A number of years ago while still in the military I was stationed in a highly volatile part of the world. The crisis was pretty intense and it was the first job I held where my boss was routinely on the evening news on both U.S. and world television stations. As has happened numerous times in history, the U.S. was attempting to solve the problem by bringing a considerable military presence to that part of the world. My job was the Command Briefer, in civilian terms think of network news anchor. I hadn’t particularly wanted the job; primarily because of a medical condition I was dealing with, I was over the accepted weight standards of the Navy. Because of that, I suggested to my superiors they might be better served by someone who was skinny. My Boss said: “Oh heck Gail, we need your intellectual skills and your operational background for this job. Wear your white uniform. You don’t look too fat in that one”. How could I refuse such a charming request?
I made one demand; I would only do it if I could write my own briefings (news reports). At the time most Command Briefers only read things that had been written by the organization’s intelligence analysts, who were considered the commands experts on various topics. In the arrogance of youth, I told them if they wanted me because of my intellectual skills then I was smart enough to write my own briefs. I wasn’t a total jerk and worked closely with the other intelligence analysts on the presentations.
Things went pretty well until the day my Boss told me to stick my neck out and make some predictions on the how the conflict was going. Several of us younger intelligence analysts were convinced looking at the still rising statistics of violent activities that things were going badly and the U.S. military policy and strategy was not working. We sat around talking trash about our bosses and wondered what were they thinking? The head of that organization was a crusty 4 star Army General. I decided to start out my next presentation by saying something to the effect: “As the increasing level of violence shows, our policy is not working.” The 4 star interrupted me and gave me a lecture on how sometimes it takes a while for a strategy to turn things around. He concluded by telling me I had my head up a certain portion of my anatomy. Needless to say that was the last time I was the Command Briefer for that organization.
The interesting thing about the whole situation was HE WAS RIGHT. Our military strategy did work…eventually. The crisis ended and now people from all over the world, to include the folks from the U.S., are buying luxury homes in that region. That brings me to the topic of this blog. A very courageous young army officer published an article in Armed Forces Journal titled Truth, lies and Afghanistan. Basically as I understood the article he stated the situation in Afghanistan was going “from bad to abysmal” and the senior leaders were not being honest in their public statements about the situation.
I thought long and hard about commenting on this article; primarily because I didn’t want to give anyone the impression that I thought I knew more than the author of the article about the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. I have never served in that country and am limited to knowledge I’ve gained from interviewing many of the senior officers and NCO’s serving in Afghanistan for this blog as well as conducting extensive additional research. What I can say is I have never felt that the military leaders were not being truthful during any of the presentations I participated in. In fact they were pretty consistent saying the major problems in Afghanistan interfering with success were corruption, literacy, and safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan. They never made statements guaranteeing the trained Afghan forces would be up to the task but they talked about what training they were doing to give them that capability. When discussing how the war with the Taliban was going the answers were also pretty consistent. Essentially they said in the past year with the help of the surge, NATO was able to halt the Taliban’s momentum but the change was fragile and reversible.
My experience is that senior military officers and NCOs are the glass is half full people. They focus on the solution and not the problem. This is not to say they have their heads in the sand; simply to state they focus on what can be done to fix a problem. Hence when talking about the efforts in training the Afghan forces, they give out a lot of statistics about numbers of people trained, results of literacy training as well as efforts made to get a handle on the corruption.
I’ve participated in two wars and numerous crises and the attitude of most military leaders I’ve worked for has been pretty simple. Here’s the problem, here’s the solution now “let’s go kick some butts”. How would it have been if I worked for someone who said: “Oh this is a problem we can’t fix. This is awful, let’s go home”. It’s been my experience that there is always a solution. The key is having the persistence to find it. This also means going against accepted military procedures and practices if necessary. I’m talking about innovative new ways of doing things, not breaking international laws. I was able to validate this view many times during my career when I was involved in many situations over the years most people felt at the time could not be fixed (read my book A Woman’s War for more specifics).
Early on in my career, if I thought something was messed up or not working, I’d barge into my boss’s office and as only someone born and raised in New Jersey could do put one hand on my hip, wave the other in the air and state something like: “This is screwed up!” My attitude was I was close to the problem and being leaders; they were too far up the chain of command to understand what was really needed in a particular situation. I would get really frustrated when my bosses not only wouldn’t listen to me but would also throw me out of their office.
I finally got smart and started going into their offices not just with a problem but also with a proposed solution, one in which I thoroughly researched and had already coordinated with whichever other organizations and commands that needed to be involved to make it work. In doing the coordination I was always careful to let the other organizations know I was not speaking officially for the command but was simply working on proposed contingency plans I wanted to present to the higher ups and wanted their opinion on how to make it better. I also told them I needed to know if the plan was accepted and they were officially asked to participate what would their issues be. Then we would work to come up with a solution they could live with if asked to help out.
I believe it’s also important not to continue with a strategy that’s not working. This is a tough one and something military planners grope with all the time. How do you know a policy is working? What is the desired end state? Are there metrics that could be used to help determine that? At what point do you institute a course change? What if a course change is needed but the higher ups don’t agree with you? Do we have the needed assets if that becomes necessary? I think this is why the Obama administration put the emphasis on “reversibility” in their recently announced defense strategy. In this new media centric world, if you make a course change, you run the risk of being accused of having failed. Then the argument goes the old policy has failed, why should we trust you to try something new? Maybe that will fail too. I believe the only way to have a successful military strategy is to be able to change directions as needed. I also don’t believe the media should be given the details; primarily, because the enemy will read the news reports and then make changes to their strategy as well.
While researching this blog I went and looked at what some of the senior leaders were saying about Afghanistan. Testifying before the Senate Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security on February 16, 2012, the Director on National Intelligence James Clapper stated the following:
“During the past year, the Taliban lost some ground but that was mainly in places where the International Security Assistance Forces, of ISAF, were concentrated and Taliban senior leaders continued to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan.
ISAF’s efforts to partner with Afghan national security forces are encouraging but corruption and governance challenges continue to threaten the Afghan forces operational effectiveness. Most provinces have established basic governance structures, but they still don’t provide essential services.
The International Security Assistance Forces and the support of Afghanistan’s neighbors notably and particularly Pakistan will remain essential to sustain the gains that have been achieved. And although there’s broad international political support for the Afghan government, there are doubts in many capitals, particularly in Europe about how to fund the Afghanistan initiatives after 2014.”
Testifying before the same group, Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated:
“I would like to begin with current military operations in Afghanistan where we assess that endemic corruption and persistent qualitative deficiencies in the Army and police forces undermined efforts to extend effective governance and security. The Afghan army remains reliant on ISAF for key combat support, such as logistics, intelligence and transport.
While Afghan Army performance improved in some operations when partnered with ISAF units, additional gains will require sustained mentoring and support. Despite successful coalition targeting, the Taliban remains resilient and able to replace leadership losses while also competing to provide governance at the local level. From it’s Pakistani safe havens, the Taliban leadership remains confident of eventual victory.”
According to a January 11, 2012 article in the LA Times the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Afghanistan also paints a dire picture of the situation. In the article, written by Ken Dilanian and David S. Cloud, they state the NIE:
“Appeared at odds with recent optimistic statements by Pentagon officials and have deepened divisions between U.S. intelligence agencies and American military commanders about progress in the decade-old war… it challenges the Pentagon’s claim to have achieved lasting security gains in Taliban strongholds in southern Afghanistan, according to U.S. officials who have read or been briefed on its contents… Although the review gives the U.S. military and its allies credit for driving the Taliban out of some areas last year, it says the gains were not enough to bolster the weak central government in Kabul, haven’t diminished the Taliban’s will to keep fighting, and haven’t instilled confidence among Afghans in much of the country.”
I have never seen any statements from Pentagon types saying the security gains achieved lasting security. I also can’t claim to have heard every Pentagon statement on Afghanistan so it’s possible I missed something. When asked during the Senate testimony about the NIE and its differences with the estimates of military leaders, Director Clapper stated:
“Classically, intelligence is supposedly in the portion of the glass that’s half empty and operational commanders and policy-makers for that matter are often in the portion of the glass that’s half full.
Probably the truth is somewhere in the — at the water line. So I don’t find it a bad thing, in fact I think it’s healthy that there is a contrast between what the operational commanders believe and what the intelligence community assesses.”
Time will tell how good the Afghan forces are. The world is getting the first really good luck as we watch them deal with the crisis caused by the inadvertent burning of Korans by U.S. forces. I continue to be concerned about a hard deadline for the departure of NATO troops but… think I’ll end here. As always my views are my own.
