Indonesia's Military

Indonesia’s military has been busy lately, and not just perusing terror suspects, but in activities one might consider a serious misallocation of resources.  The Indonesian Navy has deployed Marines to the barren island of Jemur, one of nine islands in the Riau (Arwah) Archipelago,  in response to both the Travel Journal and Osvaja.net listing it as part of the Malaysian state of Selangor, instead of  the Indonesian province of Riau.  This posturing is disturbingly reminiscent of  the conflicts the two nations had in the Sulawesi (also Ambalat or Celebes) Sea, which lasted from 1962-1966.

The waters in the Straits of Malacca are oil-rich and both Indonesia and Malaysia have contracted major multinational oil companies to do exploration and production, Royal Dutch Shell (2005) and ENI (1999), respectively.  Culturally, the area is believed to be the origin point to modern ethnic Malay culture and the Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesian).

It is not the first time this year naval forces have been mobilized over territorial claims in the region.  On May 25th, Indonesian ships threatened to fire on a Malaysian patrol boat that Indonesia claimed was 12 miles inside its territory.  Conflict was avoided when the Malaysian ship withdrew.  Currently, Indonesia has 6 warships patrolling the waters and another 7 navy vessels on alert.  Malaysia has four warships on patrol.

Malaysia’s armed forces chief, General Adbul Aziz Zainal has met with his Indonesian counterparts in Jakarta in hopes of defusing the situation, but there has been several demonstrations at the Malaysian Embassy in Indonesia over this issue and others between the two nations.  Much of the animosity is related to issues that have dogged both nations since the end of colonialism.   Where does one nation truly begins and the other ends, not just in territorial terms, but cultural, as both nations share an ethnic Malay-Polynesian culture that heavily overlaps in many areas.  Before the arbitrary boundaries established by the colonial powers people freely moved between the areas of both nations regularly.

It might be a good idea for Indonesia to avoid using scarce resources to  inflate the ego of  nationalist interests and focus on real security concerns.  As a recent New York Times’ op-ed discusses, Indonesia’s navy is already stretched thin:

“Imagine, they say, a stretch of land covering the distance from Seattle to New York, or Lisbon to Moscow. And then imagine having fewer than 100 police cars responsible for patrolling that entire area — to respond to emergencies and protect national borders.”

The air-force is not in much better shape with 220 air-crafts, some of which were made in the 1960’s.

This must change if Indonesia can possibly help stem separatist and radical Islamic groups in the region and help to check China’s expansion in SE Asia.  The U.S. could be a key benefactor for Indonesia, but there are tensions between Jakarta and Washington, part of which stem back to the 1991 human rights abuse allegations against the Indonesian military in East Timor. Relations are thawing; still, the U.S. hopes to increase military aid to the archipelagos by only US$10 million.

Op-Ed writer, Stanley Weiss, believes the U.S. should focus on shoring up Indonesia’s navy and air-force, especially its ability to provide  border security.  This type of aid and support should be packaged as a formal strategic partnership, something Indonesian President Yudhoyono seems to want, which might be similar, although larger in scope,  to what the Philippines enjoys with American.  Indonesian could be a key player in this informal alliance, along with Japan, India, Australia, Vietnam, and Malaysia if the Obama and Yudhoyono administrations can come to some understanding at the APEC summit this fall.   Indonesia might first show it can be a regional leader and solve its territorial disputes, which are common in the region, without such bellicose nationalistic grandstanding with a nation that poses an insignificant threat to Indonesian interests.