Iran’s first nuclear power plant in Bushehr will not be up and running until next year, according to reports from the Iranian atomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi. Iran began loading Russian-made fuel rods into the plant in August with the expectation that the plant would be connected to the national power grid by October. Salehi announced Wednesday that, “the fuel will be loaded to the core of the reactor completely by early November and…two to three months after that, electricity will be added to the networks.”
The announcement follows a long history of delays with the Bushehr plant. Reza Aghazadeh, Salehi’s predecessor, promised to turn on the switch back in 2008. This year, Iranian officials have blamed intense heat for more recent delays. Meanwhile, American and Israeli officials continue to condemn the facility as a piece of an Iranian weapons program.
Speculation has been swirling over the past few days about a different reason for the delays. Last weekend, Iranian officials confirmed that the computer virus known as Stuxnet had infected industrial infrastructure systems throughout the country. One official said that 30,000 individual computers had been affected.
Some analysts say Stuxnet was created to target a specific industrial facility. Is it possible that the worm was designed with the specific purpose of disrupting Iran’s nuclear program? Ralph Langner, a German cyber-security researcher, told the Christian Science Monitor that “Stuxnet is a 100-percent-directed cyber attack aimed at destroying an industrial process in the physical world.” His research into the virus, which is supported by other experienced cybersecurity analysts, asserts that Stuxnet “is looking for one specific place and time to attack one specific factory or power plant in the entire world.”
Iranian officials deny these assertions and no damage has been reported at the Bushehr facility. But Langner and other cybersecurity experts say that no one knows what Stuxnet’s ultimate aim really is.
What is clear about the virus is that it is incredibly sophisticated. Analysts agree that it must have required a team of developers supported by a wealthy individual, organization, or perhaps a government. Once Stuxnet identifies its target and certain parameters are met, Lagner writes that “we can expect that something will blow up soon. Something big.”
The United States and Israel have the software development capabilities and the motive to create a sabotage effort aimed at Iran, but is this actually a likely scenario? It is difficult to believe that the Obama administration would employ computer espionage to try to derail Iran’s nuclear program. Similarly, the Israeli government, while certainly worried about an Iranian nuclear bomb, would probably turn to other means to delay or destroy the program. It is also likely that they would wait until closer to the point of no return before showing their hand.
If and when the Bushehr plant comes online, it is expected to generate 2.5% of the country’s power. This would be an important victory for Ahmedinejad’s government, which has repeatedly rebuffed international efforts aimed at stopping the Iranian nuclear program. But Stuxnet may have found its target. We don’t really know if the virus is the main reason for the delay in opening up the plant, or exactly what damage it has already caused, or what it is waiting for.
One question will remain regardless of the outcome in Bushehr: who created the Stuxnet virus in the first place, and for what purpose?
Photo Courtesy of The Christian Science Monitor.
