There are administrations that have been undermined as a result of disasters, but others have emerged from crises more powerful than before. The difference lies in how disasters and crises are handled. Taiwan is predisposed to earthquakes and storms and is experienced in handling the typhoon season that hits the island at this time every year. While Taiwan’s government should be accustomed to dealing with such adversity, the devastation brought about by Typhoon Morakot has caught the island off guard. Morakot caused the country’s worst flooding in 50 years, bringing over 2.5 meters of rain in just three days. It brought more than half the average annual rainfall in many places in Taiwan, two-thirds in the worst affected areas. The death toll has now reached 118 with over 500 still missing, 400 of which are from Hsiaolin village in southern Taiwan who are believed to be buried under a 20-30 meter deep avalanche of mud.
On the political front, President Ma Ying-jeou of the Republic of China and his cabinet are blamed for not doing enough, being too slow to realize the magnitude of the emergency and for the slow rescue and relief processes. Having been hit by the typhoon since 8th of August, some survivors said that their villages have not had any food dropped off by helicopters. Upon reviewing the rescue efforts thus far, experts on emergency rescue and relief criticized the lack of proper gear, equipment and technology for the rescue missions. Already, four rescuers’ lives have been claimed, including a volunteer who was properly trained and had 16 years of rescue experience.
Serious questions directed at the present administration and its capacity to govern have been raised. Why didn’t the central and local governments give the people sufficient warning? Why weren’t people evacuated in time? Local officials explain that, under Taiwan’s present legal system, local governments can only urge residents to abandon their homes if a disaster is foreseen. Even then, villagers of Hsiaolin said they did not receive such warning or instructions to evacuate.
The fact that the government had trouble realizing the magnitude of the problem and coordinating an appropriate response was blatantly revealed when President Ma and his cabinet refused U.S. aid, only to quickly reverse themselves. When the U.S. offered assistance on August 12th, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Henry Chen indicated that Taiwan would not request foreign assistance because the island was capable of handling the disaster relief work on its own. On the same day, President Ma, his cabinet and the legislative speaker stated that there was no need to declare a state of emergency. Ma argued that the newly ratified Disaster Prevention and Relief Act incorporated many of the elements of the state of emergency. Ma’s cabinet also stated that there was enough money for rescue and relief. However, on the following day, the same government began requesting donations, foreign aid and considered updating the Disaster Prevention and Relief Act to incorporate guidelines for compulsory evacuation. By August 14th, the emergency operation chief was replaced. What’s also remarkable is Taiwan’s refusal of specific technical assistance from the neighboring People’s Republic of China, which offered help since the 10th of August. Shouldn’t humanitarian efforts be a priority over political considerations in times of emergency? Rather, Taiwan asked the U.S. and Japan to send giant cargo helicopters that can carry large earth diggers and other machinery into remote mountain areas to help re-open roads.
Other related policy issues concern riverine and land management. Why were people allowed to build, farm on and enjoy unrestricted use of dangerous hillside lands? This leads us to question the effectiveness of existing disaster prevention mechanisms and the quality of existing infrastructure. Why weren’t sufficient equipment and facilities for times of emergency available?
These questions hit deep into the heart of Taiwanese politics, raising further questions about possible corruption and officials’ neglect of their duties. Why did southern Taiwan flood even though billions had been spent by the government on flood prevention? Despite the fact that the administration of ex-President Chen Shui-bian had earmarked US$2.5 billion to prevent flooding—a budget was later increased to US$5 billion—low-lying areas in southern Taiwan were swamped during Typhoon Morakot. Did the contractors collude with officials during the construction of these projects?
Another deep-rooted problem of Taiwanese politics revealed by the disaster is the relations between northern and southern Taiwan. The areas affected by Morakot are remote farmlands inhabited by Taiwan’s indigenous people, Austronesians, related in language and heritage to indigenous people in the South Pacific and parts of south-east Asia. These inhabitants have long felt neglected by the government, which they claim has allotted more funding and resources to the north inhabited mainly by those who moved from mainland China to Taiwan after the Chinese civil war in 1949. Indigenous people are also some of the poorest in Taiwan, with shorter life expectancy and higher unemployment than the national average. Many of the working-age people had gone to the cities to find work, leaving behind mostly elderly people and young children.
The test of the current administration’s governing capacity will continue long after the day Morakot hit Taiwan. The Transportation Ministry estimates that repairs in the worst affected areas will likely take up to three years to complete. Morakot has caused at least US$225 million in agricultural damages alone, with nearly 30,000 houses still without power and 750,000 homes without water. If infrastructural damages are included, the total amount of damages could reach US$910 million. Reconstruction is expected to cost some US$3.65 billion. As a democracy based on the rule of law, the current government under the Kuomintang political party must be accountable to the people by ensuring a high level of transparency when investigating the causes of such extensive casualties. Already, President Ma has taken the crucial first step in taking full responsibility for the delays of the rescue efforts and for not having done enough. To correct its mistakes, the government must move on to re-evaluate and assess policies and laws related to flood prevention, especially those associated with land and industry development, criteria for infrastructure construction and city planning. More importantly, the government must handle the reconstruction of the destroyed villages effectively and resettle the survivors quickly.
