Central Asia: Revisiting "Demographic Upheavals"

The first tidal wave
In 1996, Martha Brill Olcott wrote an important paper on the pressures for migration in Central Asia during the 1990's: “Demographic upheavals in Central Asia.”  In this paper, she discussed the many Central Asian natives, primarily of Russian ethnicity, who picked up stakes and left the five newly-independent Central Asian states to head back to a Russia they did not know.  In Olcott's words:

  . . . millions of people have chosen to suffer the costs of relocation from Central Asia, even though no one has really wanted them to leave.  The demographic changes occurring from this relaocation will make the transition to independence more difficult for Central Asian states, as well as change the nature of the societies evolving there.

The reasons for this were varied: 1. the leadership in Central Asia emphasized the ethnic heroism of predominant ethnic groups (e.g., Turkmen in Turkmenistan or Tamerlane in Uzbekistan), which (perhaps unintentionally) made the new independent environment look far less welcoming; 2. with less aid from a Soviet center, social service fabric broke down, making poverty more acute and economic hardship more dangerous; 3. the maintenance of industrial complexes hit the skids, meaning that ethnic Russian skilled workers or management, faced worse working conditions, and 4. the imposition of a national language, such as Uzbek or Kirghiz, for official documents and proceedings over Central Asia's lingua franca, Russian.  No doubt Central Asia's natives and outmigrants could give a variety more reasons, including instances where anti-Russian resentment flourished.  In the case of Tajikistan, the 1992-1997 Civil War was a powerful inducement to leave if at all possible.  According to World Bank, 40,000 went to Turkmenistan alone. 

These are the statistics cited by Olcott (1996), who also said it was difficult to get good numbers in such reactive conditions:

In Uzbekistan, 17% of ethnic Russians left between 1989 and 1996.
In Kyrgyzstan, 20% left, although many returned in 1995-1996, in Olcott's estimation, based upon policies designed to attract them to return.
In Tajikistan, Russian ethnic population decreased by 41%. 

Two items that might not be true now, but were in the 1990's:
First, Olcott reports that Russia did not want ethnic Russians to leave Central Asian states or the Ukraine, in order to keep a significant population that would presumably retain loyal ties to Russia and identify with Russian interests.  In the case of the Ukraine, such a sentiment has certainly borne out, as the less-Russian side of Ukraine pushed for the Orange Revolution, and the more Russian-populated regions of Ukraine wanted everyone to go home and get back to work.

Second, in Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs from other states were welcomed into the state in order to dilute the Russian influence on voting and presumably ensure more Kazakh solidarity.  Olcott writes that this strategy backfired somewhat, as ethnic Kazakhs from Mongolia and elsewhere did not share an exact language or cultural practice with former Soviet Kazakhs. 

Little new data
Professor Olcott's poll results are over ten years old.  1995 is also the last year for which we have census figures of this sort for Central Asian republics, which means that the ethnic and religious information one can find on the region is also inaccurate.  Therefore, looking at CIA statistics or State Department Country Reports (that use the CIA statistics) gives an outdated picture.  When reading about the ethnic or religious composition of the region, one must substantially discount any Russian population in most of these states.  And yet, one must not discount their presence altogether.

There have been enough demographic upheavals since 1995 to warrant gathering new information.  However, we can only guess or estimate these demographic flows based upon isolated news reports.  One thing is certain: migration activity is a constant pressure within Central Asia, and its streams and eddies mark opportunities and challenges for Central Asia's governments. 

The bulk of migration in Central Asia now is economic migration largely unrelated to ethnicity and violence.  I will feature some issues of economic migration in a subsequent post.

References:
Check out the FPA Migration blog by Rich Basas and Cathryn Cluver, about the importance of good population statistics
See this blog's “Worth Reading Page” for Martha Brill Olcott's pioneering article
International Organization of Migration's country pages, accessible from Central Asia portal page:
Robert Greenall for BBC (2005, November 23) on Central Asia's ethnic Russians with estimated population data

Photos: OrganizingLA.blog; GardenVisit.com; WUMag.Kiev; OSCE