Traditionally the deployment of U.S. armed forces into a conflict zone is one of the most difficult and controversial in U.S. foreign policy. In general, it is often stated that vital national interests that are at stake and the potential political risks as well as costs of a deployment of U.S. armed forces are among the determining factors for such action. Starting in the 1990s we have seen a remarkable evolution from Somalia, after which humanitarian intervention seemed likely to disappear as an international strategy, to Kosovo, where the humanitarian agenda has not only been fully incorporated into foreign policy but has even been extended to post-intervention nation-building, and just recently in 2011 to Libya, where the UN Security Council approved a ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians. In the latter case the representatives of China and the Russian Federation abstained but did not block any action as in the case of Syria.
The question whether a UN Security Council resolution (Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations) is required in any of the aforementioned cases is dependent on someone’s legal view of the relationship between non-intervention in domestic affairs (one of the key principles mentioned in Art. 2 (7) UN Charter) and humanitarian intervention (not in the UN Charter per se but it could be viewed as international customary law by now). I am not going to address this question here because this essentially legal issue is overlaid with a political discussion. The voting pattern in the UN Security Council is a clear reflection of that.
What I will try to address here is why there has not been an U.S. humanitarian military intervention in Syria yet. Humanitarian military interventions can obviously be justified on humanitarian grounds. However, this does not explain why the U.S. was willing to initiate humanitarian military interventions in general and why there were a certain selectivity even though in some instances the atrocities committed and the level of violence were quite similar. In order to explain this seeming selectivity, we need to examine the following question: Why does the U.S. fail to protect human life in some places but does intervene militarily to stop similar human rights abuses in other places? To be very clear, my intention is to explain past U.S. decision-making in order to understand when the same decisions may be made again in the future.
In a recent Canadian editorial piece, Haroon Siddiqui asked himself exactly that: Given that there are daily massacres of civilians in Syria, “why is there no international military intervention, as there was in Serbia in 1999 and, more pertinently, Libya last year?” Siddiqui argues that President Bashar Assad’s regime is “anchored in the Ba’thist ideology and multiple centers of power such as his minority Alawi community, the military forces and a dozen security services“. Especially the latter tells the story of a highly regulated and controlled civil society under a strong, authoritative presidency. He goes on by naming Bashar Assad’s supposed friends – Russia, China, Iran and Hezbollah (Lebanon) – and by pointing out that Syria does not lend itself to air strikes given that a population of approximately 20 million people lives on about 185,000 square kilometers. That is all very different from the situation in Libya where Gadhafi – with no real friends – ran a nearly ten times larger desert country – even though in comparison far less populated (six million people). He then writes about the “combustible neighborhood“.
I would describe it as a highly volatile geopolitical as well as geographic neighborhood with plenty of complex security issues which may constrain the appetite for intervention tremendously. Syria is located on the eastern Mediterranean, sharing a border in the north with Turkey – especially with its Kurdish population in southeast Turkey – and Iraq in the east with the adjacent Kurdish region of northern Iraq – with its Kurdish nationalist movement and vast oil reserves around Mossul. Both could become even more a source of tension as the “internal“ conflict within Syria drags on. Then there is to the southwest Lebanon which is not exactly a beacon of stability itself. Finally, we have Jordan and Israel to the south. In this respect it is crucial to note that there is still no peace treaty between Syria and Israel. Thus, we have an ongoing – Israel has occupied the Golan Heights since the 1967 war – but in a sense ’frozen’ and therefore stable conflict between these two countries. In sum, as outlined here I also see a lot of cross-border conflict potential in the future due to unresolved issues and Siddiqui was right to hint at them.
Siddiqui then evaluates what he calls “constraints on those most likely to intervene“ and looks at the crucial actors. He argues that the “U.S. has no interest in getting involved in a third war“ with a Muslim nation – especially with no UN Security Council mandate by the international community in sight. Given that the U.S. was willing to intervene in Kosovo and Libya should put to rest any arguments giving the decision a ’religious coloring’ of whatever nature. I think in the case of Syria the U.S. presidential elections in November 2012, the currently low levels of media coverage as well as the low degree of public support, and above all the low chance of a quick success – for example with air strikes given the geography and a densely populated country – along the lines of the “Powell Doctrine“ are the most constraining factors. In essence, the “Powell Doctrine“ postulates, as summerized by Doug DuBrien, “that military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security by the intended target; the force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy; there must be strong support for the campaign by the general public; and there must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged”.
So yes, much of the above explains why the “world” is observing and waiting for the U.S. to act. Well, a familiar pattern. Consequently, Siddiqui put forth some very valid arguments in his editorial piece “why Syria is not being bombed” right now. However, all those aforementioned constraints may be thrown out the window once large refugee flows directly affect key U.S. allies in a region. This is also the logic that best explains why the U.S. has intervened in Kosovo (1999) or Libya (2011) but not yet in Syria: The U.S. has the political will – beside the prerequisite of humanitarian impulses – to launch American humanitarian military interventions only if at least the following two-part determinant applies; namely, only if the U.S. as the major power is directly or at least indirectly affected in a negative way by the spread of internal turmoil and violence into neighboring states or states in the region – typically key strategic U.S. allies – through large refugee flows that have the potential to endanger regional security and economic stability in the whole region. In 1999 the European Union – Germany and others – experienced large refugee flows from Kosovo after having already admitted refugees from Bosnia (1993) earlier in the decade. Macedonia, a direct neighbor of the then Kosovo province was overwhelmed by ethnic Albanian refugees threatening to destabilize the whole country and by extension the EU which is a crucial economic region for U.S. trade with plenty of key U.S. allies in the region. In the case of Libya (2011) not only were the refugee flows from Libya to Italy decisive in the decision-making but also the fact that Libya is a crucial oil-exporting country and its production immensely important for world supply and Europe in particular.
To make it very clear, refugee flows do not matter much unless key U.S. allies are directly affected by them and therefore the U.S. as sole superpower with global interests and global reach is indirectly affected as well. The link here is economic globalization and the expansion of the concept of `security`. The gravest dangers to U.S. security – military and economic – are no longer military threats from rival great powers, but rather transnational threats emanating from poorly performing developing countries that are connected to humanitarian catastrophes, mass migration and/or regional instability. Eventually a ‘spillover effect’ in the form of cross-border spillovers – especially in a region that is crucial for the world’s energy needs – may hurt all industrialized countries economically. Refugees are a political risk and social as well as economic burden to the host country. The presence of refugees further exacerbates conflict, tension and insecurity in general. Just think of the so-called Palestinians refugees in Jordan or Syria. Thus, the underlying reasoning is that the threat of refugees must be regarded similar to an accelerator, making this threat directly relevant to all states in a region because of the potential fragmentation dynamics – dragging all into a messy conflict with usually nationalistic and potentially religious (here Sunni–Shia divide) ingredients.
So, let me give you the scenario under which the U.S. may launch a so-called humanitarian military intervention: The internal turmoil and violence within Syria widens and refugees start pouring across international borders into northern Iraq and southeast Turkey. The Kurdish nationalist movement may want to seize this opportunity in turmoil and destabilize the fragile governance structure in Iraq as well as reignite Turkey’s Kurdish problem. This could start a dangerous downward spiral especially given the ongoing severe geopolitical tensions around Iran’s nuclear program. In this respect, I should note that Syria serves as a perfect distraction for Iran allowing it to flex its military muscles and to threaten, for example, Turkey. Siddiqui wrote in his article about a warning by Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, “that should Turkey join a NATO attack on Syria, Iran would bomb American and NATO bases in Turkey“. At the same time, another power in the region trying to determine the right time for action may use the same distraction to its advantage.
In conclusion, this is a scenario nobody can have an interest in. Currently, Syria has its hands full with preserving its regime. If this internal conflict does not spread to neighboring countries with the destabilizing effect of refugee flows, the United States will not intervene given its primary national interest in regional stability. A known commodity like Assad is better than an unknown successor in a turbulent transition with the potential of a ‘Hamas-like’ outcome as experienced in the Gaza strip previously. However, if large refugee flows occur across international borders, those will not only endanger regional security and economic stability in the region but will also indirectly affect the U.S. negatively by way of its European allies. Besides, key resources crucial for the world economy such as oil and gas would creep higher and stay high due to protracted geopolitical risks and widespread regional instability. Notwithstanding its relative modest production of crude oil (according to EIA about 400,000 barrels per day in 2010 with most of it being exported to Europe) and natural gas, Syria’s geographic location is strategic in terms of regional security and prospective energy transit routes. In this respect, we have to view Syria in connection with the expansion of a pipeline network to eventually connect the natural gas suppliers Iraq and Egypt – the latter through an extended Arab Gas pipeline as a way to diversify the supply – to the planned Nabucco pipeline in Turkey which would then deliver natural gas to U.S. allies in Europe. This project is in the U.S. national interest because it would lessen its European allies’ dependence on Russian energy. As for the Nabucco natural gas pipeline project, however, recent reports surfaced suggesting that rising construction costs and a lack of concrete supply agreements from countries such as gas-rich Azerbaijan might shelve the project. That remains to be seen just like it remains to be seen whether the U.S. will eventually intervene on ‘humanitarian grounds’. As I have outlined above there may be certain compelling factors at work in the future to justify an intervention on grounds of vital U.S. national interests – indispensable for acting on any humanitarian impulses.
