Nagorno-Karabakh timeline: 2009-2010

Radio Free Europe reports that the Iranian ambassador to Armenia has warned publicly against the insertion of US peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh in the event of a comprehensive settlement of the 1992-94 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  In a Yerevan news conference on June 23, Seyed Ali Saghaeyan claimed that the United States is eager to station troops in the Fizuli district, most of which was seized by Armenian forces during the war and remains occupied.  Fizuli borders Iran, and the ambassador maintained that the presence of US forces would constitute a threat.   Armenian troops continue to occupy all or part of seven districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh proper, and the fate of these districts  is one of the key components in the ongoing peace talks sponsored by the OSCE’s Minsk Group.  The Minsk Group’s three co-chair states–Russia, France, and the US–continue to attempt to broker a final settlement.

I don’t intend to post a history of the conflict here or an analysis of the negotiations.  (For a backgrounder, go here.)  But I do want to comment briefly on the strange assertion by the Iranian ambassador, and then follow with a timeline of major diplomatic events regarding Karabakh for the years 2009-10.

Briefly, it has been a given for many years that peacekeeping forces would be necessary following the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the seven districts.  I think the reasoning is twofold:  neutral military forces would act as a deterrent to war initiated by either side, and such troops would protect Azeri refugees (“IDPs” – or internally displaced persons) who had returned to their former homes in Karabakh itself.  The presence of a peacekeeping force as well as the return of IDPs is addressed in the so-called “Basic Principles” which were enunciated in 2006 and updated in 2009.  (See the timeline.)

But it has also been mentioned often–with no one that I am aware of objecting to this interpretation–that peacekeeping forces would consist of personnel from nations that are not Minsk Group co-chair states.  That means no Russian, French, or American forces.

So why did the ambassador feel it necessary to make his point?  Why did he go so far as to say that Iran would “not allow the deployment of American forces”?  I doubt that he has inside information, and I strongly doubt that the US wants suddenly to deploy troops in yet another hot spot.  There is a strong disincentive for America to get involved in potentially deadly encounters between two of its Caucasus allies.  It doesn’t make sense.  Let’s just assume that the ambassador is nervous and wanted to spell it out clearly for the Americans:  keep off the grass.

My guess is that once a settlement is reached, the OSCE might deploy armed peacekeeping forces, which would be the first time in its history that this multilateral organization has done so.

At any rate, below is a timeline of Karabakh-related diplomacy for 2009-2010 (or at least late June 2010).  I don’t claim that it’s complete – it’s something I’ve cobbled together from the major and minor developments in the recent past.  But it’s fascinating reading for several reasons.  Note, for instance, the apparent significant concessions made by both sides in the late spring and early summer of last year, more or less corresponding to the Prague summit between President Aliyev and President Sargsyan, and then more than six months later during and after talks in Munich.

The most interesting development, it seems to me, was an apparently major concession from President Aliyev, who told Russian TV in July of 2009 that the final status of Karabakh “will be solved only when the parties agree on that. This could happen in one year, in ten years, in 100 years, or this could never happen. Time will tell.”

I may be wrong (an Azeri friend of mine, the analyst Leila Aliyeva, says I am), but that sounds like a huge concession.  Did Aliyev tell his Russian interviewer that he could live in a world where Karabakh proper would not be absorbed into Azerbaijan?  Would he give up that dream in order to get the seven districts returned?  That’s what he appears to have said.  If the Armenians ever agree to this, there would have to be a concomitant agreement from Azerbaijan forswearing the use of force to re-take Karabakh.

But the idea never got any traction in public, and the Azeri press didn’t comment on the President’s statement.

Here is the timeline (reverse chronological order), with appropriate links:

July 7, 2010: Aliyev says Armenia has “last chance” to leave “the occupied lands”

http://asbarez.com/83135/‘last-chance-for-armenia’-threatens-aliyev/

Three days after Hillary Clinton’s visit to Baku, President Aliyev warns at a public event, “This is the last chance for Armenia to leave the occupied lands voluntarily for the sake of its own future and its own security.”

Note the use of the vague term “occupied lands.”  Azerbaijan has for some time used this nomenclature rather than “Nagorno-Karabakh,” which may imply their willingness to give up Karabakh itself as long as Armenia withdraws from the seven districts as called for in the Madrid Principles.

http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijan_Says_No_New_Karabakh_Peace_Proposals/2092584.html

Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian claims that Medvedev presented “a new version of the Madrid Principles” of a Karabakh settlement at a news conference in Yerevan with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on July 4

Aliyev rumored to have rejected new proposals.

Azerbaijan denies any new deal or new principles on July 5.

Radio Free Europe says: “According to senior figures in the ruling Republican Party, Sarkisian reacted positively to the new peace proposals although his Azerbaijani counterpart Aliyev apparently did not. They claim that Aliyev cut short his visit to Russia as a result.”

June 24, 2010: Iran opposed to US peacekeeping forces in Karabakh

http://www.rferl.org/content/Iran_Against_Any_US_Peacekeeping_Role_For_Karabakh/2081078.html

Iran’s ambassador to Armenia says that his government opposes any deployment of US peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh in the event of a peace settlement. He claimed that the US is interested especially in a deployment in Fizuli, a district that borders Iran.

June 18, 2010: Azerbaijan attacks at Line of Contact, several dead

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=118188

http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/karabakh-clash-follows-failed-talks

Azerbaijan attacks with unusual level of intensity one day after “failed” St Petersburg talks. At Senate confirmation hearing, Matt Bryza later confirms that the attack was launched by Azerbaijan: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61586

June 17, 2010: Sargsyan, Aliyev and Medvedev meet in St Petersburg, Armenia reports “new version of Madrid Principles”

http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_Convenes_Third_Meeting_Of_Armenian_Azerbaijani_Presidents/2075841.html

http://times.am/2010/06/25/st-petersburg-meeting-opened-new-stage-in-karabakh-process/

Speculation that Russia offered new version of Madrid Principles favorable to Armenia. Ruben Safrastyan, director RA NAS Institute of Oriental Studies quoted in article.

May 18, 2010: Armenia denies agreeing to leave seven districts

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058945.html

In response to comments by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov the Armenian Foreign Ministry denies that it has agreed to withdraw from the seven districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.

May 4, 2010: Armenia allegedly tells Baku it needs time to withdraw

http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=121484

Azerbaijani official tells television network that Armenia has informed Baku that it needs time to withdraw its forces from “a part of occupied territories of Azerbaijan.”

March 24, 2010: Armenian president seems to offer to trade seven districts for NK self-determination

http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Leader_Outlines_Compromise_On_Rebel_Region/1991692.html

Armenian President Sarksyan says that if Karabakh is given the chance to determine its own future, “in compromise the Armenian side can consider the return of the regions around Karabakh, preserving the corridor linking [it] and Armenia.”

March 15, 2010: Mammadyarov discloses key components of Madrid Principles

http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijani_Foreign_Minister_Discloses_Details_Of_Madrid_Principles/1984485.html

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov appears to disclose key components of Madrid Principles, outlining phased implementation. Stresses Armenian withdrawal from Agdam, Fizuli, Djebrail, Zangelan, and Gubadli districts as well as thirteen villages in Lachin.

Peacekeepers would be deployed to ensure the security of returning Azeri IDPs.

2010

2009

November 26, 2009: Armenia supposedly agrees to withdraw from five districts now, Lachin and Kelbajar later

http://www.news.az/articles/3389

According to Turkish daily Hurriyet, “Armenia has agreed to withdraw from five occupied districts of Azerbaijan and to continue negotiations on definition of the status of Karabakh.” 

Armenia was also said to have agreed to withdraw its troops from Kelbajar and Lachin, but only after further negotiations.

November 23, 2009: Armenia reportedly ready to leave Kelbajar

http://news.az/articles/3104

News.az reports that at the Munich summit, the Armenian side said “that it could leave Kelbajar by the end of the year…”

A second stage would see the withdrawal of remaining Armenian forces from Lachin and Kelbajar, followed by the return of Azeri IDPs.

November 22: Negotiations in Munich, Aliyev and Sargsyan

November 21, 2009: The day prior to Munich summit, Aliyev threatens war if upcoming summit unsuccessful

http://www.reporter.am/pdfs/AW112809.pdf

http://www.reporter.am/go/article/2009-11-27-sargsyan-aliyev-hold-summit-as-baku-issues-an-ultimatum

“If that meeting ends without result, then our hopes in negotiations will be exhausted and then we are left with no other option,” said President Aliyev. “We have the right to liberate our land by military means.”

September 5, 2009: Armenia reportedly offers to demilitarize Lachin corridor

http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=46827

Turkish daily Yenisafak is reported to have said that Armenia would unilaterally demilitarize and open the Lachin corridor in order to encourage rapprochement with Turkey.

August 7, 2009: Matthew Bryza states that referendum should be held in Karabakh only

http://asbarez.com/69141/karabakh-people-to-determine-status-says-bryza

Matthew Bryza reiterates the OSCE Minsk Group’s position in support of a referendum in Karabakh to decide the province’s fate. Bryza strongly implied (again) that such a vote would not be held in all of Azerbaijan, but only in Karabakh.

“What I can not tell you today is when the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be determined through a vote,” said Bryza.

“But you did not hear me say that Nagorno-Karabakh will be returned to Azerbaijan. I never said that. I just said that the interim status will be determined now and the final legal status will be determined by the people of Karabakh.” (Italics added.)

July 14, 2009: Armenian opposition party fears “capitulation” regarding Karabakh

http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Opposition_Alarmed_At_Possible_Capitulation_In_Karabakh_Talks/1776777.html

See outline of Basic Principles below.

The Armenian National Congress (HAK) headed by former President Levon Ter-Petrossian issues a statement on July 13 registering concern that the “revised Madrid Principles” entail concessions by Armenia that are tantamount to “treason.”

July 11, 2009: US clarifies Minsk Group’s Basic Principles

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-nagorno-karabakh-conflict

Basic Principles divulged, but no reference to “referendum.” Rather, a “legally binding expression of will” is denoted. Also, no reference to a “phased” withdrawal of Armenian troops from districts.

The Minsk Group’s Basic Principles call for, inter alia:

• Return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control

• An interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance

• A corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh

• Future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will

• The right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence

• International security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation

July 7, 2009: Aiiyev tells Russian Vesti TV channel that the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh may never be determined

http://www.armenialiberty.org/content/article/1771405.html

“As regards the question of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status, a mechanism for a provisional status could be agreed in the first stage [of the peace process], while the issue of the final status will be solved only when the parties agree on that,” he said. “This could happen in one year, in ten years, in 100 years, or this could never happen. Time will tell.”

July 6, 2009: Aliyev says Armenia has agreed to Karabakh Withdrawal

http://asbarez.com/66071/aliyev-says-parties-have-agreed-to-karabakh-withdrawal/

In addition to apparently conceding that Karabakh might never be returned to Azerbaijan, President Aliyev also reportedly tells Russian TV that consensus has been reached with Armenia regarding withdrawal from the districts surrounding Karabakh.

May 15, 2009: Novruz Mammadov alleges Minsk Group bias, attacks Matt Bryza

http://www.rferl.org/content/Is_The_Karabakh_Peace_Process_In_Jeopardy/1732576.html

Novruz Mammadov, chief of the international relations department within the Aliyev administration, denies assertions from the OSCE Minsk Group that progress had been made in peace talks, adding that the Minsk Group was biased toward Armenia.

Mammadov also implies that delays in progress are engineered by the Minsk Group co-chairs in order to enhance their careers, and suggests that US Minsk Group negotiator Matthew Bryza might have deliberately fed false information to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Barack Obama in the hope of gaining a promotion.

May 14, 2009: Karabakh foreign minister says NKR participation in talks only option

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Special-Reports/Karabakh-Uneasy-Limbo/Synopsis/

NKR Foreign Minister Georgi Petrosyan expresses confusion over Matt Bryza’s “new obstanovka” and says that his side’s participation in peace talks is critical to a final resolution: “That’s why we are saying, and not just saying, we are insisting that we should sit at the negotiating table…”

May 12, 2009: Bryza denies saying that NK would be returned to Azerbaijan, talks of “new obstanovka” for Karabakh, which causes even more confusion

http://www.panorama.am/en/politics/2009/05/12/brayza/?sw

U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group Matthew Bryza denies reports claiming that he said that “Karabakh and other territories” will be returned to Azerbaijan. He then discusses a “new obstanovka” (or “new situation”) for Karabakh, further muddying the waters.

May 8, 2009: APA (Azerbaijan) speculates that Aliyev did not approve of NK “self-determination,” and suggests that Matt Bryza confused two Russian words

http://en.apa.az/print.php?id=101905

“Most likely Bryza mixed up the words “samoupravlenie” and “samoopredelenie”. The first notion is about the forming of self-administration bodies, the second one is about the right of any nation to establish its state. The President [Aliyev[ said ‘the people living there should feel themselves secure, have self-administration opportunities for the solution to the conflict. The[n] Matthew Bryza’s mistake put forward one of the main targets of the OSCE Minsk Group – the recognition of Nagorno Karabakh self-determination right by Azerbaijan and they follow[ed] this goal in long-year negotiations. Otherwise Matthew Bryza, who mixed up “samoupravlenie” and “samoopredelenie”, wouldn’t say that “significant step was made toward the preparation of Azerbaijani population to the agreement on basic principles”.

May 7, 2009, Aliyev and Sargsyan meet during Prague Summit

January 5, 2009: Aliyev again threatens war

http://asbarez.com/59866/aliyev-again-threatens-new-war-for-karabakh/

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev once again threatens to take Nagorno-Karabakh by force, saying the country should to be ready to initiate an all-out war with Armenia “at any moment.”