The Story of Reconciliation in Afghanistan: Describing the Three-Headed Beast

The news of reconciliation in Afghanistan is nothing less than three-headed Cerberus, internally conflicted and unruly.  One head: the Karzai story, pushed about in the major media outlets, that NATO is helping broker preliminary, testy, exchanges that might well precede a contested power-sharing agreement. The second, reported by the BBC is that the Taliban are in fact ready to negotiate.  Nearly ten years of fighting has exhausted all parties to the fight at hand.  The third, reported today on the eve of Eid-ul Adha, that Mullah Omar will not negotiate and will instead fight ISAF throughout the land till NATO withdraws out of Afghanistan.

Talk of negotiation is ramping up because the Obama administration thinks it necessary to draw up a feasible plan to exit with dignity, this given the electoral “shellacking” it recently received with barely a flexed muscle.  A sullen defeat, stretched out over time, tanks rolling on into adjacent border, replaying the recent Soviet past, will not do– especially with an opposition ascendant waiting by the sidelines for news of stubborn, drowning failure.

Instead, President Obama’s July  2011 conditions based drawdown has become the thrust of his national security policy. What combination of policy and military instruments is he to use?  De jure drawdown with 50 thousand or more troops left behind, a training contingent of soldiers and diplomats?  Hence the U.S and NATO has stood next to Karzai’s calls to Afghan nationalism and national reconciliation. It is one part posturing to show strength, that Karzai can stand without U.S. support–indeed that the U.S. and its NATO allies are now in the business of reacting to his moves.  Another to show the Taliban that he is the man with whom to share out the trillions of dollars of mining deposit that were discovered.

NATO has happily gone along with the move; especially since Pakistan and its military has begrudging acceded into the talks as well.  As the nominal king-maker, tightly ensconced with the powerful war lord Jallaluddin Haqqani, the Pakistani military’s step into the ring is a welcome turn.  According to reports, the Taliban, in its turn, has put out feelers that it is now finally ready to negotiate.

Why is that so? Perhaps because ISAF’s stepped-up campaign to kill mid-level Talib has borne fruit: the Taliban are tired of replenishing their ranks of tested fighters with barely teenage boys.  Morale might be down; fear might have set in.  No doubt this is true for the vast majority of Talib– that is, if the story is true.  Further, if the Afghan military can settle into confidence and capability, the Taliban, in particular, the operational, mid-level coterie of that band of groups, might have to seek shelter. And why not, then find shelter with their tribal brothers, the Pashtun in Kabul?

The new Afghan military’s upright stride is the key to successfully dissolving American ties to Afghanistan.  Whether the military will become a credible and creditable force, remains unknown.  Perhaps boosting nationalist propaganda might do the trick.  But so far, that has been a hard sell.  And Afghan men of a capable age aren’t buying.

The lynchpin of a feasible argument for peace, on both sides, will turn on whether Taliban can uncouple its allegiance, as a host, and dethrone foreign Al Qaeda fighters.  This is possible though difficult.  In short: force the Taliban to disinvite Al Qaeda by laying out the irreconcilability of their opposing goals.  The American sponsors of the NATO intervention will walk away with their mission to deny Al Qaeda an operational home.  Nationalist, salafi, Afghans will be able to finally uncouple their insurgency from a widely despised alien globalist agenda.

Perhaps, seeing the writing on the wall, noticing that young Taliban are muttering amongst themselves, talking about surrender and a homebound life, Mullah Omar delivered an appeal to his international fans to support his cause against the invading army, a cause that he couched in terms of Muslim obligation.  (Never mind that the whole argument for a globalist jihad is a misapprehension of terms.)  Omar promised to fight ISAF throughout the land and that negotiation and reconciliation is fanciful talk of unreal things, just so many unicorns in the dreamscape of androids.

There is another way to view his missive.  He knows that the Taliban are being cut down. Hundreds are dying by the month as sorties to grab and kill insurgents have multiplied geometrically compared to similar moves last year.  He needs money and he needs men. Convenient then to speak of Islam and obligation.  It is no better, and  is much worse, than blackmail.  Your lord’s faith in you will remain wanting unless you help, Omar wants to say.  Were that no one would listen.