Here are two radical proposals for Afghanistan. Neither of them has yet been attempted by the United States. They are: engage in counterinsurgency and attempt to make peace deals with the Taliban.
As I’ve noted before (here, here, and here), though there’s a lot of talk of counterinsurgency, the current NATO effort does not very much resemble the road map laid out in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. First, the Field Manual recommends a troop-to-population ratio of 1 troop per 50 residents, which would mean an occupation force of around 600,000 – well above the current ISAF level of 137,000 (add in the 150,000 active members of the Afghan army and we’re still only at 287,000 – not even halfway there). Second, the Field Manual recommends establishing a legitimate authority with accountability. The clearest indication that NATOhas not seriously done this is the detention center at Bagram. Prisoners essentially “disappear” into Bagram – there’s no way for them to appeal their detention and no way for family members to get any information about them. Though the original U.S. plan was to hand-over full control of the prison to Afghanistan by January 2011, thus allowing prisoners access to Afghan courts, as of last month, Afghanistan only controlled 75% of the prison. As FPA Afghanistan‘s Faheem Haider notes, the lack of checks and balances in the Afghan constitution could lead to further legitimacy problems for the Afghan central government.
Similarly, though there’s much talk of making peace with the Taliban (reports last year noted that the United States was facilitating Afghan-led peace efforts and reports last week stated that the U.S. has been attempting to engage the Taliban directly), this option has not been pursued seriously either. Just ask Taliban militant, Mullah Sahib Jan. In 2009, he approached the Independent National Reconciliation Commission with 50 other Taliban fighters, all determined to end their fight against the Afghan government. In exchange for an agreement that the reconciliation office would restrict NATO night raids and civilian killing, he began to preach to other Taliban members that they too should lay down their arms. What happened? Sahib Jan was killed by U.S. forces in a night raid. Also, the head of the Afghan High Peace Council has admitted that “[t]here are cases of officials intimidating former Taliban members who were not fighting…” And NATO has not embraced the Taliban’s desire for a base in a neutral country, where negotiations could proceed unimpeded by the Pakistani government, which has admitted to attempting to sabotage peace talks.
If the United States was actually doing what it claims it is doing, success would be more likely.
