Can Lula Mediate the Iran Nuclear Standoff?

By Sean Goforth (from a piece originally published by World Politics Review)

Last week, Lula was informally tapped to mediate negotiations between Iran and the West over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reportedly told his “brother,” Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, that Iran was prepared to accept Brazilian mediation “in principle.” The starting point for talks will be the same as last fall’s nuclear fuel swap deal, whereby Iran was to ship its enriched uranium to France and Russia for reprocessing, after which the reprocessed fuel would be returned to Iran for use in the Tehran medical reactor.

But while Lula is perceived as among the world’s pre-eminent diplomats, in this case he is not an impartial mediator: He firmly opposes further sanctions against Iran.

Part of his rationale grows from Brazil’s own checkered nuclear past. In the 1970s and 1980s, Brazil’s military government amped up the country’s nuclear program. After years of uncertainty regarding Brazil’s nuclear intentions, the combined effect of a transition to democracy, prolonged recession, and the mounting costs associated with developing a nuclear program eventually defused the proliferation threat. In 1988, Brazil’s Constitution officially forbade nuclear weapons. Brazil then invited the IAEA in, and eventually signed on to the NPT. Today, Brazil operates two nuclear power plants for electricity generation, and a third should become operational this year or next.

But Iran is not simply Brazil, 30 years on. Even by the more anxious estimates of the day, Brazil’s program was smaller than Iran’s program is now suspected to be. Most importantly, Brazil’s past ambitions reflected a regional rivalry with Argentina whose impact was unlikely to spill outside of the continent. The destabilizing effects of an Iran in possession of a nuclear weapons capacity would surely resound well beyond the Middle East.

Any attempt by Lula to mediate the current standoff must also be understood in the context of Brazil’s efforts to shape global affairs. Brazil is pursuing an agenda of “autonomy through diversification,” which refers to autonomy from the U.S. by diversifying economic and political ties. The nation is also at the vanguard of pushing for reform of prominent international institutions in order to make the “old clubs” more representative of the global power structure of the 21st century. Taken together, these strategies indicate an effort to foster ties with nations outside the traditional Western orbit, while working to recast Western institutions. Significantly, too, Brazil places an emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention, a posture that puts it more in line with emerging powers like China and India than the U.S. and its Western allies.

Why then would the U.S. acquiesce to Lula’s mediation? The harsh reality is that even talks chaired by a biased, but pragmatic, Brazilian team are better than no talks at all. As a recently leaked memo from U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates makes clear, the U.S. is out of options when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program. Also, if Brazil — and Turkey, which is also playing a diplomatic role — try to bridge Tehran and Washington’s differences only to find that earnest engagement from Tehran isn’t forthcoming, it may further isolate Iran in international opinion.

Given the array of impediments, Brazilian mediation is unlikely to prove decisive — or satisfactory — to the United States, Britain, or France. However, in the long run, Brazil’s willingness to play such a prominent role in world affairs may bode well for Western governments. As the world transitions into an “Asian century” or the “BRIC era,” there should be some consolation in knowing that a democratic Brazil is willing to make its presence felt, not only in the global economy, but also in global politics.

Sean Goforth writes for FPA’s Latin America blog, here. An expanded version of this article first appeared in World Politics Review, here.

(Photo credit: Reuters)