Castaneda's Err Apparent

In a recent article on Project Syndicate, Jorge Castañeda equates President Calderón’s war on drugs to President Bush’s invasion of Iraq. He argues: “Just like Bush’s invasion of Iraq, Mexico’s drug war was a war of choice. It was a war that Calderón should not have declared, that cannot be won, and that is doing enormous damage to Mexico.”

The former foreign minister of Mexico is way off target. First and foremost, Calderón did not create America’s appetite for drugs, nor has he nurtured the drug trade in Mexico. Since coming to office in 2006 he has exposed, and disrupted, the grim realities of a narco nation. He could have ignored the reality if he wanted to, but he certainly did not contrive a threat the way President Bush apparently did with regard to W.M.D. in Iraq.

Second, viewing Calderón’s actions as elective overlooks another crucial distinction, that between an internal and foreign threat. The growing reach of Mexico’s drug gangs is in part a product of PRI collusion during its seven decades of authoritarian rule that ended in 2000, and in part a product of the US crackdown on Caribbean transit routes in the wake of 9/11. (For a good historical overview of Mexico’s drug gangs see Shannon O’ Neil’s article in the July/August edition of Foreign Affairs.) Over the past decade, Colombian cocaine has been increasingly pushed up to America via the land route through Mexico. In short, Mexico’s problem predates Calderón’s presidency.

So why did Calderón decide to go after the drug gangs? According to Castañeda the newly-elected president declared a war on drugs in 2006 to bolster his democratic legitimacy. This is a curious assertion given that Calderón soon enjoyed widespread support throughout Mexico, if for no other reason than the unwinding of the PRD after the election. But Calderón’s efforts were not singularly directed to quelling drug gangs; after two years in office, the president had claimed more legislative successes than his predecessor—Dr. Castañeda’s boss from 2000 to 2003—enjoyed in his entire six-year term.

The falling approval rates of the Mexican president and increasing civilian casualties from the drug war are cited as evidence that the drug war isn’t popular. It is undeniable that President Calderón’s approval ratings have waned of late, down to 52%. A return to reality, no doubt, for a man who enjoyed approval ratings above 60% for the past two years, despite increasing casualties from the drug war and Mexico’s slide into recession.

Castañeda cites the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) as evidence of the feckless drug war. Based on statistics contained in the study, he argues that seizures have decreased and drug production has increased since the war on drugs commenced. Yet, somehow, Castañeda managed to overlook the key findings of the INCSR. The conclusion of the 2009 INCSR states:

The restructuring of security forces, coupled with the military’s strong engagement in the fight to dismantle major drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), has proven to be effective. These efforts led to numerous arrests of key narco-traffickers, the discovery of clandestine drug laboratories, and a dramatic decline in the importation of methamphetamine and precursors into the United States. The Calderon Administration is courageously dealing with increased violence as DTOs resist and fight among each other.

It is true that since 2006 Mexico has come to produce more drugs, whereas it was previously just a trafficking hub. Increased drug production in Mexico is certainly cause for alarm, but this may just as well be a product of the declining production in Colombia, supporting the phenomenon known as the “ballooning effect.”

What is the solution? Castañeda proposes a gradual drawdown that will “allow the drug war to vanish from television screens and newspapers, and have its place taken by other wars: on poverty, on petty crime, and for economic growth.” Not a strategy for unbridled success, mind you, but a “least bad” outcome preferable to “prolonging a fight that cannot be won.”

The major err of Castañeda’s argument should be apparent: he isn’t arguing for any solution to Mexico’s drug woes in so much as he is advocating that policymakers turn a blind eye. That has been the story of Mexican governance in the twentieth century, and it needn’t be a de facto perpetuity clause. Mexico’s traditional elites—like Castañeda’s family—would be comforted by the return of an implicit agreement wherein trafficking is largely condoned and politicians are protected from the violence. Meanwhile, the poor would be ravaged by the proliferation of low-grade drugs, and the creeping reach of drug gangs into small business would stymie the aspirations of the middle class.

The faults of Calderón are likely to stem not from his intents, but his constancy. By switching his focus from the war on drugs to a war on poverty, as Castañeda suggests, and as Calderón indicated in a recent address to the nation, deep-seeded changes in Mexico will be supplanted by superficial reforms that kick the can down the road.