Some new facts have recently come to light regarding Syria’s sale of missiles to Hezbollah. Both Israeli and U.S. intelligence have been watching Syria replenish Hezbollah’s stock pile of weapons for some time. Shipments from Syria have included rockets and anti-tank missiles. Estimates of said weapons arsenal number approximate 30,000 missiles and rockets. This number has accumulated since the 2006 Lebanon War. In 2009 American Intelligence identified a significant shipment of weapons from Syria to Hezbollah and has since monitored the situation with concern.
In addition, Israel has warned Syria that should it ship the SCUD missiles, Israel will retaliate by bombing targets in Lebanon and Syria. Up to a few weeks ago Syria had refrained from taking this step, which the United States and Israel have considered “crossing the red line”. Israeli Intelligence knew about the shipment that transferred the SCUD missiles and was about to bomb the convoy, but refrained at the last minute presumably to take diplomatic action.
Syria was known to possess several types of SCUD missiles that it could have transferred to Hezbollah, including the SCUD B- range of 300 Kilometers, Scud C- range of 500 kilometers which was developed with the help of North Korea. The SCUD missiles are far more accurate than Katyusha rockets, which were used in the 2006 Lebanon war. The SCUDs are able to hit targets in the heart of Israel, Tel Aviv and its surroundings.
It is important to note that since the Lebanon war the U.N. as part of the cease fire, passed a resolution to prevent weapons from being transferred over the Lebanese border. An international force is placed on that border to prevent such activities. However, Syria has been transferring the weapons in violation of the ceasefire and the U.N. resolution.
Even though the U.S. administration has made several attempts to reach out to the Syrians, including naming the first ambassador to Syria in five years, the Syrians have not stopped the weapons shipments to Hezbollah. The Syrians work in conjunction with Iran, in terms of arming and training Hezbollah fighters. The 2006 Lebanon war is considered a proxy war with Iran by a number of analysts, wherein Iran tried to challenge Israeli standing in the region by unconventional warfare in conjunction with conventional weapons and training- a hybrid strategy that the Israeli Army was not prepared for. Iran felt that they had succeeded with this strategy. Syria’s rearming of Hezbollah benefits Iran, adding to its perceived deterrence power in the region.