Why Russia Must Trust America's Perestroika

“Americans Chose Perestroika” was the headline splashed across Russia's leading tabloid, the Komsomolskaya Pravda, on November 5th.

Indeed, the scenes of solidarity, jubilation and catharsis that I witnessed in downtown Washington DC  around 11pm on November 4 could have come from a documentary about the fall of the Berlin Wall, or the immediate aftermath of Ceausescu's overthrow.

Drivers honking their horns, people with flags leaning out of car windows, spontaneous hugging, drumming; truck and bus drivers and police officers stopping to fraternise with and high-five the human roadblocks: this was People Power, in all its triumph, sincerity, and naivete.

Such scenes are especially poignant for Russians, who remember, first-hand or otherwise, the Gorbachev years. Our Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent writes:

“It is not my country, not my history, but I was over-run with goosebumps when the results were announced”.

Is it any surprise then that Gorbachev sees a glimmer of himself in the President Elect?

“I am very happy. Two or three years ago I said America needed perestroika, and this was greeted with cheers in the US,” Mr Gorbachev was quoted as saying, using the term for his 1980s liberal reforms that helped end the Cold War.

“It is no accident that the whole world followed these elections, including in Russia, where they were followed like never before. This shows there is hope that the arrival of a new administration will bring changes,” he added.

Comparisons are impossible to avoid:

By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was fighting an unwinnable war in Afghanistan, experiencing a deepening economic crisis and increasing international isolation that left it bankrupting itself still further in the arms race.

Just as in the US under Bush II, the Brezhnev years were marked by social conservatism, foreign invasions, increased domestic surveillance, crackdowns on dissidents and debt-financed lifestyles; in another eerie parallel, making fun of the apparently senile, gaffe-prone and increasingly incompetent Premier had become a national past-time.

Sample Brezhnev jokes:

Lenin showed us how to govern. Stalin showed us how not to govern. Khrushchev showed us that any fool can govern. And Brezhnev showed us that not every fool can govern.

Brezhnev called together a group of cosmonauts. ‘Comrades! The Americans have landed on the Moon. We here have consulted and have decided that you will go to the Sun!’
‘But we will burn up, Leonid Iljich!’
‘Be not afraid, comrades, the Party has thought of everything. You
will leave at night.’

At the 1980 Olympics, Brezhnev begins his speech. “O!” — applause. “O!” — more applause. “O!” — yet more applause. “O!” — an ovation. “O!!!” — the whole audience stands up and applauds. An aide comes running to the podium and whispers, “Leonid Ilyich, that's the Olympic rings, you don't need to read it!”

Of course, people did not choose Gorbachev in an open election, but they were crying out for change.

Victor Tsoi, the USSR's most legendary rock star, distilled this sentiment in the song “(We want) Changes”:

[kml_flashembed movie="http://www.youtube.com/v/bhIwoHbMrU8" width="425" height="350" wmode="transparent" /]
The words articulate much of what American youth was also feeling on the eve of this vote:

Instead of fire – there's only smoke.
Instead of warmth – cold.
Another day is crossed out on the calendar grid.
The red shining sun has completely burned out,
And this day goes out with it,
And over a glowing city, the shadow will fall

We want changes!
It's the demand of our hearts.
We want changes!
It's the demand of our eyes.
In our laughter, in our tears, and the pulse in our veins.
We want changes!
And changes will begin…

WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS?

Unfortunately, history is in danger of repeating itself as farce.

When Gorbachev unveiled his New Thinking on international relations, the Reagan administration was very slow to react. By the time the US had come round in 1989, too much valuable time was lost, and Gorbachev's vision, and job, were in terminal crisis.

The Russian people have still not forgiven what they see as cruel American circumspection and delay in engaging their country's sincere offer of a clean slate.

So far, it looks like Medvedev is following in Reagan's footsteps. He was the last major head of state to congratulate Obama. The day before his election, Medvedev delivered some pointed barbs at the US, and the day after, declared his intention to install rockets in Kaliningrad.

Medvedev's caution is widely shared. Like Reagan's America, while Russians are broadly happy about Obama's victory, few believe that the US can really change its stripes; perhaps this whole Obama thing is some sort of cunning ruse, the repackaging of ‘imperialism’ as ‘leadership’ etc etc etc.

Speculation that Obama is considering bringing in former Clinton officials like Holbrooke (despised in Russia for expanding Nato and bombing Yugoslavia) plays into that very narrative.

This threatens to be a self-fulfilling prophecy; Russian policies must not provide any excuse for a genuine hawk takeover of the Obama administration.

Democratic presidents are automatically on the defensive about perceived ‘foreign policy weakness’ (one reason why the USSR preferred Republicans). Thus, by acting conciliatory and not being seen to take advantage of US overstretch, Medvedev can do much to blunt this criticism and avoid the pitfalls encountered between Russia and previous Democratic administrations.

On the other hand, any attempts to exploit or test the new president will only invite Obama to over-compensate.

Moreover, Medvedev should not forget that Obama was the only presidential candidate to have placed responsibility of both Russia and Georgia for the August war, at a time when seeminly everyone else was single-and simple-mindedly condemning Russia.

It is entirely understandable for Russians to have a certain amount of cynicism regarding US elections: foreign policy has traditionally been largely non-negotiable (‘partisanship stops at the water's edge’) and decoupled from domestic policy. This is how a domestic liberal like Clinton could also comfortably be a foreign affairs hawk.

However, it is too easy and irresponsible to not see the trees for the forest.

This year may present a perfect foreign policy storm for the US: Obama's personal anti-war, pro-detente stance+ US ‘imperial overstretch’ in Afghanistan and Iraq+economic crisis that will necessitate roll backs in defence spending+public opinion sea-change all point to the possibility of an at least quantitatively new direction.

Obama may not seem radical enough for some Russians, but Katrina Vanden Heuvel is confident that his election is good for Russia.Most importantly, no matter what Medvedev may think of Obama's intentions, the American public hungers for change.

Russia: take America at her word today, as America should have taken you at yours in 1987.

You may regret not having done so.