Been silent the last couple of weeks because of bouts with a sinus infection and bronchitis. I did get out of bed a few times to participate in some Department of Defense sponsored bloggers roundtables on Afghanistan. More about that later and kudos to the Department of Defense for providing the venue. If there is an up side to illness, it’s the fact that you are forced to slow down and reflect. For me the reflections centered on a series of well thought out questions I was recently asked. Essentially the questions were how can you motivate and lead military men and women into harms way in a conflict that appears to be failing after nine years of effort? Historically, Afghanistan is a difficult military problem that gave even Alexander the Great, probably the greatest military mind in history, fits. In the past other militaries like those of the Soviet Union and Great Britain had major problems there as well. What makes us think we will succeed in an environment where so many others failed?
I believe both the questions and answers are multi layered. There is no doubt that after being defeated in 2001 the Taliban regrouped and waged a successful come back guerilla war campaign. Like many, I’ve wondered why we didn’t do something earlier to counter the Taliban resurgence before it got out of hand. The conventional answer that it was because the military focus was on Iraq doesn’t ring totally true with me and raises many questions. As the situation deteriorated, did the on scene military commanders request more assets? If they did, were they denied because of a lack of available assets because the focus was on Iraq? Did the political leadership not recognize or refuse to acknowledge the situation was deteriorating because of concerns others would think their policy was flawed and they would be perceived as incompetent by political opponents?
I don’t know the answers; but the situation has caused many to question whether the governments of the U.S. and its NATO allies have the will and determination to go the distance in Afghanistan. The announcement of the July 2011 deadline has added to the concerns. I don’t question the right of the Commander-in-Chief to establish a deadline; I question why the date was made public. It would appear to me you’re enabling the enemy. From the enemy’s perspective they just have to hold out until July and they’re home free. I’m of the opinion all you tell your enemy is that they’re going down. You don’t give them any details. Keep them off balance.
That said I think it’s worth mentioning a famous quote by General Colin Powell: “The Commander in the field is always right and the rear echelon is wrong, unless proved otherwise.” What that means to me is those of us sitting on the side lines should be very careful with analysis of ongoing military operations because you simply do not have access to all the available information that the commander in the field has. Case in point is the Iraqi campaign. The situation in Iraq had also deteriorated and side line critics were proclaiming it a lost cause. The military came up with a new COIN strategy, the Bush administration gave the military the assets it needed and the tide turned. Those sitting on the sidelines did not have access to the details of General Petraeus’ plans, nor did they have access to the intelligence data he was using to support military planning and operations. That’s why most arm chair analysts did not predict the success of “The Surge”.
The unintended consequences of negative speculation are to discourage some of the troops. Troops in the field have access to the internet and other social media. I’m not implying that analysts and members of the media are evil and should never report and/or discuss military operations. Far from it, only if they plan to make blanket statements such as a campaign or battle is failing, make sure that statement is grounded in facts rather than personal opinions.
A personal example may provide clarity. At one point while I was participating in the first Gulf War there were a spate of articles saying African Americans were only 13% of the population yet they formed a much larger proportion of troops participating in the war. I happen to be African American and was highly irritated by the articles which seemed to imply the government was up to something nefarious and putting “poor, under privileged” minorities in harms way. First, the military is now an all volunteer force, second being in the military was a childhood dream for me. No one forced me into joining the military and I knew going into harms way was part of the deal. It was only a slight distraction and I knew those writing the articles meant no harm; but it caused me to momentarily loose my focus. I certainly could have done without it at the time.
A good example of reporting from a war zone is Nicholas Kristof’s October 20th article in the New York Times highlighting the success of Dr. Greg Mortenson, author of Three Cups of Tea, and others on setting up schools and other projects in parts of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. I found the article particularly relevant since a major part of the COIN campaign involves gaining the trust and assistance of the Afghan population.
In the article Kristof states: “The conventional wisdom is that education and development are impossible in insecure parts of Afghanistan that the Taliban control. That view is wrong. An organization set up by Mr. Mortenson and a number of others are showing that it is quite possible to run schools in Taliban-controlled areas.” The article goes on to quote Mr. Mortenson’s advice on how to set up a successful aid plan: “Aid can be done anywhere, including where Taliban are…but it’s imperative the elders are consulted, and that the development staff is all local, with no foreigners.”
Kristof’s article is the result of first hand observation during a visit to Afghanistan. Addressing the issue of the Taliban burning down schools he states: “Government schools regularly get burned down, but villagers tell me that’s because they’re seen as alien institutions built by outside construction crews. In contrast, CARE runs 300 schools in Afghanistan and not one has been burned down…The Afghan Institute of Learning, run by a redoubtable Afghan woman named Sakena Yacoobi, has supported more than 300 schools and none have been burned.”
What’s not mentioned in the article is that Greg Mortenson has been consulted by the military. I know that because I saw Mr. Mortenson give a talk last year and he mentioned it.
I do have problems with Kristof’s opening statement: “…President Obama’s decision to triple the number of troops has resulted, with some exceptions, mostly in more dead Americans and Afghans alike.” If you increase the intensity of a war campaign of course you will most likely have more casualties. I’ll have more about this in a future blog.
What about the question I started with? How can you motivate and lead military men and woman into harms way in a conflict that appears to be failing? I would start by reminding them that Afghanistan is a different situation but I suspect many lessons learned in Iraq on how to conduct a successful COIN operation are being applied there. Have mistakes in military tactics and operations been made in Afghanistan, obviously but as proved most recently in Iraq, just because a situation is difficult or failing doesn’t mean it can’t be turned around.
I would remind people that one of the most striking things for me about the military and the way they do business is the focus on solutions versus problems. A scene from one of the Star Wars movies comes to mind. The one where Hans Solo was preparing to navigate a meteorite field and C-3PO gave him some huge figure citing the odds for success were totally against them. Hans replied: “Never give me the odds!” as he went on to succeed. C-3PO saw only the problems while Hans focused on the solution.
Legend has it as Hannibal was preparing for his invasion of Rome, his Generals did not believe the elephants that were part of his fighting force would be able to make it through the Alps. Hannibal’s response reportedly was: I will either find a way, or make one.” Not all of the elephants made it over the Alps but many did. That is the type of attitude I remember encountering most during my time in the military; and it is prevalent in all ranks.
What has this got to do with anything? In recent days there have been reports that the COIN campaign is showing some signs of success. As reported in another article in the New York Times, “NATO commanders are careful not to overstate their successes – they acknowledge they made that mistake earlier in the year when they undertook a high-profile operation against Marja that did not produce lasting gains. But they are making ‘deliberate progress and seized the initiative from the insurgents.”
This attitude of learning from mistakes and making necessary changes is a hallmark of the US military culture. Yesterday I went to a talk given by the coach of the local college basket ball team. He said his team’s motto is: “The Great ones adjust.” If we are to succeed in Afghanistan, the on scene commanders need to have the ability to change plans as necessary even if it becomes apparent that more time and assets are needed. By no means am I advocating another 10 years: but, war is a fluid situation and war plans quickly get out of date. The successful military commanders adjust.
In the next day or so, I’ll do a blog on the recent Department of Defense Bloggers roundtables I participated in. As always my opinions are my own.
