The US-Japan Security Treaty Turns 50

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan, what many perceive to be the cornerstone document of the US-Japan Alliance, was inked on January 19, 1960 – exactly 50 years ago, yesterday.

This anniversary comes at time when some analysts, both American and Japanese, point to the modern nadir of the Alliance, with negotiations over the security arrangement faltering, and two freshman administrations at odds over the future course of the once “bar-none” Alliance.

Skeptics of the alliance point to the showdown over the relocation of American military bases and personnel in Okinawa (what some have dubbed “The New Battle of Okinawa”); Japan’s growing regional initiatives vis-a-vis China; and the domestic agenda of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as evidence of drift.

While there is indeed cause for alarm, and these issues are thorny ones to be sure, much of this anxiety, particularly as it is articulated by Japan’s media and America’s Japan-hands, is alarmist and misguided.

Yesterday’s anniversary proceedings should put things into perspective.

These critics would be wise to look closely at the commemoration proceedings of the Security Treaty, as both sides of the Alliance have unequivocally reaffirmed their commitment to the Alliance and, in my opinion, done much to quell fears of an all out breakdown.

Of course, these statement offered yesterday were nothing if not expected, and do smack of a sort of banality reserved only for 50th anniversaries of bilateral treaties. But more importantly, they demonstrate an unfaltering resolve to work together – however that may be, and however long it may take – that will temper the debate over the US-Japan security apparatus in the months and weeks to come (or at least until May, when Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has promised a policy position).

Indeed, there is now talk of an Alliance Makeover.

Mr. Hatoyama stated in his address that “the Japan-U.S. security alliance has contributed to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.” He continued on to state that the presence of the U.S. forces in Japan will continue to “function as a public good by giving a strong sense of security to countries in the region.”

President Obama also chimed in with praise: “As we celebrate the anniversary of the treaty, we pay tribute to its role in supporting regional security and prosperity, and strengthening our two democracies. Let us now undertake to renew our alliance for the 21st century and enhance the bonds of friendship and common purpose that unite our nations.”

The real story though is that the Foreign and Defense ministers of Japan, Okada Katsuya and Toshimi Kitazawa respectively, and U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and Defense Secretary Gates said the two countries will reduce “the impact of bases on local communities, including Okinawa,” while endorsing ongoing efforts to maintain deterrent capabilities. This is a sign of real, tangible progress in the negotiations, and demonstrates a bona fide resolve to make good on the renegotiation efforts, albeit in baby steps.

While the climate in Washington regarding the Alliance is changing, slowly but surely, towards patient support, Tokyo’s position is fractured and prisoner to a weighty domestic agenda. Indeed, Japan’s goodwill no doubt springs from a domestic wake-up call (a rude awakening for the DPJ, to be sure) that a major overhaul of Japan’s security policy is virtually impossible in the current political climate. As Robert Madesen and Brad Glosserman have shown in an excellent PacNet article, Japan’s aging population has little patience for lofty rhetoric on regional security, when they are bogged down by a litany of domestic problems, a flailing economy foremost among them. With an upper-house parliamentary election around the corner and the top party brass embroiled in controversy, the Hatoyama is left with little recourse but to maintain the status quo. This puts him in the unfortunate position of having to shy away from campaign promises and take flack from some in his coalition government – i.e. the socialist party of Japan. But as Michael Cucek has noted, the Socialist Party is taking a much more moderate stance than is often displayed in media reports, and a working site for base relocation, one that at least pleases those in Tokyo (who knows about Okinawans), might not be far off.

In other words, the US-Japan Alliance is a simple matter of dollars and cents: it is economically unfeasible for Japan to foot the bill for its own defense, and as this reality descends on the DPJ ranks, the New Battle for Okinawa, and in turn the fundamental underpinnings of the US-Japan Alliance, will be smoothed out.

In the meantime, Washington would be apt to take a moderate stance on the issue, and strive to give Mr. Hatoyama and his team the time and resources necessary to make sense of their policies. In the words of Madsen and Glosserman, “the United States should not dwell on the fact that Japan has no alternative to the bilateral partnership but rather seek to enhance the mutual confidence that underlies it.”

This lends further credibility to the notion that US-Japan Alliance is suffering from a case of the freshman jitters, as I have noted here before.