A few bright spots in the U.S.-China relationship?

Finally, China comes to the table on Iran. A few days ago Liu Zhenmin, a former deputy ambassador to the U.N. and lead Chinese negotiator on previous Iran sanctions, reportedly participated in a conference call about U.S.-proposed Security Council sanctions, ending months of disengagement on the issue.

While this is a step in the right direction for U.S. diplomats, there is little to suggest this move represents any real shift in China’s strategy. Li Baodong, the new U.N. ambassador, has since reiterated China’s general commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its strong preference for negotiations over sanctions. Nor are the Chinese looking to really jumpstart the process. Liu, China’s negotiator, agreed only to further telephone discussions and not face-to-face meetings.

Security Council diplomats noted too that China’s lukewarm re-engagement to the process was matched by Russia’s noticeably harder line on sanctions. Given Xi Jinping’s concurrent and exceedingly friendly meet and greet with Putin and Medvedev, the whiff of Chinese-Russian collusion is heavy in the air.

What’s more interesting, however, is the disclosure of increased friction between Iran and China. Russia and China were apparently rebuffed in their behind-the-scenes efforts to get Iran to defuse the crisis. From Reuters:

A senior Russian diplomat said that Russia and China have pressed Iran to accept a United Nations offer to replace fuel for an atomic reactor that would require Tehran to ship most of its low-enriched uranium to Russia and France for further enrichment and processing into fuel assemblies.

Western diplomats told Reuters that Russia and China quietly admonished Iran’s government earlier this month, saying they wanted it to accept the U.N.-brokered offer and change its nuclear policy. They added that neither received a satisfactory reply.

Articles in the Global Times earlier in the month suggested Chinese officials’ unhappiness with Iran’s obstinacy. The full-page article on the cover of the March 11 edition, titled “Iran’s Friendliness to China is Belied by a Demand for Help,” was a markedly chilly response to the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s open entreaties for China to withstand U.S. pressure.

Iran’s [Foreign Ministry] spokesmen…seemed to increase the ‘forcefulness’ of his tone, …and said that if China did not help resist Western pressure, it would influence the Iranian-Chinese relationship. One fears Chinese people will feel discomfort upon hearing this kind of language. For every confrontation between Iran and the West over the years, Chinese has been quick to urge reconciliation; it seems [Iran] is a bit ungrateful.

Most Global Times front page articles can safely assumed to be hewing closely to the Party’s daily messaging imperatives, and this one is likely no exception. By sowing resentment against Iran among the Chinese public, such an article prepares domestic opinion for a possible shift against Iran. While this strategy of hedging public support for Iran reveals little about Beijing’s real intentions, it does suggest China may have been looking for leverage over Iran in behind-the-scenes negotiations.

Bizarrely enough, this article can no longer be accessed directly online (above text copied from a hard copy of Global Times).

Forward motion on Taiwan?

China’s positive signals on Iran may well reflect impatience with Iran rather than any real warming to U.S. overtures. But the impact of another recent article hints however at a separate and perhaps positive development in the Sino-U.S. relationship that may have eased bilateral tensions.

In an unusual move, Chinese state media outlets played up tough talk on Taiwanese independence from David G. Brown, a former U.S. diplomat. Chinese media focused on his March 25^th commentary in Taiwan’s Asia Times, which sent a clear warning to Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Should the DPP take steps that derail cross-straits talks upon winning in upcoming elections, as they did under Chen Shui-bian’s administration, Brown said the U.S. would “explicitly” oppose Taiwanese independence (as opposed to the current policy of just not supporting it) and would also likely “suspend both arms sales and…consultation on defense issues.” This pointed threat comes about two months after the most recent U.S. arm sales to Taiwan and just a few weeks after senior U.S. officials were dispatched to Beijing.

The Global Times, Xinhua and other media outlets ran a neutral article that quotes Brown’s tough language at length, a departure in tone and content from typical articles about U.S. behavior regarding Taiwan. Most omit positive information about the United States’ Taiwan policy or otherwise seek to cast the U.S. as unreasonable, aggressive or anti-Chinese.

The whole affair smacks of an orchestrated win-win arrangement. Improving communication of U.S. strategic intentions with regard to Taiwan seems to be a goal for U.S. policymakers. This had been hampered up until now by skewed Chinese media coverage that exacerbated widespread paranoia about U.S. intentions, something I discussed in a recent post. On the other hand, Beijing surely appreciates a more forceful position against Taiwanese separatism emanating from Washington. Wide and fair coverage of the Brown commentary in Chinese media certainly has something for both sides.

While it’s difficult to say for sure if this was a quid pro quid negotiated between Chinese and U.S. diplomats, evidence abounds, not least the visit to Beijing by the Assistant Secretary of State that preceded the Brown article by several weeks. The Chinese articles were also tellingly titled “American Expert Claims De Jure Taiwanese Independence Would Damage U.S. Interests,” a surprisingly straightforward statement of U.S. talking points.  As Google and the Renminbi roil Sino-U.S. relations, it’s nice to think that Taiwan may be one spot where tensions are easing behind the scenes.