Changes sweeping the Middle East leave Washington scrambling for a policy

Hosni Mubarak is gone and the streets of Cairo look like a million Mardi Gras. But as Egyptians celebrate their revolution, a different kind of transition has taken place in Lebanon.  In less than thirty days, the pro-Western March 14 coalition shifted from majority to opposition, leaving Washington scrambling for a strategy.

The trouble is over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), a UN-led tribunal charged with investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. At the time, Syria was widely believed to be behind the hit. Massive protests ensued and Damascus was forced to end its 30 year occupation of Lebanon.  After four years of tense stagnation between sectarian rivals, a mostly Sunni-Christian coalition of MP’s, led by the slain leader’s son (Saad Hariri), swept into power in June 2009.

Suddenly Washington had a viable ally in Lebanon. The new Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, was close to the Saudi royal family and known to be pro-Western. In the parliamentary elections of June 2009, Hariri’s March 14 coalition won the majority.  The Obama administration supported March 14 and was pleased with the victory, but by December of 2009 reality had reared its ugly head.

As Saad Hariri tried to form a government, he quickly came to the realization that it would be impossible without Syrian support. At the urging of Riyadh, Hariri traveled to Damascus to make amends with the man he believed behind his father’s death, Syrian President Bashar Assad. Thus, Hariri was forced to publically acknowledge Syria’s “privileged role” in Lebanon. Soon after, Damascus’ tentacles began to repenetrate and Lebanon’s shortly live tryst with sovereignty was at an end.

Over the next year, all the gains made by March 14 were undone and the situation was returning to the status quo. The exception was the STL, which Hariri (and therefore Washington) still had in his pocket. But the focus of the investigation had shifted from Syria to Hizballah, and members of the Shiite militia were expected to be indicted. Washington clung to this, as an indictment against Hizballah would strike a deep blow to the organization, alienating it from the Lebanese people and Sunni Muslims in general.

When it became clear that the focus of the Tribunal was now on Hizballah, the group used all of its leverage to get Prime Minister Hariri to publicly question the STL and to distance himself from it. Short of acquiescing, Hariri promised that if members of Hizballah were named, that they would be considered “rogue elements within the organization” only; he reaffirmed Hizballah’s status as the defender of Lebanon from Israel; and he proclaimed that Hizballah’s arsenal was not up for debate. But he would not disavow the Tribunal.

While Hariri’s concessions were extremely generous, for Hizballah it was not enough. The group wanted the Tribunal to go away. When this didn’t happen, Hizballah played its hand and withdrew its March 8 coalition’s 11 ministers, collapsing the government.

For Saad Hariri, this seemed like a temporary setback. He was still the Prime Minister and his coalition had a majority. He would just begin forming another government. Indeed, at the time of the parliamentary elections in June 2009, he did have a majority. But since then, the political winds had shifted and with it the alliance of Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader who controlled enough seats to shift majority to minority. When Jumblatt thrust his support behind Hizballah and March 8, Hariri was finished.

Hariri was now a “caretaker” prime minister. Billionaire businessman MP Najib Makati nominated himself prime minister. President Suleiman accepted. The Parliament voted and the new majority confirmed. Suddenly Lebanon had a Hizballah-backed, pro-Syrian Sunni Prime Minister attempting to form a new government.

And that is where we are today. As far as the Tribunal is concerned, indictments from the Special Prosecutor were handed down to the judge, who now has about a month to decide if he wants to issue arrest warrants. Monday marks the six-year anniversary of Rafik Hariri’s murder.

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These are tumultuous times for US foreign policy in the Middle East. America’s strategy of supporting despots in the name of stability seems to be coming undone. Revolts in Tunisia and Egypt have shown that previously apathetic Arabs would no longer tolerate oppressive and corrupt US-backed regimes. Egypt’s Mubarak and Tunisia’s Ben-Ali had been in power for more than 50 years combined. Now both countries face an uncertain future and that includes their relations with the United States.

In Egypt in particular, America missed a great opportunity. Though Mubarak was popular in Washington and Tel Aviv, he was despised throughout the Arab world by a citizenry that viewed him as a dictator and a puppet of the West. As protests erupted in Cairo and Alexandria, demonstrators were met by state security forces hurling tear gas from canisters labeled “Made in America”.

Now Mubarak is gone and we have to face the Egyptians that have suffered for the last thirty years with our help*. Let’s hope they are not as pissed as the Iranian’s were in 1979, after they over threw another American-backed despised despot, Shah Reza Pahlavi. The United States is haunted to this day by our flawed and short-sighted policies in Iran.

*From the Carnegie Endowment: “As for U.S. security and military aid to Egypt, which is about $1.3 billion annually, it does not aim to strengthen Egyptian military power against any external threat, as this would be contrary to the declared U.S. objective of ensuring Israeli security and maintaining Israeli military supremacy over its Arab neighbors, including Egypt. Instead, this aid is devoted mainly to strengthening the regime’s domestic security and its ability to confront popular movements. This hardly enhances USAID’s popularity among the Egyptian people or educated elites.”

American foreign policy in the Middle East is based on two principles: oil and Israel. For the last 43 years this strategy has been a success, but only when measured against those two principles. The cost has been staggering: bloody, expensive, and unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; unconditional support for Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the Lebanese; and the support for despots throughout the Arab world have may have achieved cheap oil and Israeli stability, but the results could prove to be catastrophic as America loses influence on this key region at an alarming rate.

Since 1994, when the USS Cole was bombed off the coast of Yemen by a fledgling Al Qaeda organization, America has been paying the price for the aforementioned strategy. The talking heads will tell you that that “they hate us for our freedoms” but more informed sources (Robert Baer, Stephen Walt, and Michael Sheuer for example) will tell you that it is American foreign policy that invites such trouble  .

Thankfully, it seems that militant Islamism doesn’t appear to be the answer that Arabs were looking for, as demonstrated by the relatively peaceful protests in Tunisia and Egypt.  But those transitions to democracy came not because of American policies, but in spite of them.  When the dust settles over the next few months, what will we have? The emerging new governments are not guaranteed to be virulently anti-American, but we will have surely lost significant stature.

Tunis and Cairo will not likely continue to be the stalwart allies they were in the past. This doesn’t mean that Egypt will be pulling out of its peace agreement with Israel (which would be a complete calamity), but when US policy makers look to their counterparts in those countries, they will see far fewer friendly faces than they’re used to. The loss of Tunisia is not such a big deal, but Egypt is a country of 80 million people and very strategic in its location.  For America, a healthy relationship with Egypt is critical.

With US military resources stretched thin on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, America does not project the same might as it once did, especially considering that everyone knows we had to borrow money from China to finance those wars. Now our most powerful ally in the region is Saudi Arabia, another unpopular regime backed by America.

Which brings us back to Lebanon. During most recent political crisis in Lebanon, Riyadh and Damascus were working behind the scenes on a deal that would have averted the current crisis. All sides (Saudi Arabia, Syria, Hariri, and Hizballah) came to an agreement they could live with but it was undone by Washington at the last minute when the Obama administration reportedly refused to let Hariri go through with it. The result was Hariri losing the Premiership and Hizballah taking charge of Lebanon. Hizballah, Iran, and Syria all won; America and Saudi Arabia lost. From Al Akhbar on January 24:

“The second conclusion of this week is that the Saudis, sponsoring the March 14 coalition, have walked yet again into a minefield that exploded in their face. The Saudis repeated, yet again, their experience in Palestine that caused their alienation, their experience in Yemen where they held their breaths and received one blow after the other, their experience in Iraq that made them regionally powerless, and their confrontation with militant Islam that turned them into enemies. And here they are now exiting Lebanon, weak, humiliated, with no one able to lend them a helpful hand.”

Not only did this course of action weaken Hariri, more importantly it weakened Saudi Arabia, whose domestic and regional authority is sure to be called into question in the wake of the Egyptian Revolution. Washington and Riyadh know this, and there is little doubt that precautions are being taken to ensure stability at any cost. As powerful as Egypt is, it does not produce much oil. It is absolutely critical to the United States that Gulf oil continues to flow.

Over the last five years, Hariri has learned a harsh lesson when it comes to seeking support from the America: democracies and despots are supported simultaneously as Washington sees fit. The problem is multiplied exponentially when you consider that countless others across the region have learned the lesson too.

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As Prime Minister-designate Mikati (a close personal friend of Syria’s President Assad) attempts to form his government, Hizballah is in the driver’s seat in Lebanon. March 14 has vowed it will not participate in Mikati’s new government, but it is unclear how long Hariri can keep his coalition together. March 14 has been the most substantial political force in Lebanon to oppose Syria, and it has been a goal of Damascus to see it shatter. Perhaps this is where we are heading, or perhaps March 14 is stalling until the results of the STL are made public.

Whatever the case, the winds of change are blowing in the Middle East. The question is whether Washington can adjust its strategies to capitalize on the new political calculus. Drastic changes need to be made, but as America has demonstrated in the past, it turns like a cruise ship. Hopefully we can avoid the iceberg of history that is clearly in our path.