Last week’s Economist had a couple of nice articles on China’s National Day on October 1st, when the Chinese showcased their military, including the DF-31 nuclear-tipped ICBM, which can hit any city in America. Most of these armaments have “Made in China” tags, not unlike all of our clothes and toys.
The Economist leader on the subject lamented this show of militarism, even comparing modern-day China to Prussia/Germany and Japan in the late 19th century. I recall attending Bastille Day celebrations along the Champs Elysee in Paris in years past, when the glory-obsessed French showcased their military hardware; yet nobody got bent out of shape about French militarism.
Yet the rise of China should rightfully be compared to the rise of powers-past, such as Germany, Japan, Russia and the U.S. We should consider how status-quo powers such as Britain might have mismanaged some of these rises in the 19th century and how we might avoid such mismanagement with regard to China today. The blame for German militarism rests largely on the shoulders of Germans, this is true, especially on the fragile shoulders of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his cabal (though even Bismarck shares some of the blame). Even so, the Western Powers could have better managed Germany’s rise. They lacked an agenda for providing Wilhelmine Germany with enhanced international privileges to match its rising power. Matching privileges with power is key to peacefully managing a power’s rise. And, anchoring a rising power in the institutions of the status quo is likewise critical.
With the Concert of Europe and the Congress system of Metternich dead by the late 19th century, there were no international institutions to anchor Germany. China, by contrast, is a card-carrying member of the U.N. Security Council, the WTO, the IMF and World Bank, the G-20, G-2, and other institutions. Furthermore, although China may still feel somewhat dissatisfied because Taiwan and other East Asian assets (such as oil reserves in the South China Sea) are not being handed to it on a silver platter, Chinese privileges in the world are being equated step-by-step with Chinese power. The “peaceful rise” of the dragon is taking place, at least in part thanks to Western statecraft.
The parallel with Wilhelmine Germany is a nice one, but on one key parameter, China falls short of authoritarian Germany. Germany of that era was a pluralist, if not a liberal, society. There was the Reichstag, in which the Social Democratic opposition was well represented. Sure, the Kaiser and his ministers were not beholden to the German parliament. Yet the nascent democratic institutions were there, whereas Chinese communism has not provided such vehicles for democratic development. Likewise, Bismarck had provided Germany of those days with the most progressive social security safety net in Europe, neutralizing in part the appeal of the left. In China’s Workers’ Paradise, the social safety net is woefully inadequate.
A few months ago, observers worried that the global financial crisis could weaken the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power. As long as the CCP delivered economic growth north of 8% a year, few questions were asked by the populace. But this social contract was seen as at risk. These days, observers are applauding the resilience of the Chinese economy at weathering the storm. However, China’s recovery has been driven by a huge fiscal stimulus and a massive state-directed lending boom, which could lead to banking sector weakness in the future. True, China is much less-leveraged than the US or almost any Western nation, so it has room to be a little profligate. Nevertheless, an economic shock in China, followed by political turmoil, cannot be ruled out. Note that China’s leaders told Beijingers earlier this month to stay home in their crowded apartments to watch the National Day Parade on television, instead of thronging over to the Forbidden City, which couldn’t have a more suggestive name. Since 1989, popular protests are the nightmare of China’s leaders.
