By: Madhavi Bhasin

Note: This post reflects the views of the author, not those of the Foreign Policy Association. The author is an independent contributor.

President Obama’s comment that “India is not simply emerging but has emerged” charmed his Indian audience. Was President Obama’s assessment rhetorical or was he making a valid appraisal? India’s record on indices of democratic governance, economic growth and socio-political stability are encouraging if not exquisite. Yet power implies a relational aspect which makes India’s foreign policy – style and substance – a critical factor in determining its power profile in international affairs. Though India’s claim to great power glory was professed much before the country achieved independence in 1947, the current phase reflects India’s willingness to work towards that goal rather than make a fortuitous claim to it. India has started the process by taking fresh look at its traditional positions, but the Asian elephant can truly emerge by articulating a vision for the future.

While the goal of India’s foreign policy, much like other states, continues to be defined by its national interests, India is avoiding the use of traditional jargon in communicating its foreign policy. In words of former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, “If India is to become a credible candidate for permanent membership of the Security Council then we must adjust out traditional positions.”

Attention is shifting from labels to results of the policy. For instance, India is not clamouring for an expanded role in Afghanistan to prove its regional leadership credentials. The ‘rising giant’ is content with having its foot in the door by providing Afghanistan with development aid and keeping safe distance from the nasty process of nation building. While India continues to express its commitment to a non-aligned foreign policy, which is nothing more than a moral variant of Morgenthau’s national interest principle, there is no effort to reinvigorate the non-aligned movement.

India’s unease with the presence of great powers in its geographical vicinity is replaced by interest in creating an inclusive security and economic architecture in Asia. Since 2004, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has referred to the concept of Asian Economic Community. India is talking of building a ‘qualitatively’ different relationship with the major powers. Rather than expressing anxiety, India is welcoming the possibility that Asian security in the 21st century would be shaped by the interactions between major Asian powers and influential external actors such as European Union, Russia and the United Sates.

On a variety of issues including Iran and Myanmar, India is making difficult decisions and efficiently dealing with the consequences. From facilitating transparency negotiations at the Cancun climate summit to proposing anti-piracy operations under the U.N. command, India’s appetite for involvement in international regime making is growing. India is working on gaining full membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export control regimes.

The most perceptible manifestation of India’s growing pragmatism in foreign affairs is its changing approach to ‘good’ neighbourly relations. Prime Minster Manmohan Singh was frank in stating that “the mere lowering of tariffs and pruning of negative lists does not add up to creating relations of mutual benefit.” According to Prime Minister Singh “the glass of regional cooperation, regional development and regional integration is half empty…Declarations at Summits and official level meetings do not amount to regional cooperation or integration.” India no longer considers the success of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a specimen for proving its managerial and leadership abilities.

Though India is aware of the challenges in its neighbourhood it no longer refers to these as constraining forces. The involvement of anti-India Communist party in Nepal’s mainstream politics, persistence of the issue of illegal immigration from Bangladesh and Sri Lankan Government’s offensive against LTTE were issues of concern which were not hyped in the usual calamitous tone. Relations with Pakistan have remained problematic but India is attempting to discard the big brother responsibility. Exchange of dossiers on Mumbai attacks and subsequent meetings between Indian and Pakistani diplomats indicates that though dialogue has resumed, India is not interested in gathering accolades by resuming the peace process. India’s Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao categorically stated that “no breakthrough is expected” in the next round of India-Pakistan talks due in March-April 2011. India is strengthening its case against Pakistan by referring to Pakistan’s anti-India terrorist activities within the wider discourse of the global war on terror.

India’s influence may be increasing but the purpose of this influence still remains ambiguous. The transition from ‘emerging’ to ‘emerged’ will depend on, to use the words of Harsh Pant, providing “a guiding framework of underlying principles.” India’s foreign policy needs a conceptual framework that can integrate the above strands into a meaningful strategy. While India’s dependence on traditional shibboleths is diminishing there is no sign of an alternate blueprint. Peaceful neighbourhood and nuclear weapon free world are laudable objectives of India’s foreign policy. However, the international community needs to know exactly how India plans to achieve these goals. India’s growing economy and stable democracy are not persuasive arguments for claiming permanent membership of the Security Council. India will have to clarify what the country brings to the high table and how will it contribute to making the U.N. effective. It is critical for India to satisfactorily address these concerns. Until then India shall remain a threshold power, which gets ecstatic on receiving positive feedback for isolated gestures.

India's Ongoing Transition from 'Emerging' to 'Emerged' Power Status

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