan).

Before I get to the General’s comments, I would like to do two things, first to reiterate the U.S.goals and objectives for Afghanistan as stated by President Obama in a speech at West Point in 2009:

“Our overarching goal remains the same:  to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan.  We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven.  We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.  And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility forAfghanistan’s future.”

Second I’d like to take a look at the latest statistics available from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on how we’re doing against the Taliban.  On April 21^st, ISAF published: ISAF Monthly Data Trends through March 2012.  In the category of enemy initiated attacks, the report made the following observation:

“Enemy-initiated attacks over the last 3 months are 21 percent lower compared to the same quarter last year.

• Each month since May 2011 had fewer enemy-initiated attacks than the corresponding month one year ago.

• This is the longest sustained year-over-year reduction in enemy-initiated attacks recorded by ISAF.”

In terms of executed IED attacks:

“IED and mine explosions for Mar 2012 are 21 percent lower when compared to Mar 2011.

• Insurgents continue to rely on IEDs as the principal means to execute their campaign.

• Over 60 percent of civilian casualties caused by insurgents result from indiscriminate IED explosions.

• More than half of IEDs and mines were found and cleared rather than exploded.”

In terms of civilian casualties, the reported stated:

“Insurgents caused approx. 80 percent of civilian casualties (deaths and wounded) in Mar 2012.

• The number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties decreased by 68 percent for the first three months in 2012 compared to 2011.

• ISAF continues to work with the ANSF to make every effort to protect the Afghan population and ensure that the number of civilian casualties is kept to an absolute minimum.”

Now on to Major General Toolan’s comments; he began by saying over the year he and his forces were there, they were able to:

“…distribute what I call the force densities throughout the Helmand and Nimroz province, the two provinces that comprise my AO in Regional Command Southwest. Having those sufficient force densities in the population centers in those provinces helped bring a level of stability that then the Afghan national security forces were able to build upon.”

He also said the Afghan security forces began to come into their own because of the training they were provided.

“The training with — the three key elements of building an Afghan security force was capability — the training really that we provided helped build their capabilities; their capacity, meaning the numbers of security forces grew during this period of time for a lot of reasons, but one is — has been particularly that people felt that if they contributed to the Afghan national security forces, that they were actually contributing to eventually what would be the winning side; and then lastly is, you know, we really saw the fruition of investment and development in the AO where we beat — we were able to things like secure the roads, open up roads and then secure the Kajaki Dam, which — and the — will certainly serve to improve economic development in the province for the years to come”.

Major General Toolan did not shy away from discussing problems stating:

“I’m concerned that there is still a host of threats. You know, there’s still a ruthless and cunning Taliban leader that, although the leadership is operating at a quite a — you know, they’re conducting and retaining control by murder and intimidation. I think, you know, poppy and the drugs and impact on the insurgency is still something that needs to be dealt with. I believe that the ANSF can handle the threat, but they got — they’ve got to make sure that they’re maintained and resourced properly.

And then lastly, I — the threat that’s probably most challenging is the corruption and the threat of corruption that can occur inAfghanistan. And I look at two levels of corruption. One is the parasitic corruption, which I think is evident up in the central government with people like Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, who is somebody who’s been a thorn on the side of Governor Mangal, who I’ve been working with and who’s been the governor the past three and a half years. And the — unfortunately, you know, some of those central government officials are making money on the drug industry. They’ve got — they’re negative influences in the provinces, and they got too much say up in the central government.

But we need to keep — you know, it’s much like any parasite: It needs a weak host to survive and unless that government of Afghanistan continues to strengthen, these parasites continue to negatively influence its progress.

And then, lastly, is the — what I call predatory corruption, which really is the corruption of — the threat of it is among the Afghan national security forces in the province who can prey on the public by taking advantage of their power and their authority and, you know, collecting taxes to taking land away.”

As to the question of how good are the Afghan security forces, the General remarked:

“I believe that the Afghan security forces are better led, better trained and better equipped than the insurgents.  When I talk about being better led, we’ve made it — made a concerted effort to bring in, you know, leadership. General Maluk (ph), who’s a 215th Corps commander is a — is an exceptional leader. He’s honest, he’s forthright, and he’s got the respect of his brigade commanders. And the brigade commanders are good, and really many of the young officers are talented and educated. The challenge is at the NCO level, and it is something that — we need more time to help build an NCO corps. But I think that the leadership overall — when you compare it with what the Taliban have, which is really senior leaders that are not present on the battlefield — they are in safe havens in Quetta — and the people are legitimately asking questions, like, well, why is it that I gotta sacrifice, while this senior Taliban leader’s giving directions from the safety of, you know, Quetta?”

Major General Toolan indicated Taliban influence in the region he was responsible has waned:

“…we are the home team. We weren’t necessarily the home team two years ago. Two years ago, the Taliban were. They were integrated into every village and every district. Shadow governance was the predominant governance, and they were in control. And the legitimate governance was — really was nonexistent. If you think, in the past three years, how we’ve now developed a rule of law where we have prosecutors, we have judges, we’ve got courts, we’ve got detention facilities, all of that stuff has occurred over the past three years, and because of it, because we now have systems in place where we hold people accountable, as well as development projects, as well as, you know, good leadership in the Afghan national security forces, people are coming back to it.

So now the — with the local nationals supporting the Afghan national security forces, we’re the home team. We have the inside advantage. And I think it’s going to — it’s going to continue to make a difference. But if we lose it, if the police become susceptible — and they are — to predatory corruption, we could lose those gains.”

I asked the General if he had read the February 2012 article in Armed Forces Journal, Truth, lies, and Afghanistan, by Lt. Col. Daniel Davis and if he had what were his thoughts.  The General replied:

“I try not to turn a blind eye to the — to the challenges that exist inAfghanistan. It’s not all rosy, as I painted just earlier about — the threat to corruption; it’s very real, various levels. And, you know, as a — as a senior person, I — as I evaluate our progress in Afghanistan, I think, as I mentioned in my introductory comments, you know, we’ve made some progress in development and governance, and, you know, we’ve provided the proper force densities in places in order to bring stability.

But, you know, we also have significant issues that I don’t know if we can — certainly that we can in uniform solve, like the borders. I can’t stop the flow of lethal aid intoAfghanistan. I can interdict it when it gets there. I can’t stop the flow of drugs out ofAfghanistanthroughPakistanandIran. And those have a significant impact on the environment. And until we make arrangements, until we can get the cooperation of some of the border countries, this problem will persist.

Additionally, you know, the drug industry inHelmandprovince in particular is huge.

Some people estimate, you know, a billion-dollar profit being made just inHelmand. That doesn’t include how much money is made on those drugs when they’re moved out ofAfghanistan.

It’s very hard to compete with, you know, a billion dollars going into the coffers of the criminal patrons’ networks, and a good portion of that being paid out to fuel the insurgency. But we’re trying. We’re trying to bring in some really talented, smart people from Treasury Department, et cetera, to figure out how they finance these — this movement of drugs back and forth and go after the hawalas and hawaladars.

But you know, again, the big picture — you — everybody sees it at different level. I think — yeah, I think Dave (sp) has brought up some good points. But this is — in — certainly in my case, there is no purposeful trying to distort the picture and make it look like it’s better than it is.”

I’ve  mentioned it in other blogs, but I’ve interviewed many of the senior leaders and have never got the impression they were not being forthcoming and they have been pretty consistent.  They’ve all said the gains against the Taliban are fragile and could be reversed, corruption and literacy were problems as were the safe havens inPakistan.  Think I’ll end here.  As always, my views are my own.