Here’s the conclusion to my series on Afghanistan based on several Department of Defense sponsored Bloggers Roundtables I participated in over the last several weeks. On May 3rd, Major General Richard Mills, United States Marine Corp, spoke on the topic The Evolving Security Situation in Afghanistan. General Mills is the former commander, Regional Command Southwest. General Mill’s command was right in the thick of things and consisted of about 30,000 troops. Of that number he said 20, 000 were U.S. Marines “and 10,000 other coalition forces…mainly made up of British forces, but also including a battalion from Georgia and forces from Estonia, from Denmark, from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and also from Tonga who provided us with some security capability”.
He stated, “Highlights of our time over there…were the culmination of the battle of Marja, the battle of Sangin and several other fights that took place along the Helmand River…” He was so inspirational if it wasn’t for my gimpy knees and iffy back, I’d dye my hair, lie about my age and attempt to reup but…probably wouldn’t make either the Navy or the Marine Corp weight standards. By saying I found him inspirational, I’m not implying he tried to smooth over or focus only on the success of what has been a very challenging operation. In light of the debate over timing of removal of coalition forces, I thought his experiences would provide some valuable insights into a very complex issue.
General Mills began by providing an overview of his year in Afghanistan: “The year that we were there I think we saw a remarkable change in the situation on the ground. I inherited a situation that was improving every day. The…about 10,000 Marines that had been there before I was there, had done a good job of laying the groundwork as had the British forces who had been fighting there for several years. During the year we were there, I saw a remarkable increase in the capability and confidence of the Afghan security forces, both the police and the army, and when we left the Afghan army forces that were in the…area were about three brigades, all of whom were capable of semi-independent operations and doing those operations out in the field. We saw…several of our districts were in such a good security posture that they were prepared –at least the conditions were set for transitions to Afghan security control, and I think the Afghan security forces that were there were ready to take on those responsibilities.”
When asked to elaborate on what type of support coalition forces were still providing, he indicated: “By the time we left, they were conducting independent –semi-independent operations supported by us with some logistics. Things like…air support; they don’t have at this point. We would give them some communications capability. Initially, we provided them with fire support, but they have brought artillery capability online and they use it, and we found them very, very capable of getting to the field, planning an operation, conducting that operation up to 96 hours and beyond and then withdrawing the forces in a very timely manner…”
The General also gave some metrics to help put the situation in perspective: “I think some of the metrics we saw, some of the indicators, I think, that these gains would be long lasting was the commitment by the Helmand population to the government of Afghanistan as exemplified, I think by their support of the education initiatives. A hundred and twenty-five thousand students that went to school or are going to school there right now, about 20,000 of those students are now females. I think that indicated areal investment by the …population in the future…of the province as those students were threatened, as were their parents about being sent to school and about supporting the education initiatives…as far as development went, we also saw some significant gains there, improvement of roads, …phone systems and several economic areas…Probably most important was reduction in poppy growth”. General Mills pointed out that poppy was not only a “poison” to the world but also was a resource the enemy was using to fund its efforts.
One of the bloggers mentioned he had been in Marja last summer and things hadn’t been going that well, he asked how had things gotten turned around? General Mills pointed out, “…Marja centered a large drug area, and he (Taliban) was using that to fuel the insurgency…So…to Marja to him was absolutely critical ground, and he was fighting hard to maintain it. When we took a look at it, we really felt that the battle of Marja was not going to be won in the streets of Marja, that it was really a commuter’s fight on his behalf. He had placed his IEDs I place, he put his minefields in place. What he was doing, I think, was commuting to the war from other places. So we took the fight—we freed up some forces, thinned out some places, closed down a couple of bases and freed up some maneuver force and went after him in the places we felt that he was using as assembly areas…I think by taking the fight out there we regained the momentum…made him fight on ground he didn’t want to fight on…He rolled back to the defensive…”
The General said the other thing “we did is we worked with the local elders to give them some confidence in the Afghan security forces…The national police did a good job, then we worked with the elders to raise a local police force…”
I asked the General if the intelligence support for the Afghanistan operations had improved. I referenced an article that had been published by the former senior U.S. Military Intelligence Officer in Afghanistan that had been critical of the intelligence community efforts in the region saying efforts were too focused on traditional military intelligence targets and not enough effort was being spent supporting on providing information needed to succeed in counterinsurgency operations. General Mills passed on: “…I think what we saw was a growth in the intelligence community to encompass a lot more than what your traditional military intelligence…used to focus on…there was a growth…encompassing an awful lot of organizations, both military and civilian, that allowed you to really open that aperture up quite wide and take a look at the entire situation…The cultural piece was absolutely critical…”
General Mills provided a lot more great information. I’ve included the hyperlink and would recommend checking out the entire transcript of the roundtable. Before I close I would like to make a couple of comments on those who would like to bring home a significant number of troops from Afghanistan next month. I understand that the U.S. is broke and heavily in debt. I understand that the conflict in Afghanistan is costing us $10 Billion a month; but I also understand that the situation in Afghanistan can still go wrong if the coalition leaves too soon. I believe the views that should carry the most weight are the current people running the war. They’ve reversed the situation in Iraq when all was considered lost and have stopped the momentum of the Taliban when many thought that situation was also lost.
If the lawmakers want to make cuts in the defense budget have they considered things like the 47,000 troops we have in Japan? What about all those forces and bases we have in Europe? Do we really still need large numbers of troops in Germany and Italy? Last time I checked they were no longer our enemies. Our relationship with Russia has also come a long, long way. I understand the need for forward deployment. Is it necessary to forward deploy troops or could we have basing agreements in place to forward deploy when needed? Yes I understand there could be a situation were because of politics one of our allies might not allow us to forward deploy to use military force in a situation they don’t agree with but we have that situation now. Witness Italy’s initial reluctance to allow operations against Libya from bases on their soil. I’m not saying we should do any of these things but wonder if the politicians have looked at any of these solutions. I know the military has, they’re always working issues like this. The point I’m trying to make is simply this, IF it’s necessary to make major cuts in the Department of Defense WHILE we are still in a war does it make sense to cut those forces and assets needed to fight the war? There are a number of other things that could be cut and/or modified. Think I’ll end here. As always my views are my own.
