Europe Keeps “Talking Turkey”; Is Turkey Listening?

The tables have turned in Turkey’s relationship to Europe over the past decade. That is fitting. Both Turkey and Europe have changed dramatically in those ensuing years, both economically and politically. The potential for Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) was long seen as a measure of Europe’s acceptance of a Muslim nation as its eastern border. Consideration of Turkey’s bid to join the EU was seen, at least in part, as Europe extending a favor eastward. If anything, the reverse may be the case today.

One motive for Turkey’s push to join the EU – a desire to link itself to the West – was negated before the EU was born. Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, five years before the Treaty of Rome created the precursor to today’s EU. NATO’s founding imperative – containing Soviet expansion and responding to its aggression – demanded incorporation of Turkey’s strategic location into the alliance. None of the issues that have long blocked Turkey’s EU hopes – the divergence between its Muslim culture and Europe’s “Christian heritage,” the strength of its democratic institutions, its use of the death penalty – prevented its enlistment by the West as a strategic ally. Though the Soviet Union is gone, NATO remains, and it remains an enduring tie between Turkey, the U.S. and Europe, partly undermining the need for EU membership to bridge the gap.

More recent and profound have been the economic changes on both sides of the EU-Turkey accession equation. While Europe has sputtered and crashed economically in the past decade, Turkey has prospered. Those who caution that Turkey’s democratic development may be suffering have nonetheless praised its economic strength. Former Congressman Robert Wexler, at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last July, cited a World Bank report that outlined the country’s economic success. As “one of the success stories of the global economy,” Turkey tripled its per capital income in the decade between 2003 and 2013, and paid off its IMF loan. Although Wexler went on to express concern over actions by the Turkish government to “delegitimize voices of dissent,” he returned to a basic point that the country’s recent growth provides a firm foundation for its long-term democratic development.

Contrast that with Europe’s recent economic picture. After the financial crisis of 2008, Europe’s primary concern has been the long-term issue of large sovereign debt burdens resting on projections for diminished economic growth. A recent Economist column spoke to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan boasting that the EU needs Turkey more than the reverse. The column cites the domestic troubles that have slowed Erdogan’s stride more recently, but it glosses over the profound shift in status that has taken place between Turkey and Europe. Assuming that the EU succeeds in creating both more stringent common banking regulation and new procedures for budgeting – each large challenges – the union will have withstood the recent crisis as an existential challenge. Not only would Turkey be joining an EU that has very recently had a threat to its life, it would join one that very likely will count on its larger member economies to respond to future economic and financial crises in the zone. Will Turkey see enough benefit in EU membership to be worth taking on that responsibility?

Demographics also play a role. Europe’s populations are aging. Turkey’s median age as of 2011 (29.3 years) was lower than any of the EU member states. Where Europe needs to figure out how fewer workers will support more retirees, Turkey and other MENA nations face an extraordinary need for high levels of sustained job growth to absorb large populations of young workers. Extremes at both ends of the demographic spectrum pose threats to economic and social – and thus political – stability.

Finally, while economic considerations are meaningful, Turkey is engaged in period of cultural change that began with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s leadership in the years between the end of the Ottoman Empire and World War II. Ataturk did all he could to create a Turkish Republic that was secular and aligned with the West. Those Turks who favored Ataturk’s vision now struggle against those who favor a national identity more closely tied to its Islamic heritage. This is a cultural tension that may never be fully resolved. But only the Turkish people can resolve it.