China hosts talks with Kachin rebels

As foreign tourists flock to an apparently open and reforming Myanmar, ethnic conflict continues in the regions along its borders. One such conflict involves the Kachin, a Christian/Buddhist/animist people who have been fighting for greater autonomy and political rights for decades.  A 17-year ceasefire between the government and the Kachin broke down in June 2011, resulting in tens of thousands of refugees fleeing the region. After the failure of a dozen rounds of talks and a return to intense fighting, the government announced a unilateral ceasefire in January with the Kachin, but battle resumed shortly with the government army capturing a key outpost. The most recent fighting has centered on the town of Laiza in Kachin State, from which the Kachin army controls an autonomous area of the state. The Myanmarese Army has been pressing to capture Laiza or other crucial military positions, deploying fighter jets and heavy artillery. Human rights organizations have reported several civilian deaths in the region due to the fighting.

Since the Chinese province of Yunnan shares a border with Myanmar, Beijing has silently attempted to contain the situation – while trying to maintain its facade of non-interference with other countries. But following reports of at least four artillery shells landing within Yunnan this year, allegedly fired by the armed wing of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Beijing has taken a more public and vocal role in trying to bring the warring parties together to negotiate a peace.  Beijing is worried about its investments in Kachin State, where it has large investments in the local jade trade, mineral exploration, hydroelectric power, retail and agro-industry.  Beijing also fears an uncontrolled influx of refugees, some of which are already living in hotels and the homes of family and friends in Yunnan. At least 7,000 Kachin refugees have crossed the border in the twelve months from June 2011-June 2012, according to Human Rights Watch. There are reports that many refugees have not received adequate aid or protection from China and were forced to return, though Chinese state media claimed that those who went back had done so of their own accord. The Kachin, called Jingpo in China, are among 56 ethnic groups that are officially recognized by the Chinese government. According to official statistics from 2000, 132,158 Kachin are living in southern China, mostly in Yunnan Province.

Beijing’s latest attempt at bringing peace to the region occurred last week, as representatives of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) — and its armed wing the KIA — met government officials led by President’s Office Minister Aung Min in the Chinese border town of Ruili from March 11-12,  The talks were attended by Wang Yingfan, a high-ranking foreign ministry official from China who has been assigned to monitor all future talks between the Myanmar government and the Kachin.  Sources say the talks broke down after China  put heavy pressure on the KIA to accept an unconditional ceasefire with the Myanmar government.  The two sides, however, agreed to hold further round of talks, but over the weekend Kachinland News reported that fighting had broken out again between Myanmar forces and the KIA.

Given the failure of Beijing’s latest attempt to reconcile the peace, the worry now is for a more serious spillover of refugees and continued fighting. How Beijing reacts is paramount, especially in light of recent reports of Chinese troops in the area undergoing intense military training in the hills of Yunnan Province. The training comes after China has placed soldiers along its border with Myanmar in January, in response to the renewal of conflict between the Myanmar government and the Kachin. Given the strained history between the two neighbors, China needs to tread lightly. The Manchus invaded Myanmar four times in the 1700s, and Chinese maps once showed vast swathes of territory of northern and eastern Myanmar as part of their territory.  Myanmarese have not forgotten Chinese military support for the insurgent Communist Party of Burma (CPB) from 1968-78.  The recently inaugurated Chinese leadership will need to be more cognizant of the effects of an increasingly aggressive foreign policy on neighboring populations, especially in light of territorial disputes with its neighbors in the East and South China Seas. Beijing needs to publicly disavow its stated policy of noninterference, stick to diplomatic means to help solve the conflict, and not add fuel to the fire through increased militarization on its borders with Myanmar.