Nicholas Kristof’s recent op-ed in the New York Times highlighted Richard Holbrooke’s concern for the declining relationship between the US and Pakistan and, essentially, pronounced the need for America not to forsake Pakistan, as tumultuous as relations may be. Pakistan, without question, is grappling with a litany of issues: rampant poverty and natural disasters; protection of minorities amongst fomenting extremism; ensuring democratic rule amid a military state; transnational terrorism; and safeguarding nuclear weapons. Looking at these, we see that America and Pakistan have shared interests, and when we lay them out to predict decision-making behavior – assigning values according to each state’s interest (‘utility scale’) – we should be able to reliably develop strategic and tactical policies that account for these interests, right?
The answer is evidently wrong because the most pivotal concern for Pakistan – its existential fear of India – is not accounted for in this value set. Strategic competition with India does not merely deserve the highest rating in the value set; rather, it should be noted as a contingent condition, which if absent, vetoes any suggested action; in logic lingo, it is necessary, but not sufficient. Thus, any policy that adversely affects Pakistan’s ability to counter Indian influence and expansion is irrational and, hence, doomed from the beginning.
While this observation seems evident or academic, its logic is critical to addressing the divergence in utility scales that is driving instability in Afghanistan. The US, for example, has adapted an irrational strategy in dealing with the war in Afghanistan and the undocumented, grey war in Pakistan, because it is not concretely addressing Pakistan’s strategic competition with India; if this is accounted for in appropriate policies, then Pakistan can seriously contemplate them. The problem lies herein, though, for if the US seeks to address this necessary condition, it will need to adopt concrete, radical policy alternatives that may damage its relationship with India and throw (even more) weight behind state-sponsored covert support for insurgencies, highlighting the dichotomy between American and Pakistani interests.
(Part II will address radical policy alternatives that could prove sufficient enough to enjoy Pakistani and US partnership on addressing instability in Afghanistan and the grey war in Pakistan.)
