What’s in Store for President-Elect Hassan Rouhani?

Editor’s Note: 

The following is a contributing guest piece by Muhammad Sahimi. Dr. Sahimi is Professor of Chemical Engineering and Materials Science and the NIOC Chair in Petroleum Engineering at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. In addition to his scientific work, Dr. Sahimi is a well-known analyst on Iran’s political developments and its nuclear program for over 15 years. His analyses and commentaries have been published by leading media outlets such as the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, International Herald Tribune and The Guardian, as well as leading websites such as Foreign Policy, Truthdig, Antiwar, and the Huffingtonpost.  From 2008 to 2012 Dr. Sahimi was the lead political columnist for the online publication Tehran Bureau. He is also a co-founder and editor of the website, Iran News and Middle East Reports.

 ____________________________________________________________________________

by Muhammad Sahimi

Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric, was elected Iran’s president in a landslide on June 14, 2013.  Those in the West who seek accommodation with Iran and the rest of the Middle East had a sigh of relief after Rouhani’s election. Those who seek confrontation, imposing even more crippling sanctions on Iran, and eventually going to war with that nation have already panicked over the emergence of a what appears to be a moderate, soft-spoken Iranian President that is an expert on the nuclear issues, was deeply involved in Iran’s nuclear program for two decades, and promised in his first press conference as President-Elect more transparency regarding the program and Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The opinion of the Iranian people about Rouhani’s election is roughly along the same lines. Those who oppose the sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States and its allies and their constant threatening of their nation by Israel, and believe that change in Iran must come from within, voted in the election and encouraged others to do the same. Those who seek regime change with the help of United States, the bulk of whom live in the Diaspora, dismissed Rouhani’s election as nothing but window dressing for an unpopular political system in which the real power rests elsewhere and is controlled by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, whose office in Iran is known as the beit-e rahbari [the abode of the leader] and the high command of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps [IRGC].

To be sure, when Rouhani announced his candidacy, he was not the choice of the Green Movement, the reformist faction of the Iranian politics, or any other democratic group. That is because there is little doubt, if any, that former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi is the most popular Iranian politician, and if he could have run, he would have been elected easily. But he, his wife Dr. Zahra Rahnavard, a professor of arts, and Mehdi Karroubi, the popular former Speaker of parliament, the Majles, – the trio represents the leadership of the Green Movement – have been under house arrest since 15 February 2011. In their absence, Mohammad Khatami, a true reformist and the highly popular former president, was best hope for the president for his supporters. But, Khatami is despised by Iran’s fundamentalists and the security and intelligence forces. He was threatened repeatedly over his possible run for the office; thus, he never entered the race. Next in line was another former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a centrist and shrewd politician. But, after he entered the race with Khatami’s backing, the Guardian Council, a constitutional body hat vets the candidates, astounded the nation by disqualifying him from running on the excuse that he was too old. After Mohammad Reza Aref, 62, the Stanford-educated First Vice President (Iran has eight VPs) in the second Khatami administration (2001-2005), withdrew from the race and supported Rouhani, the two former presidents also threw their support behind Rouhani, which excited the nation. Many, who had decided to sit the elections out, decided to vote, which led to Rouhani’s landslide victory.

But, can Rouhani make a dent in the tall mountain of problems that Iran is facing, ranging from a terrible state of economy brought in part by the crippling economic sanctions imposed on the nation by the United States and its allies, to its confrontation with the West over its nuclear program, and the chaos in the Middle East that has pitted Shiite forces led by Iran against extremist Sunni groups led by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and their allies? Is he a truly pragmatic moderate conservative with the necessary skills to address at least some of the problems that Iran is facing? Will his election usher in a new era in Iran and, hence, the Middle East? Most importantly, will he be able to operate in Iran’s highly polarized political arena, tame the hardliners, lower the expectations of the Green Movement for great changes over a short period of time, and then deliver on his campaign promises? To address these issues, we must first take a look at Rouhani’s background.

Who is Hassan Rouhani?

Rouhani was born in 1948 in a town east of Tehran. He joined the movement against the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi at a very young age. In 1966, he secretly crossed the border into Iraq to go to Najaf to meet with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had been exiled there the year before, after the uprising he led in June 1963 failed. About a year before the Revolution of 1979, Rouhani left Iran because he was afraid for his life. After Ayatollah Khomeini moved to a suburb of Paris in the fall of 1978 to lead the Revolution, Rouhani joined in and forged close ties with Khomeini.

After the Revolution toppled the Shah in February 1979, Rouhani was appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini to reorganize the armed forces, which was in total disarray due to the Revolution. Ever since, Rouhani has been at the center of power in Iran, almost exclusively in the national security domain. In addition to being a five-term member of the Majles, chairman of its national security and foreign policy committee, and deputy Speaker, Rouhani also held important military positions during the war with Iraq from 1980-1988, being deputy commander- in-chief of the armed forces in the last two years of the war. When Iran’s Supreme National Security Council was formed in 1989, Rouhani was appointed to the Council, led it until 2005 as its Secretary-General, a post he holds to this date.  

Rouhani was also the Khatami administration’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2003-2005 and led the negotiations with Britain, France and Germany that led to the October 2003 Sa’dabad Declaration and November 2004 Paris Agreement, according to which Iran was supposed to suspend its uranium enrichment program and implement voluntarily the provisions of the Additional Protocol of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Although Iran delivered on its part of the two agreements, they ultimately failed because, instead of rewarding Iran, the European trio negotiating with Iran on behalf of the George W. Bush administration, demanded that Iran suspend its nuclear program indefinitely.

After Ahmadinejad was elected president in June 2005, Rouhani resigned from his position of chief nuclear negotiator, and spent the last eight years directing the Center for Strategic Studies of the Expediency Discernment Council, a constitutional body headed by Rafsanjani that arbitrates the dispute between the parliament and the Guardian Council, and also acts as a collective adviser to Khamenei. He used his position to frequently criticize Ahmadinejad.

To understand whether Rouhani can make a positive difference by working within Iran’s power hierarchy, we must first have a better understanding of the power structure itself starting with the two most important centers of power in Iran: the Abode of the Leader and the military/intelligence establishment.

The Abode of the Leader

Khamenei’s office is run by people with background in intelligence and security. His chief of staff, cleric Mohammad (Gholam-Hossein) Mohammadi Golpayegani, who is father-in-law of Khamenei’s daughter Boshra, used to be a judge of military courts, and a deputy minister of intelligence. Khamenei’s chief of security is another cleric, Asghar (Sadegh) Mir Hejazi, who coordinates everything with the IRGC and intelligence forces. Hejazi was also one of the founders of the Ministry of Intelligence in the 1980s. Khamenei’s chief personal aide and deputy chief of staff is Vahid Haghanian, known in Iran’s political circles as Agha [Mr.] Vahid, who is an IRGC officer in the Sarallah Base, the IRGC large military barrack responsible for Tehran’s security.

Despite the fact that the office is run by the hardline security staff, there are three factions that work with the Office and have close relations with Khamenei. One group is led by Khamenei’s senior foreign policy adviser and former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, who is a traditional conservative and has been very close to Khamenei for at least three decades. When Khamenei was Iran’s President in the 1980s, he wanted to remove Mousavi from premiership and appoint Velayati instead, but was blocked by Ayatollah Khomeini. Velayati was a candidate in the just concluded presidential elections, and during nationally-televised election debates he fiercely attacked the foreign policy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and that of Saeed Jalili, Ahmadinejad chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, also a candidate himself. Velayati accused Jalili of being partly responsible for the failure of the nuclear negotiations with P5+1 – the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany. Velayati also revealed an important state secret, namely, that he and the Speaker of the Majles Ali Larijani, who was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2005-2007, twice reached agreements with the European Union on how to resolve the nuclear dispute, but both preliminary agreements were scuttled by Ahmadinejad. Thus, Velayati is likely to support Rouhani to reach an understanding with the West over Iran’s nuclear program, and possibly Syria, another sore point in relations between Iran and the West.

Another group in the Abode of the Leader is led by former Speaker of the Majles Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri. Nouri heads the Office of Inspection of the Abode, with authority to check and monitor every organ of the government that is controlled directly by Khamenei. A traditional conservative, Nategh Nouri is a relative moderate that supported Rouhani during his campaign, and has very good relations with both Rafsanjani and Khatami. He is likely to support not only an opening with the West, but also relaxing the harsh security environment and repression at home with a more open press.

The third faction is led by Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, the trio of the hardline security men that run the Abode, and a faction of the IRGC high command, including Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the IRGC chief, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, the former IRGC chief and the current senior military adviser to Khamenei, Brigadier General Masoud Jazaeri, deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for cultural affair and propaganda, and Brigadier General Mohammad Hosseinzadeh Hejazi, usually referred to as Sayyed Mohammad Hejazi, overall deputy chief of staff of the armed forces. This faction opposes any deviations from the hardline policies of the past eight years, both domestically and in the international arena.

It is not clear yet which faction will prevail. There is some evidence that Khamenei wants to resolve the nuclear dispute with the West with the hope that it will lead to lifting of at least some of the sanctions. That will, in turn, help the economy, and reduce anxiety and discontent in the society. There is also talk of Velayaty being appointed Secretary-General of the Supreme National Security Council, and even his old portfolio, the foreign minister. If that happens, Rouhani will have the support of at least one group in the Abode of the Leader.

The Military/Security Establishment

Unlike the claim by some pundits, Iran’s military/intelligence forces do not represent a cohesive and unified group. The inability of the intelligence/security forces in wiping out the Green Movement, coupled with Iran’s diplomatic isolation, the crippling sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States and its allies, and the terrible state of economy have created fissures within the IRGC ranks, which go back at least a few years. These rifts surfaced again during the June election.

One group of the IRGC officers, led by General  Jafari, several other top IRGC commanders, as well as the regular military, appeared to support Jalili. This group is very close to Mojtaba Khamenei who wields considerable power behind the scene and was instrumental in the rise of Ahmadinejad to power in 2005. Together with the trio of the security/intelligence that run the Abode of the Leader, Mehdi Taeb, the hardline cleric who heads IRGC’s Ammar Strategic Center since 2009 elections, supported Jalili. The Ammar Center has close ties  with Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, the hardline reactionary cleric whose political group, Jebheh Paaydaari-ye Enghelaab-e Eslaami (or JPEE) [steadfast front of the Islamic revolution] endorsed Jalili. Many top IRGC officers also have close relations with Mesbah Yazdi.

It appeared that there was also a second faction of the IRGC officers with a reputation for being relatively uncorrupted with professional military credentials. This group supported Tehran’s Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, an IRGC retired Brigadier General, former commander of its air force, and former commander of the national police. The most prominent of these officers was Major General Ghasem Soleimani. It was reported that General Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force [IRGC’s special force operating outside Iran] endorsed Ghalibaf in the election. This was highly significant, as Soleimani, one of the most formidable IRGC officers and part of its strategic brain trust, is believed to be highly popular within the force.

Some believed that a third faction of the IRGC officers, which consisted of the nouveau riche class of the past eight years, supported, Mohsen Rezaei, retired Major General and the IRGC chief from 1981-1997 and current secretary-general of the Expediency Discernment Council. Rezaei himself has become a very rich man by setting up several corporations and business activity in a wide range of areas. He has not been able to avoid accusations of financial corruption.

There have been speculations that Rouhani will bring both Rezaei and Ghalibaf into his cabinet. Both men have expressed interest in working with Rouhani, an interest that has not been turned down by the President-Elect. If that happens, Rouhani may get at least some support among the IRGC rank.

The Majles

The parliament also consists of several factions, with the hardliners representing two groups. One faction consists of Ahmadinejad’s critics, many of whom are retired IRGC officers; while a second faction is made of the JPEE members supporting the outgoing president. Both groups supported Jalili during the election and have already begun threatening Rouhani with blocking his legislative efforts, should he decide to include Reformists and supporters of the Green Movement in his cabinet.

Can Rouhani Deliver on his Promises?

It is in such an environment that Rouhani will begin his presidency next month. He has good relations with Khamenei and knows all the important players within the power hierarchy. He has also been deeply involved in addressing Iran’s national security problems and respected by senior European diplomats. He also knows the labyrinth of Iran’s nuclear diplomacy. On the other hand, hardline and extremist groups oppose him and may try to create insurmountable problems for him, the way they did for Mohammad Khatami and his administration. Whereas Khatami is a mild-mannered politician that tries to avoid confrontation, Rouhani is tough-minded and determined.

No realist expects Rouhani to be able to solve all the problems that Iran is facing. But, he is very close to Rafsanjani, and considered not a reformist in the way Khatami is. This reassures the conservatives although during his campaign many of his positions were close to those of the reformists and supporters of the Green Movement. Rouhani has called for “a government of moderation and justice,” and in his first press conference as President-Elect promised greater openness over Iran’s nuclear program, claiming “we have to enhance mutual trust between Iran and other countries,” adding, “we have to build trust.” Domestically, he will try to clean the house, and is likely to push for more social and political freedom.

Even many of the hardliners recognize that the country is in dire situation. Mounting economic problems, the vast corruption that has always existed in the Islamic Republic, but spiraled out of control over the past eight years, the crippling economic sanctions, and all the regional wars and revolutionary movements have given rise to a nation that is restless and demands deep changes.

The Iranian nation demonstrated its utter maturity by rejecting the calls by some, particularly in the Diaspora, to boycott the election and demonstrated once again that it prefers gradual change over radical regime change espoused by outside forces. If Rouhani managed to resolve the standoff with the West over Iran’s nuclear program, convince the hardliners to release all the political prisoners, particularly the trio of the Green Movement leadership, and open up the political system, he would put Iran back on a positive and constructive path. Whether or not the opposition to Rouhani will allow him to do so remains to be seen.