Lebanese-Israeli violence following Saudi-Syrian summit in Beirut

Just days after Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah and Syria’s President Bashar Assad traveled to Beirut to quell the fears that another regional war was just around the corner, fighting broke out between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in Southern Lebanon. The trouble started when an Israeli battalion commander was killed (apparently by a sniper) and the IDF returned fire with artillery, killing two LAF soldiers and a Lebanese journalist.  For now, the violence has ceased and once again it is quiet on Israel’s northern front*.

*Sometimes it seems that Israel does not have borders, only fronts.

The IDF was in the area clearing brush from the border fence to improve their vision of the terrain. Lebanese officials claimed that the IDF had ventured into Lebanese territory, but the United Nations has stated that the IDF was in fact operating within its borders.

All eyes were on Hizballah for a reaction or possible escalation, but it appears that the shot did not come from the Hizballah, but from the LAF. Unless the shooting was some sort of premeditated move by the Resistance, the idea that it was just case of an overzealous LAF soldier (Shia or not) is plausible, as Hizballah is known for its calculating discipline, and this type of supremely risky action is uncharacteristic of the group.

If anyone should be familiar with the stakes, it is Hizballah. In 2006, the group captured two Israeli soldiers, and for the next 34 days, Israel unleashed hell on Lebanon, causing billions of dollars in damage and claiming hundreds of lives in the process. Given the tensions in the region at the moment, Israel could have easily responded in a similar fashion yesterday, especially with the killing of such a high-ranking officer.

The fact that Israel did not respond (with its so-called “Dahiya Doctrine”, where the IDF plans to punish the entire state of Lebanon for the actions of Hizballah without the any of the “restraint” it used in 2006) as such belies the notion that the Jewish State was spoiling for war with the Party of God. This tells us that Israel is comfortable with the status quo and that there is quite a bit of inertia to change things. This may also indicate a lack of confidence in Israeli officials in their ability to defend against what another war with Hizballah might bring.

Given Hizballah’s increased arsenal, even with Israel’s new “Iron Dome” missile defense system, the country is still vulnerable. For example, Hizballah launched about 4,000 rockets into Israel in the 2006 War. Flash forward to today, when Hizballah is thought to possess some 40,000 rockets; ten times the original amount launched in 2006. This time around, if the Iron Dome stops 80% of Hizballah’s 40,000 rocket barrage, we are looking at a situation where Israel is struck by twice as many rockets as before. This is not an improvement, and should comfort no one in Haifa and beyond. The lesson here is that Israel’s efforts should be focused on preventing Hizballah from acquiring weapons in the first place.

It also appears that Hizballah is not as inclined to tangle again with Israel as is commonly thought. Sayyed Nasrallah has been beating the drums for war for months, stating that his army is absolutely prepared for another go-round, and would in fact relish the opportunity. Also, various accounts have characterized Hizballah fighters as “chomping at the bit” for another fight with Israel. Yet even after a fatal mortar and helicopter attack on Lebanese soil, there was nothing. If there is ever to be a decent pretext for war, that was it. Yet still, all is quiet in the South.

Indeed, both sides talk tough, but it appears all the macho rhetoric was for deterrent purposes. And it appears to have worked.

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The shooting however, comes just days after Hizballah’s Hassan Nasrallah held a press conference stating that he expected the Hariri Tribunal to issue indictments against Hizballah members. This is the gasoline that brought Bashar Assad and King Abdullah running, hoping, with all of their power and influence, to extinguish the blaze before it starts.

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria were downright frosty in the wake of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. The Kingdom was furious with what many believed was a Syrian plot, and the Kingdom put its full weight behind helping the Lebanese rid themselves of their Syrian overlords.

The two Arab heavyweights remained hostile towards each other until 2009, when Damascus and Riyadh buried the hatchet and endorsed a new government for Lebanon. This time it would be run by Prime Minister Saad Hariri, the man’s whose father’s murder started the whole spat.

Hariri Jr. publicly blamed Damascus for his father’s death, and was a key figure in the Cedar Revolution, which ended the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. At the time, Hariri had the backing of Saudi Arabia and Washington, when both powers were hostile towards Syria. Eventually though, as the threat from Iran grew, the strategy in Washington was to pry Damascus away in order to isolate Tehran from its strongest ally. The price for this reconciliation was Lebanon, and now we are witnessing a full-steam resurgence of Syrian influence there. Short of having a standing army within its borders, it is widely believed that Syria is on its way to becoming every bit as strong in Lebanon as it had been in the not-too-distant past.

And a Syrian military presence in Lebanon is not out of the realm of possibility at this point. As Syria did with the PLO in 1975, they can make the case that they are the only force that can keep Hizballah under control. The difference today is that few people believe that Syria is the cure for Israel’s troubles with Hizballah. On the contrary, Syria is the root cause. Whatever the case, Bashar Assad continues to masterfully play his cards in a way that maximizes his few strengths: his influence with Iran and Hizballah.

From 2005 to 2009, Hizballah had free reign over Lebanon. But as Syria begins to reassert itself in there, it will also have to reassert its position vis a vis Hizballah. Assad wants to be the boss in Lebanon, and he wants Hizballah to be a useful tool in his arsenal, not an equal partner in some romantic struggle against Zionism. This is about power, and Nasrallah and Assad cannot both be in charge.

It is in this context that the Hariri tribunal is expected to issue indictments against Hizballah members. The charges are a tremendous blow to the Party of God, and suddenly Hizballah could use Syria’s help, which it gets.

Nasrallah’s strategy seems to be two-pronged:  get out ahead of the charges to weaken their impact, and blame the whole thing on Israel. If it is an Israeli plot, the goal would seem to be to drive a wedge between Nasrallah and Hariri. However, if this is the case, there is little chance of success, as Hariri has demonstrated his profound capacity for pragmatism, valuing Lebanese stability above all else. To reiterate, Hariri once very publicly blamed Syria for his father’s death, but after he saw the writing on the wall that his coalition was all alone in the world, he quickly reconciled, making no less than three trips to Damascus since taking office.

The visits of Assad and Abdullah to Lebanon were meant to ease tensions and buy time for Lebanon. Additionally, the presence of Assad is meant to signal his nation’s return to prominence in Lebanon. Together, maybe they can prevent another outbreak of violence akin to what we saw in 2006. However, with yesterday’s events in south Lebanon in mind, it’s clear that only Hizballah and Israel are capable of keeping the peace between them.