Re-Imagining America’s Security Presence in Iraq

Although months of debate, discussion and endless deliberation undoubtedly remain before a final pact is reached, “after weeks of wrangling and lots of US pressure [this deal] appears to be a breakthrough,” according to Al Jazeera’s Jane Arraf. At odds is the tough question of whether US military trainers would be civilian contractors or active US troops. Likewise there’s the prickly issue over the matter of granting legal immunity those remaining security personnel.

Undoubtedly, these are important concerns…however, as Alice Fordham notes in her post for the Post’s security blog “Checkpoint Washington,” more important considerations underlie recent US efforts to strong-arm their invitation to remain in country. Fordham cites preeminent MENA analyst Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), who believes that American troops need to continue operations along the border between the semi-autonomous (and oftentimes, more amenable) Kurdish region, while building a positive Iraqi-American security relationship through a military training presence.

I agree with Cordesman regarding the necessity of some small troop presence in Iraq. As he states, “We don’t need a large combat presence; we need Special Forces and perhaps some forces who would be effectively combat troops.” I also believe this is a lesson we ought to have learned ages ago…

Fighting “terrorism,” as defined by Iraqi insurgency, does not depend on a massive, population based counterinsurgency operations and cumbersome nation-building projects. These efforts that are designed to establish control are, in fact, the source of instability. The failure to grasp this vital counterintuitive has hampered our ability to pursue the real “terrorists” in Iraq — i.e. those who would employ violence against non-uniformed, non-combatants to achieve political ends. There’s a critical difference between matters of insurgency, and concerns of “terror.” As our adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, attempts to resurrect broken states catalyze both elements of violent resistance.

But America’s future in Iraq need not depend on a large ground presence, that is as unwieldy as it is unhelpful, in the fight against “terror” and the preservation of the fragile Iraqi state.