China in Haiti: Preparing the Chinese people for a greater role on the world stage?

In the midst of the tragedy of the earthquake in Haiti, China has given the international community a glimpse of its humanitarian spirit. The Chinese government wasted no time in dispatching a team of 15 rescuers along with several millions of dollars in aid, and later sent 45 or so medical staff.  At the same time, the PRC found a valuable opportunity to engender good will with Haiti, a country whose historically close relations with Taiwan have stood in the way of formal diplomatic relations.  State media noted that the first Chinese rescuers arrived days before Taiwan’s did.

But the Chinese government has achieved more in Haiti than minor diplomatic and public relations victories; for domestic audiences, the affair was turned into a nationalist spectacle and used to disseminate to the masses a barely hidden moral: to represent China in working for the good of the international community is glorious (more or less).

The existence of a concerted messaging campaign was first evident in the lop-sided state media coverage of the Haitian calamity.  State news broadcasts were dominated by stories on the work of the Chinese rescue team and the Chinese lives lost, with relatively little attention paid to the unfolding scope of the calamity or its macabre details.

Most striking was the pomp and circumstance surrounding the repatriation and burial of eight PRC peacekeepers killed in the Port-au-Prince earthquake.  The attention of state media was riveted on the return of their bodies last week, which culminated with a heavily-publicized memorial for these “martyred heroes” in the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery, the resting place of many distinguished Communist Party leaders and heroes.   No fewer than nine members of China’s State Council, including Mssrs. Hu and Wen, were shown solemnly bowing before the caskets and then personally delivering condolences to the bereaved.  It was said to be the most elaborate state funeral for a non-leader since the founding of the republic (footage is worth a look even if it’s only in Chinese, here).

The meaning of the almost excessive grandeur of the ceremony was helpfully interpreted by a few Chinese foreign policy heavyweights.  In a sina.com article, China National Security University professor Wang Dawei believed this funeral was “mainly about symbolizing the great importance and regard China has for its international peacekeeping work.” Zhu Feng, a reknowned scholar of international relations at Peking University with connections to policy making circles, noted that although this was the first time department level cadres have died overseas, this “was actually not the main reason for having the funeral.” In Zhu’s analysis, the hoopla was mainly about

educating domestic audiences on peacekeeping and other international actions, as well as showing respect to those who sacrificed their lives. For foreign audiences, [it was about] displaying that as a great power, China has the resolve and sense of responsibility to actively participate in international affairs.

With his allusion to “active participation” (积极参与) Zhu is no doubt referring to one of Hu Jintao’s five principle of international relations, recently unveiled in the party magazine Outlook Weekly (here, in a quick and rough English summary; here for the original article in Chinese).

The memorial ceremony for the Chinese peacekeepers and the non-stop positive domestic coverage of China’s good work in Haiti strongly suggest the existence of a carefully planned media campaign, perhaps aimed to condition domestic public opinion to support national adventures abroad in the future.  If nothing else, this should be taken as further confirmation that President Hu and his colleagues are serious about having China gradually take on some of the more burdensome work required of a great power in international affairs.  As the emphasis on “joint responsibility”, “global harmony” and “shared development” in Hu’s five principles underscore, China’s leaders are also serious in their desire to contribute to humanitarian causes.  While Hu’s idealistic foreign policy doctrine should of course be taken with at least a few grains of salt, it would be foolish to lose sight of the fact that China genuinely wants to be a force for good in the world.  This last point may confound knee-jerk critics of China, but it is worth keeping in mind.

On a lighter note, the awkwardness of holding such an elaborate state funeral for the victims of a random natural disaster did not escape the notice of many in China’s blogosphere. One prominently displayed state media photo showed China’s austere and imposing Public Security Bureau central headquarters with its flag at half-mast, prompting Chinese internet users to sardonically question the legality of such a grandiose and rarely seen display of mourning for people who were really just victims of an unfortunate accident.  Another, referencing the “martyred hero” status of the deceased, quipped:

…now I hope when an earthquake comes it will take care of [kill] me too …I will be labeled a hero, my parents can shake the hands of the national leaders and I won’t have to worry anymore about housing prices, or for paying for my parents’ healthcare if they get sick…

While foreign observers are always taken aback by how little public relations savvy China’s media and propaganda mandarins seem to possess, what they may not know is that many Chinese are actually constantly thinking the same thing.