A Liquid Frozen Conflict

While most news about Central Asia discusses pipelines and transiting materiel to Afghanistan, southern Kyrgyzstan still sways uneasily in a quiet cross-breeze of mistrust and recriminations, after riots in June 2010 that killed over 400 people. After 18 months, two special commission reports, and a new president, few residents in this mountainous region believe the perpetrators will ever be held accountable.

In a region where ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz have long lived next to each other, certain facts about the five-day conflict, centered in the city of Osh, cannot be disputed. Uzbeks suffered most from the carnage, which included over 2000 buildings destroyed, paramilitaries somehow acquiring Kyrgyz military equipment, and police that did not intervene. Both ethnic groups suffered losses and accuse the other of instigating the conflict, yet independent accounts recall Kyrgyz groups roaming Osh, burning Uzbek houses and threatening families, with smaller scale events in the towns of Jalalabad and Bazar Kurgon. Ease of access to digital cameras and phones has chronicled dozens of personal stories of tragedy, widely available on the Internet, where the debate and finger-pointing rages on, evidence of this potential “frozen conflict” still in a very liquid, dynamic form.

Most observers cite recent roots of the conflict as competition between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz for housing and jobs, in a region where many towns have traditionally had ethnic Uzbek majorities, and fears that Uzbeks would lobby for an autonomous zone. More long-term causes involve ties to the capital Bishkek, in the north of the country, and the powers that influence security and the economy. When the Soviet Union started to disintegrate in 1990, rural Kyrgyz began migrating to cities, which in the south were populated by Uzbek merchants and traders. Riots in Osh that year over a housing issue sowed the seeds for the conflict in 2010.

A range of mountains divides southern Kyrgyzstan from the north, hence an affinity among citizens for regional identification. Some theorize that stability in the south depends on that region’s ties to the northern capital. Eric McGlinchey, in his 2011 book Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia, relates how President Kurmanbek Bakiev, in office during 2005-2010, from the south and with family and business interests there, was able to control security organs in the south and represent southern interests in Bishkek. After Bakiev was chased out of the country in April 2010 over corruption charges and an interim president took over, McGlinchey argues, powerbrokers in the south were freer to assert themselves.

Arkady Dubnov, a journalist with Russia’s Moscow News, underlined this north-south relationship last November, just after recently elected President Atambaev took office. “How Atambaev will consolidate the south, and satisfy southern politicians, that is the question. He must find them a place in the current power structure.”

To spur dialogue and work toward reconciliation, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and regional partners have enacted engagement groups in Osh and Jalalabad provinces. International donors are also establishing youth centers to emphasize collaboration among inter-ethnic communities, to deter the sense that issues can be resolved through street violence. Real progress though will depend on cooperation between local government, and community leaders of both ethnic groups, to foster constructive relations and jointly address employment issues. Osh has long been famous for its bustling market at this way-station of the Ancient Silk Road, but only stability will bring needed foreign investment.

Blocking the way forward are several polarizing realities, including strong Kyrgyz nationalist sentiment in the region. The mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov, is viewed as a de facto regional governor due to his wide influence and pro-Kyrgyz exhortations. Moreover, law enforcement and state administrators are predominantly ethnic Kyrgyz, a fact which complicates investigation work, and invokes fears that they may again stand idly by in renewed conflict. Persecution of Uzbek activists, such as Azimjon Askarov, now imprisoned in Bishkek, is a further disencouraging practice for a state agency that needs confidence-building reform. On Tuesday lenta.ru news (Russian) reported that Fergana News, a website that has in the past reflected both sides of the June 2010 conflict, has been blocked in Kyrgyzstan, a further sign of the authorities’ attempt to control the narrative of reconciliation efforts.

China’s appetite for natural resources tends to dominate regional headlines, but the subdued tension in Osh and the uncertain security posture, just off the international radar, is a linchpin for regional stability. Aside from the ethnic tinder-box that remains, militants and narco-traffickers traverse southern Kyrgyzstan to access Tajikistan and Afghanistan. While criminal elements will bribe border guards to pass, Uzbek authorities arbitrarily close border points for their own risk control, including in June 2010 when ethnic Uzbeks were trying to flee the attacks.