The current situation in Afghanistan demonstrates something that may seem surprising: counterinsurgency would probably work. The problem is, the United States has been reluctant to actually attempt it. The policy brief, The Trust Deficit, published last month by Open Society Foundations, demonstrates this pretty clearly. The document, created after interviewing over 250 Afghans in focus groups and individually, paints a very pessimistic portrait of ISAF’s efforts. The report states that “many Afghans are angry and resentful at the international presence in Afghanistan.” It’s “hard to overstate the level of Afghan resentment over civilian casualties, or detentions, in Afghanistan.” Afghans are enraged about the lack of legal accountability, particularly regarding detentions:
A former detainee held at the U.S. Bagram Theater Internment Facility who was arrested with his brother in a 2009 night raid explained, “I thought the U.S. had come to build our country and to help our people. But my brother was a principal at a school; and I was a farmer. And what was the fault of the women and children who were in the house when it was raided and destroyed? I went to open the gate for them and they shot at me. Why are people being arrested for no reason?”
Furthermore:
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings Philip Alston noted after a visit to Afghanistan in 2008 that in most cases it was virtually impossible for average Afghans to get even basic answers about what happened to a detained loved one. The few public findings that have been released came only after extensive public pressure, and even then they have been cursory and lacked transparency into the methodology of the investigation.
And despite the fact that most civilian casualties are caused by insurgents, Afghans blame ISAF:
When a man from Kandahar was asked whom he blamed for civilian casualties, he explained, “Most of the responsibility belongs to international forces because they have all the equipment, support, training, command structure, and facilities that they need. And yet so many casualties happen.”
So the two things that frustrate Afghans the most are the lack of security and legal accountability. Since these are two pf the primary elements of counterinsurgency, the logical conclusion is that counterinsurgency might have been a good option, instead of doing something else and calling it counterinsurgency, which is the current strategy.
On security in The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, see paragraph I-67:
Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an AO [area of operations]. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.
With 28 million people living in Afghanistan and around 150,000 ISAF troops, that’s about 5 troops for every 1000 Afghans. Add members of the Afghan National Army into the mix and we’re still only around 11 troops for every 1000 Afghans. With a troop ratio closer to levels recommended by the Field Manual, ISAF might be able to provide the security that Afghans currently crave. On law and accountability in the Field Manual, see paragraph I-132:
Illegitimate actions are those involving the use of power without authority – whether committed by government officials, security forces, or counterinsurgents. Such actions include unjustified or excessive use of force, unlawful detention, torture, and punishment without trial. Efforts to build a legitimate government through illegitimate actions are self-defeating, even against insurgents who conceal themselves amid noncombatants and flout the law. Moreover, participation in COIN operations by U.S forces must follow United States law, including domestic laws, treaties to which the United States is party, and certain HN [host-nation] laws… Any human rights abuses or legal violations committed by U.S. forces quickly become known throughout the local populace and eventually around the world. Illegitimate actions undermine both long- and short-term COIN efforts.
Instead of doing this, the Obama administration has decided to deprive detainees in Bagram of any means for challenging their detention. And U.S. courts have gone along with it. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, ruling on this issue earlier this year, quoted the Eisentrager decision of 1950:
Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.
But this is counterinsurgency, a completely different kind of war, and actually, it’s “difficult to devise more effective fettering” of counterinsurgency than depriving Bagram detainees of access to courts.
The same thing that happened to communism with the fall of the Soviet Union is happening to counterinsurgency. The Soviet Union had nothing to do with what Marx wrote, nothing to do with workers controlling the means of production, the original principle behind socialism, and though it was a dictatorship, it was not a dictatorship of the proletariat, as Marx conceived. And yet, when the Soviet Union fell, the West was inundated with proclamations that communism had failed, the entire idea of it discredited. Yes, it may look good on paper, but this is what happens when you put it into practice, so it’s no use giving it another try. Exactly the thing people say about counterinsurgency today. But like Ghandi said of Western civilization, I still think counterinsurgency would be a good idea.
