Newspaper editorials that recommend policies to foreign leaders and governments are almost invariably pointless and patronizing – in short, a waste of time. Do European publications, for instance, really think that President Barack Obama will be influenced by their views in dealing with the new Republican-led House of Representatives – or that Chancellor Angela Merkel pays attention to The Washington Post in running the German economy?
Of course, not.
Sometimes, however, such editorials are worse than a waste of time. They parade the newspaper’s ignorance and cross the borderline from patronizing to offensive. A case in point is an appallingly ill-informed editorial in The New York Times November 8 on the recent defense agreement between Britain and France, which was clearly written by someone with little or no knowledge of defense and strategic issues, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons.
One of the main thrusts of the editorial is that Britain and France don’t need nuclear deterrents, and that, if they are going to keep them, they should use money saved by their new cooperation on warhead testing to boost their conventional forces. The same should apply to savings from their plans to share aircraft carriers on a regular basis (not just “in times of crisis” as the NYT editorial wrongly states.)
The editorial contains the following astonishing statement: “The Pentagon can easily provide NATO with all the aircraft carriers and nuclear missiles it is ever likely to need.”
What on earth does this mean? NATO already has “shared” short-range, U.S.-made, theater nuclear weapons in Europe, but a number of European countries, notably Germany, are trying to get rid of them. There appears to be confusion here between theater missiles and strategic nuclear weapons, such as the British and French deterrents.
The NYT seems to be saying that France and Britain should scrap their nuclear deterrents – “weapons they do not really need,” in the editorial’s words – and rely on “the Pentagon” to provide NATO with nuclear missiles if necessary. But there is no way “the Pentagon” is going to provide NATO with a strategic deterrent. Although national strategic nuclear weapons are taken into account in forging alliance military strategy, NATO as such would have no control over their use, nor can one imagine it doing so in the future. The British and French governments have sole independent control over their deterrents (as, of course, does the United States.) Nor would it be up to the Pentagon to transfer intercontinental ballistic missiles to anyone else without reference to the highest political levels of U.S. national security decisionmaking.
Much the same applies to aircraft carriers. “NATO” is not going to ask to operate U.S. aircraft carriers, nor is it going to be provided with them. The latest Anglo-French agreement is intended to allow the two countries to keep running their own aircraft carriers more economically, still subject to their own political control. Nor is anyone suggesting that France or Britain might be provided with U.S. carriers if they needed them. Control over aircraft carriers, and even more over strategic nuclear weapons, remains the ultimate preserve of a country’s sovereignty. Indeed it is precisely to protect that ultimate sovereignty that countries like France and Britain go to such lengths to keep these weapons in their national arsenals.
By telling Britain and France that “they do not really need” nuclear weapons, the NYT seems unaware that it is endorsing a discredited policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament that has often been espoused by the extreme left, especially in Britain, but which both countries have consistently rejected ever since they have possessed nuclear weapons. It is idiotic for the NYT to stumble into this long-running debate in such an off-hand and ignorant manner.
The NYT editorialist also seems unaware of the political context of the Anglo-French agreement, arguing that money saved through cooperation on nuclear testing and carriers should “be used to expand the number of combat troops, trainers and peacekeepers they [Britain and France] can contribute to NATO missions like Afghanistan.” But the whole point of the plan is to save money in order to reduce budget deficits. If the money was simply spent elsewhere, it would frustrate the entire object of the painful and politically difficult exercise.
What the NYT really seems to be saying is that Washington wants more allied combat troops and trainers in Afghanistan, so Britain and France should scrap their nuclear deterrents to pay for them. This is not a particularly intelligent way to present the argument if it is to carry weight in Paris and London, which base their defense policies on their own, not Washington’s, interests. It also reveals ignorance of latest thinking in the U.S. military, which increasingly regards foreign troops in Afghanistan as a nuisance. The U.S. armed forces want to run their own show and are tired of having to support foreign forces that get into trouble and call in U.S. air strikes against the better judgment of U.S. commanders.
Finally, the editorial argues that strategic nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers are “20th-century prestige weapons” that do not meet the two countries’ “most pressing 21st-century military needs.” But the 21st century still has 90 years to go, and it would be foolish in the extreme to rely on an editorialist to make long range military planning decisions for the next three or four generations. If strategic missiles and aircraft carriers are scrapped, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get them back when conditions change – as they certainly will. Perhaps the NYT writer is unaware that the imminent acquisition of nuclear weapons capability by Iran is likely to lead to a proliferation of nuclear weapons in other Middle Eastern countries – hardly the best time for Britain and France to give theirs up.
There are a number of lessons here. First, editorials about whatever subject should be written by someone who knows something about it. Second, editorials should not ignorantly pontificate to foreign governments on issues with which the governments are far more familiar than the author. Third, before commissioning editorials, those in charge should ask themselves the following questions:
These rules, of course, should apply equally to European publications offering futile and ill-informed advice to the leaders of the United States.
