Is Turkey Moving Away from the West? A Critical Redux (by Miguel Vargas)

Dear FPA Blog followers,

You might know that I feature some analyses and articles not published elsewhere for the benefit of this blog. This post is one of them; it is written by an exceedingly capable student of mine at Princeton – Miguel Vargas, whose final article for the course ‘International Relations of the Middle East’ provided more insight and sound analysis than much of the scholarship that comes out of Washington’s policy debate on Turkey and whether it is ‘moving away from the West’ or not.

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Is Turkey Moving Away from the West? A Critical Redux

by Miguel Vargas ([email protected])

According to Bulent Aliriza, the director of the Turkey Project at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies: “There is a ceiling above which Turkish-American relations cannot improve, and there’s a floor which it can’t go below…We are getting pretty close to the floor and the ability of the two countries to improve their relations really has a huge question mark over it. We are now talking about an undeclared crisis in the relations.”[i] He is not alone however in this assessment, as State Department officials such as Philip Gordon have echoed Aliriza’s remarks. [ii] But to what is extent is this true? Has Turkey moved away from the West? In short, no. While Turkey is expanding Eastward, forging a new strategic set of economic and diplomatic alliances in an attempt to become the hegemonic influence of the Muslim world, it is not abandoning nor interested in leaving its still strategically necessary ties to the West.

Some of Turkey’s recent behavior is consistent with the idea of Western abandonment however.  According to Ariel Cohen, a senior research fellow at The Heritage foundation,  “since taking power in a landslide democratic election in 2002, the Just and Development Party, or AKP, is leading Turkey in a new direction both domestically and in terms of foreign policy.”[iii] This new direction, Cohen further attests, includes “rapprochement with Iran; working more closely with the Islamist regime of Sudan despite the indictment of its president on genocide chargers; supporting Hamas movement which rules Gaza; and fostering stronger ties with” two of the West biggest rivals in China and Russia.[iv]

This latter alliance is particularly surprising, as the former Soviet Union was one of Turkey’s earliest enemies and one of the sources, if not the original source, of Turkey’s alliance with the United States. [v] Nevertheless, after 32 years without a visit from a Russian president, Turkey received Vladimir Putin in December of 2004; this meeting was the first of many more high-level politician contacts between the two nations as each not only shared business but also geopolitical interests. [vi] As of 2008, Russia is Turkey’s largest trade partner with a projected trade volume of $100 billion dollars between 2008 and 2013. [vii] Further, bounding these two nations together is Turkey’s $20 billion investment in 2010 for the Russian construction of nuclear plant to be built on Turkey’s southern coast.[viii] Not only does this new relationship provide realist economic benefits for Turkey, but it also secured peaceful relations between the two former enemies that allow for Turkey’s greater mission of becoming the hegemonic influence of the Middle East. [ix]

But what is the motivation behind such expansion? According to Stephen Larrabee, while “ the AKP’s Islamic roots have influenced Turkish policy, [it]… has not been the driving force behind it.”[x]  Rather, Turkey’s new alliances and expansions can be credited to Turkey’s new foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and his “Strategic Depth” foreign policy. According to Larrabee, holder of the Distinguished Chair in European Security,  “the concept of Strategic Depth is part of a larger debate in Turkey about the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.”[xi]  Ever since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the Turkish Republic in 1923, Kemalists have sought to attach a negative image to Turkey’s Ottoman legacy. Kemalists argue that Turkey’s Ottoman heritage including its public identification with Islam is inherently backwards and as such an inhibitor to Turkey’s modernization.[xii]

However, as Larrabee points out, just as the AKP have brought back Islam back to politics in Turkey, today “many Turks have begun to view the Ottoman Empire in more nuanced and positive terms. They see aspects of the Ottoman legacy, particularly its emphasis on multicultural identities, as potential building blocks for a more active regional and global role for modern Turkey.”[xiii] Instead of seeing the Kemalist Republic era and its avoidance of the rest of the Middle East as an example, these Turks have instead viewed this era as an anomaly. [xiv]  Thus, the policy of “Strategic Depth” is a means of reinstating Turkey, the once center of the Ottoman Empire, as the dominant power in the Middle East. Though Turkey has no intention of physically expanding and conquering these nations, the AKP instead seeks to become the hegemonic influence of the Muslim world through diplomatic and economic ties.[xv]

As such, Turkey is not holding back in its formation of new allies.  While Cohen believes that Turkey would oppose any strengthening of the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, recent evidence suggests otherwise.[xvi] According to Turkish international relations expert Soli Ozel, given the instability of Iraq, especially in the face of a US withdrawal, and “the fact that relations with Bagdad are rotten now, it now transpires that the Kurds are the Turk’s natural allies in Iraq. They are the second largest export market, and…if you include informal trade, they may very well be the first.”[xvii] Furthermore, Turkey’s geopolitical position with regards to the shipment and sale of Iraqi oil and gas has drastically changed the manner by which the Turkish government deals with the northern Iraqi Kurds; the relationship between leaders of these two states is vastly different today than it was in the past.[xviii] While talks of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq used to strike fear in the Turkish leadership, who believed that their own Kurdish populations would follow suit, today Turkey  fails to reply with any opposition upon hearing such rhetoric. [xix] Given the instability of the Iraqi state and the large presence of Kurds in Turkey, an economic alliance with the Northern Iraqi Kurds makes strategic sense, as such alliance would effectively deter the PKK’s ability and desire to destabilize the Turkish state.

To the apparent dismay of the West, Turkey has also extended support to the Iranian regime. According to Cohen,  “above all else, it is Turkey’s support for Iran’s nuclear program that proves to Washington that Turkey’s foreign policy objectives are changing. [Whereas] Ankara, was once an important ally in helping to contain Iran, [today, Turkey] has become a friendly diplomatic ally of the Islamist dictatorship in Tehran.”[xx] However, like Robert Wexler, president of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, suggests Turkey’s relationship with Iran does not appear to be intended to undercut American foreign policy on Iran.[xxi] Instead, it seems that Turkey may have actually believed that it was doing what Americans wanted them to do, as Turkey, like America, does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapons program. [xxii] This position makes more sense as both Iran and Turkey have goals of becoming the Middle East’s hegemonic power, and Iran’s nuclear attainment would undermine all of Turkey’s influence on the region.[xxiii] Thus, the difference between American and Turkish foreign policy with Iran appears to be a difference in means, not ends.

According to Wexler, “America and Turkey share the same objective but have a fundamentally different view as to how to get there. Turkey has regional interests that may at times be different from American interests. The challenge is to take those differences and channel them in a positive way. In the case of the Security Council vote, however, the channeling was anything but positive.”[xxiv] Furthermore, by appearing defiant to Western regimes, Turkey can appear to be an independent Muslim power and further its influence within the Middle East. After all,  “Turkey’s new foreign policy concept is to emerge as regional hegemony through developing economic presence, interdependence, and a conspicuously important diplomatic role. “[xxv]

One of the only nations to which Turkey has not extended a friendly hand to is its former ally: Israel. After the tragic Israeli raid and murder of several activists on the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish ship carrying humanitarian relief to the Palestinians, Turkey has “gradually abandoned its role as a neutral mediator between Israel and its Arab neighbors and instead has become an active supporter of Arab and Muslim causes against Israel.”[xxvi] This shift in alliances did not occur without granting Israel a chance to redeem itself. According to Gul Tuysuz, after the raid Turkey offered Israel an ultimatum: apologize for the raid, pay compensation to the victims, and lift the blockade on Gaza or face reduced diplomatic relations, the departure of the Israeli ambassador in Turkey, and possible prosecution on behalf of the International Court of Justice. [xxvii] After refusing to apologize, “Turkey made good on its threat to eject the ambassador and downgrade relations.”[xxviii] Furthermore, when Turkey rewrote the Red Book, an assessment of Turkey’s national security threats, Iran was taken off its critical threats list and Israel’s name was put in its place. [xxix] In sum, as “President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan hastened to clarify … ‘[Turkey’s] friendship with Israel is over.’”[xxx] Making sense of this move is a bit more difficult, as hostility to Israel does not favor an alliance with the West. However, like Turkey’s apparent defiance at the UN, hostility to Israel may also advance Turkey’s popularity in the rest of the Middle East. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, this behavior may have actually arisen from a Western source.

In order to arrive at the thesis of this paper, we must analyze all of Turkey’s foreign policy movements in a greater context as otherwise the evidence seems clear that Turkey is going East.[xxxi] The reality of the matter is that Turkey is seeking to become a member of the European Union, and that as such it is expected to behave as other European nations do.[xxxii] While scholars such as Ionnis N. Grigoriadis cite as “a milestone in the deterioration of US-Turkey relations…the refusal of the Turkish Parliament on March 1, 2003 to allow US troop the use of Turkish territory in preparation for their invasion in Iraq,”[xxxiii] such scholars fail to realize, as Tarik Oguzlu points out, that the absence of support from the European Union, particularly that of France and Germany, is considered to be one of the reasons as to why Turkey was reluctant to partake in the War in the first place.[xxxiv] Furthermore, the European Union as evidenced in the European’s Commission most recent progress report is not only in full support of Turkey’s foreign policy activism under its “Strategic Depth” but encourages it.[xxxv]

If Turkey’s foreign activism is not an indication of it moving away from the West, then what is? According to Ihsan Dagi, “in accusing Turkey of turning against the West…[critics] are mainly looking at Turkey’s critical position with Israel.”[xxxvi] While the Turkish government did call Israel’s attack of the Mavi Marmara “disproportionate ” and a “war crime,” Turkey was only joining the opinion of the body of nations it sought to join, as European states repeated the same comments regarding Israel’s atrocities in Gaza. [xxxvii] Furthermore, as Dagi points out, even if Turkey’s political stance towards Israel is out of line with that Europe and the United States, “why should it mean a departure from Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy orientation? Is Israel the West?”  Obviously, it is not, and, as such, Dagi indicates it would be a mistake to equate an aggressive stance against Israel with one against the West. [xxxviii]  “Turkey has never been this integrated with the West economically, socially, and politically. It is in fact breaking its self-imposed isolation and opening up the world around itself. …Turkey today is not bullying in its region but trying to establish cooperative relationships with Armenia, Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdish administration, Iran, Syria, Georgia, Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece.”[xxxix] According to Dagi, “Turkey has never become more Westernized in its foreign affairs.” [xl]

However, not everyone is convinced; after all, Europe is not the entire West.  According to Ian Lesser, “Turkey is now a place where public opinion counts…[During the Bush Administration], opinion polls point to a dramatic decline in public perceptions of the U.S. and Turkish views of American policy are among the most negative in Europe.”[xli] According to Ionnis N. Grigoriadis, “recent findings allude to the development of an emerging anti-US bias in large segments of Turkish society. This could presage the establishment of anti-Americanism as a permanent feature of Turkish political discourse…The deterioration of the US image in Turkey could be considered a result of the recent US political and military involvement in the Middle East and the perceived clash of US and Turkish national interests in the region….The election of Barack Obama has mitigated this trend but not reversed it.”[xlii] Continuing polls do not show promising signs.  President Obama’s gains in the first two years of his presidency (14%; 17%) have dropped to an all time low of 10%—merely a point better that president Bush worst rating upon leaving office.[xliii] “Despite a long and enduring alliance between the United States and Turkey, Turkey now ranks among the countries where the United States enjoys its least popularity. Although the shift of public opinion against the United Stated is not tantamount to a wholesale rejection of the US political and cultural model, it still has the potential to harm bilateral relations and US interests.”[xliv]

The publication by WikiLeaks of classified cables between Ankara and the United States embassy that portray Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu negatively have not aided the public opinion situation. [xlv] “However, while embarrassing, the leaked cables represent a diplomatic tempest in a teapot and not a serious crisis in bilateral relations.” [xlvi] Mid-level diplomats wrote these cables during the Bush administration—a time when strains in U.S.-Turkish relations were much worse than they are today. [xlvii]  Indicating a desirability for the West, “Davutoğlu has gone out of his way to downplay the significance of the leaks, stressing the close and cordial ties that exist at the highest level with U.S. officials in the Obama Administration, and both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama have publicly reiterated the importance that the United States attaches to good relations with Turkey.”[xlviii]

Despite the decline in public support inside of Turkey, according Joshua W. Walker, “it is clear that Turkey has not suddenly “switched sides” but rather still objectively represents America’s best ally…[as] Turkey represents a critical partner to the U.S. on its three most urgent strategic issues: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq.”[xlix]  According to David Ignatius, President Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan “have developed a working relationship that is one of the most important but least discussed developments shaping…the Arab world.”[l] After Turkey voted not in favor of, a previously mentioned, UN sanctions resolution against Iran in 2010, Obama and Erdogan discussed their foreign policy goals and established this new sense of partnership.[li] Sources from the White House claim that just in 2011 both of these leaders have spoken by phone 13 times.[lii]

Currently “the most delicate piece of Turkish-American business is trying to organize a peaceful transfer of power in Syria…[where] Erdogan, once the closest foreign ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is now a bitter foe. ”[liii] According to Ignatius, Turkey’s shift in policy towards Syria originates from a diplomatic negotiation failure where Erdogan promised Obama a reform deal within 72 hours that Syria left to dry.[liv] Even with Iran, Turkey has demonstrated that it has turned a new leaf, as Erdogan has recently agreed to “deploy forward-based radar system as part of a NATO missile defense plan aimed chiefly at Iran.“[lv] According to a senior Obama administrator, Erdogan’s signing of this missile defense plan  “is probably the biggest strategic decision between the U.S. and Turkey over the past 10 to 15 years.”[lvi]

Lastly — though no less important — is the issue of public support in Turkey. According to Ian Lesser, in order for public opinion of the United States to increase, the US must aid Turkey in its fight against the PKK. [lvii] Not surprisingly, “the administration has stepped up military cooperation and assistance to Turkey in its struggle against the PKK—Turkey’s number one security problem and a source of tension with the Bush Administration”[lviii] Furthermore, the Obama administration has recently entertained pleas from Turkey’s regime asking for a Predator drone base to deal with the PKK in Northern Iran and has supported Turkey’s desire to purchase drones of their own.[lix]  Combined with massive grants of intelligence and diplomatic support against the PKK, it is not surprising that commander of the Turkish armed forces, Gen. Iker Basbug has deemed the US and Turkish relationship “perfect.”[lx] Furthermore, the Obama administration has “strongly backed Turkey’s bid for EU membership, the rapprochement with Armenia, and the Erdogan government’s “Kurdish Opening”—three other important Turkish policy priorities.”[lxi]

According to Philip Gordon and Omer Taspinar,  “the most troubling of Turkey’s relationships with the West is that Ankara no longer has a fallback U.S. option in case its relations with EU sour. Turkish-US relations have become a casualty of the war in Iraq.” [lxii] Given what was just presented about Obama and Erdogan’s relationship, Gordon and Taspinar’s observations could not be farther from the truth. Rather, as Larrabee points out, “Turkey still wants and needs strong ties the United States.” [lxiii] Furthermore, “despite frustration at the slow progress, most Turkish politicians still insist EU membership is a goal worth pursuing, even if they have to wait many years to get there.”[lxiv]  Turkey benefits greatly both from the military assistance it gains from the US and the economic gains in energy and business deals with Europe. [lxv] Thus, Turkey has a strategic interest in remaining with the West for the benefit of its security and its economy. However, there is no denying that Turkey’s “Strategic Depth” plan of expansion East is also providing it large strategic benefits. Regarding the West, the more influential Turkey is in the Middle East, the higher the likelihood that the US will continue supporting it militarily and that the EU will not reject Turkey’s ascension.

However, Turkey’s expansion East is also providing it other strategic benefits similar to those it gains from the West.  “Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East has been accompanied by ‘soft power’ and the expansion of economic relations. Growing tourism from Arab states, coupled with cultural interactions –mainly with the popularity of Turkish soap operas –has improved the image of Turkey in the Middle East. While Turkey’s trade with Arab countries stood at $6.5 billion in 2000, it reached $35 billion in 2011. Last year approximately 1.5 million Arab tourists visited Turkey.”[lxvi] Furthermore, its popularity has increased incredibly; one poll conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation found that among Middle Eastern citizens, 78% have at least a somewhat favorable view of the nation, 71% believe it should have a larger role in the region, and 61% thought of Turkey as a role model. [lxvii] What does this money and influence translate to—Davutoğlu the designer of Turkey’s long term plan “Strategic Depth” frames Turkey’s strategic, or realist, goals best: “A new Middle East is about to be born. We will be the owner, pioneer and servant of this new Middle East.”[lxviii]  Turkey is neither leaving nor interested in leaving the West, for the West provides Turkey the security and stability it needs to dominate the East.