Future historians may look back on the Georgian Crisis and define the attack on South Ossetia by Georgia as the proximate cause of the conflict while finding that several factors, including oil, ethnicity, nationalism, and alliances were the ultimate causes of the conflict. In Cracks in the Foundation: NATO's New Troubles, Cato Institute Research Fellow Stanley Kober examines the role of alliances and focuses on NATO expansion:
When the Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact dissolved, Russia agreed to live with NATO — even with a NATO that expanded to include a united Germany. But a triumphant alliance decided it should expand and take in new members. Incredibly, like Germany's leaders a century before, American leaders (and their foreign allies) did not appreciate that alliances provoke the formation of counter-alliances. As NATO has expanded, Russia's relations with China, in particular, have grown apace, leading initially to the formation of the Shanghai Five and then to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In other words, just as the Triple Entente gradually emerged in opposition to the Triple Alliance, so the SCO seems to be emerging in response to NATO expansion.
Can the Georgian conflict be seen in the context of an expanding NATO and a Russian desire to push back? Perhaps those future historians will note that although creating counterbalancing alliances is a normal and expected process in the international system, attacking neighbors to push back against a defensive alliance is likely to have the opposite effect than intended. Which is more likely: NATO will react by pulling back; or, NATO will react by rapidly adding Georgia to the alliance? There is some evidence for the latter, German leader Angela Merkel said yesterday that Georgia, “is on track to become a member of NATO.” If Russia ever meant to counter NATO expansion by demonstrating that there was nothing to fear from post-Soviet Russia, invading Georgia may have sent the wrong signal.
