How the Philippines Stays Afloat and a Thai's Military Update

– Asia Times has an article on how the Filipino economy has stayed afloat due to the prodigious amount of   remittance it receives.  In a sense, Filipinos are to parts of East Asia and the Middle East what Mexican and Central Americans are to the United States or to a lesser extent, Former Soviets from the Asian republics are to Russia.  This capital inflow is an important substitute for the FDI the Philippines has failed to acquire.

OFWs [Overseas Filipino Workers]  sent home $16.4 billion last year, making the Philippines the world’s fourth largest recipient of remittances, trailing only India ($45 billion), China ($34 billion) and Mexico ($26 billion), according to the World Bank.

At the same time, FDI into the country continues to contract, falling to a mere $44 million in the first quarter of this year, a staggering 83% decline over the same period in 2008. The decline marks a disturbing down trend: total FDI fell from $2.91 billion in 2007 to $1.52 billion last year, marking a 48% year-on-year decline. Analysts attribute the downturn broadly to waning foreign investor interest in Philippine manufacturing compared with other low-cost countries in the region.

SNIP

The Philippines would have more than 26.5 million poor, out of a population of 96 million, without the current level of OFW remittances, according to economist Ernesto Pernia.

SNIP

Data from the Employers Confederation of the Philippines, a trade group, shows that the informal economy accounts for about 70% of the labor force.

Obviously, no nation wishes to be indefinitely economically dependent on remittance, but until the push factors that lead to such high rates of emigration are addressed, this trend is not likely to change.

– The Thai military is dealing with its own Muslim militant problem in the three southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala, but unlike Indonesia and the Philippines, the militants, predominately Malay-speaking minorities, are not nearly as organized.  In fact, they are so defused and allusive it has been difficult to find or identify them.  Although estimated to be approximately 10,000 in number, the region’s thickly forested foot-hills have proved to be an excellent hiding places for the militants.  Because many have a causal allegiance to to the movement, they simply blend into the local village populations, hence the current Thai military  strategy:

Part of that strategy has been to set up military camps, each with a platoon of 31 soldiers, in the heart of 217 villages that are located by the side of rubber plantations and paddy fields. They have been identified as hotbeds of militant activity, which the military calls “red zones”.

Cutting off the militants base of operations and support is key and provides an opportunity to build relations with the local community which could lead to the acquisition of further intelligence.  This same technique was used successfully by the Malaysian government when it was battling communist insurgent on the other side of the border.  The Thai military has went further, establishing civilian militias in these “fort-towns”, which are estimated to number around 90,000.  However, in recent years violence has ticked up and almost half of the fatalities since 2004 have been civilians.  There also allegations of human rights abuses, such as torture, but this is not exactly a new thing, it has been going on for over 100 years, in the last century there were major campaigns by the Thai government between the 1960’s -1990’s in the region.

The three provinces belonged to the Pattani kingdom, which was annexed by Siam, as Thailand was then known, in 1902. Malay-Muslims have since the annexation complained of cultural and linguistic discrimination and, later, economic marginalization.

Something tells me, short of physical or cultural genocide, which has not been fashionable for a century (well, outside of places like China and Myanmar),  another 100 years of fighting is not going to resolve this issue, addressing the push-pull factors that drive many Muslims to want to join these organizations will, but that would require a lot of Buddhist Thai soul searching, not exactly an easy task for any nation.  When nationalism is involved, for many it is definitely easier to fight another 100 years then look in the mirror.  There is no indication that either sides is so tired of violence that they are ready to sit down and listen to each other, and even if the Thai government wanted to, who does Bangkok call on in the lower three provinces?  Is there some Malay-Muslim representative umbrella group with common goals?

That being said, everything is not as clear cut as Buddhist vs. Muslim.  One of the main leaders of military coup against former Prime Minister Thaksin was an ethnic Muslim,  Gen. Sondhi Boonyaratkalin.   However, he also claims ancestry from the famous Sheikh Ahmad Qomi, an Iranian trader who established a powerful political dynasty in Thailand.  Boonyaratkalin grew up near Bangkok, so it is not apparent that he identifies with the Muslims Malays of the south or that all Muslims are viewed the same in Thai society.  In fact, Boonyaratkalin spent much of his career doing counter insurgency work in the Thai south.

– In other news, Cambodian and Thai military leaders met in Phnom Penh in an effort to renew ties, although they did not discuss troop deployments in all the disputed border areas, they did declare hostilities at the Preah Vihear Temple area over.  This border standoff was the most dangerous, resulting in the death of several soldiers on both sides since 2008.  Thai and Cambodian troopos will be drawn down, but it is unclear by how much.  This is the first time such a meeting has taken place, but despite being successful in descalating the situation, no clear agreement on the border issue had been reached, so there is potential for a future flare.