We’re definitely not still stuck in the Cold War (although sometimes it feels that way), but there are some doozies from the mid-1900s that are worth remembering.
In May 1997, the Central Intelligence Agency released a wave of highly-anticipated documents on some of the agency’s most infamous Cold War activities. One of the unveiled documents, entitled “A Study of Assassination,” provides a look at the tactics, strategy and logistics behind agency-sponsored assassinations.
“A Study of Assassination” is a window into an age, one very much like ours, in which the agency viewed itself as a quick and nimble force that can better serve the president than the “lumbering, bureaucratic Pentagon” (Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, 11). And, like the CIA of yesteryear, today’s agency does a lot more than collect intelligence: It’s running a good chunk of our drone program as well.
The following “lessons” from the guide may be more closely connected than we think to an entirely different program: the U.S. drone program. Here are a few examples of how advice from the guide can tie into the past decade or so of drone strikes.
1.) Don’t attempt to assassinate anyone if you’re “morally squeamish.”
Killing is not for the faint of heart. “[A]ssassination can seldom be employed with a clear conscience,” notes the manual. “Persons who are morally squeamish should not attempt it.”
While it is true that “assassination and targeted killings are very different acts,” as Gary Solis notes, this very same “moral squeamishness” does come into play in today’s drone-executed targeted killings as well — and for good reason.
The Obama administration’s — and the president’s personal — discomfort with the U.S. drone program has come to the fore, mostly by way of leaks. Although the program has expanded since Obama took office in 2009, the administration has tried to implement various measures to the president to improve the moral calculation associated with strikes. Some examples include giving the president oversight of the so-called “kill lists,” establishing a five-point plan to determine when a strike can be carried out, and clarifying a preference for capture.
Of course, what the manual overlooks is that “moral squeamishness” is an entirely healthy psychological response, but that’s probably intentional.
2.) Don’t write anything down.
Put your kill lists away as they’re bad for plausible deniability. Committing communications to paper is a dangerous practice; therefore, “[n]o assassination instructions should ever be written or recorded.”
Plausible deniability didn’t just serve Cold War-era administrations — it’s been a key part of the drone program as well. The drone program has been split between the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the CIA, where the covert actions of the latter cannot be legally acknowledged. Attempts to improve transparency by shifting drone operations, as the administration planned to do, from the CIA to JSOC has been met with significant resistance.
For those countries where drones operate, particularly Pakistan, retaining their distance has been critical. Officially, Pakistan has opposed the violation of airspace. Behind closed doors, however, the story has been a bit different. Pakistan has jointed approved high-value targets, including some previously sheltered by the ISI.
3.) Don’t limit yourself to just “standard” weaponry.
The CIA’s assassination manual details a number of choice “weapons” that can be used in extrajudicial killings. Many of these are expected (firearms), others less so (lamps, fire pokers, screwdrivers).
Like an elite paramilitary force, drones have provided the United States with unprecedented access to regions traditionally inaccessible to manned aircraft and ground troops, but we’re not ready for an all-drone army, yet. The U.S. military also has a number of other options at its disposal as well, from using special forces to work on kill-capture missions to waging cyber attacks against terrorist infrastructure.
But one of the main failings of both programs is not placing enough focus on “non-lethal” operations. In the case of today’s drone program, given the controversy surrounding it, a holistic counterterrorism program that focuses on ending the threat in a multifaceted way would be far more effective. Improving education and limiting poverty may not be a “weapon” traditionally associated with militaristic counterterrorist activity, and it’s certainly up for debate.
Debate aside, is it worth trying? Certainly.
