The Merkel Algorithm

Daniel Drezner seems dumbfounded by the German government’s actions on both the eurozone bailout and nuclear energy and proposes a Merkel Algorithm as the explanation:

1)  A problem festers;
2)  Dither and do nothing;
3)  Public opinion polls drop;
4)  Let things fester some more;
5)  Lose an election somewhere;
6)  Announce new policy that reverses prior position
7)  Lose even more political support.

The reported story outside of Germany on most of its government’s actions over the last few months (including Libya also) was one of collective consternation. While I am also an outside observer in the sense that I do not live in Germany anymore, I am German and keep up with the national media so let me try to explain what I rarely agree with either. Note that I cannot offer you an explanatory template, which I tend to believe does not exist anyway, but rather different individual reasons.

As – historical I guess – background information it should be noted that Merkel is a political Wetterhahn (weather vane). In a celebrated – or infamous depending on whom you talk to – speech at a party convention in Leipzig in 2003 she put forward a radical reform program of the social welfare system (what in the German discussion would be called neoliberal). Following her electoral victory in 2005 none of those plans were ever carried out. Part of this was due to the grand coalition that she was forced to form with the SPD but it also was clearly related to her unimpressive victory in a race against a completely discredited Schröder-government, which was largely seen as a repudiation of her reformist economic stance. Lange Rede, kurzer Sinn (long speech, short content) for Merkel to change political beliefs on the fly is nothing new.

I’ve written about the German government’s stance on the eurozone bailout before and I stand by (most of ) what I said. I believe the issue to be much more hyped in (inter-)national media than determinative in the voting booth. The dithering of the German government in my opinion is much more related to genuine doubts about bailouts and almost chronic fear of the emergence of a transfer union. This seems to be much more of an elite-driven policy and debate than a popular one. Yes, the tabloid Bild lived up to its xenophobic image. Yes, Merkel joined in the chorus. But at the end of the day Bild‘s importance has been decreasing and while much of the populace is against bailouts, it is also far from concerned enough to either change its vote or do much of anything else because of it. The ones really dominating the majority parties’ debate on this issue are eurosceptic and libertarian (in a bad translation from the European liberal) FDP-politicians as well as nationalist conservatives within both CDU and CSU. Both of these groups are pertinent parts of the CDU/CSU-FDP triumvirate member (and electoral) base, but their influence remains limited to slowing decision-making down (watering it down too) but not preventing it.

As far as the nuclear energy issue is concerned. It is one of the most contentious issues in German politics. Huge demonstrations ever since the 1980s have taken place annually. The emergence of the Green party in the German parliamentary system was too a large extent constructed on large parts of the German population’s sentiment towards nuclear energy. The SPD-Greens government had decided upon a phase-out of nuclear energy in 2002, the current German government prolonged that phase-out significantly this fall against public protests, majority opinion and under disputable constitutional circumstances. Faced with losing an election in Baden-Württemberg for the first time since 195? to a Green party whose surge in the polls was only abetted by the aftermath to Fukushima, Merkel in a panic-ridden decision decided to temporarily put on hold the – eight – older German nuclear power plants, ostensibly for security reasons. State elections in Baden-Württemberg suddenly had turned into a referendum (and was called such beforehand) on the usage of nuclear energy in Germany and after the CDU’s trouncing in one of its traditional strongholds, the government had little choice but follow through on their – implied – promise.

In short, what am I saying then? Merkel is leading an unpopular government dominated by in-fighting. She is easily swayed by popular opinion if it is vocal enough (as I have argued before). Yet, on each of these issues (I could have included Libya as well) there is a specific inherent logic at work which makes it impossible to put forward an all-explanatory overall template. Sorry.