A drop of optimism in the sea of depression?

The outcry is global, the West made a strategic mistake by going to Libya. The humanitarian desire to protect civilians in Libya from their deadly dictator has shifted to a political desire of regime change. NATO and its allies are getting seriously bogged down in Libya raising several points. First, France is no longer the superpower it believes itself to be, not even a middle-size superpower. France does not have the military capabilities to back up its narratives. The UK is also facing a similar reality. Second, where is NATO going? Is it becoming a world policeman or simply an instrument for Western neo-imperialism? Third, what is the European External Action Service? Where is the EU on the international stage? Fourth, the West with all its military fire-power and technological edge over Qaddafi, Al-Qaeda, or the insurgents in Iraq cannot win a war. It was true then in Vietnam and it is still true today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. It was only effective in Kosovo. A strategic assessment is more than ever needed in the US and Western Europe. Strategic air-bombings do not win hearts and minds.

Even though these points are central, the word has it that France is destroying the unity of the Union in the name of its national interests. Such behavior is weakening the EU, already ongoing considerable political crises at the domestic and European levels, economic and financial crises, and now a foreign policy crisis. The EEAS has not responded as hoped in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and will most likely remain silent in Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. High Representative Ashton has taken a large part of the blame due to her lack of leadership and vision. But she is only one piece of the puzzle.

In addition, the media does not seem to recall the 2003 war in Iraq. March 2003 marked the highest point of political discords within the Union. Mr. Rumsfeld, former US Secretary of Defense, described the EU as divided between the Old and New Europe. The Coalition of the Willing, composed of the US, Spain, Italy, the UK, Poland and others, decided to invade Iraq without any legal jurisdiction and against the world public opinion. France and Germany were extremely virulent and strongly expressed their voices against the invasion of Iraq. If one recalls the narratives were exceptionally passionate and the future of the Union did not look bright at all.

Nine months later after the invasion, in December 2003, the EU adopted its first security strategy, the famous European Security Strategy. The academic literature on this document is exceedingly wide and studied it from every angle. However, even though the document lacks of clear description on how the EU should implement the strategy, it was an important symbolic document wherein the 17 Member States agreed on common threats, on the respect and centrality of the rule of law, and on a common strategy, effective multilateralism. The ESS has become a benchmark in unifying EU Member States behind a common strategy.

Historically, the European project has deepened following crisis junctures. Today tensions and divisions within the Union are major and could truly affect the European project. Thus, in recent times domestic politics have influenced the behaviors of capitals towards conservative policies, inward looking, and Eurosceptic narratives, although it was already the case in 2003. The only major difference was Javier Solana, former High Representative. Under his ten years mandate and precisely in 2003, he was able to steer the European boat into a common direction, while maneuvering in order to bridge the differences within the Union and on both sides of the Atlantic. It could be Ashton last option in order to redeem herself as the leader of the EU foreign policy and show that the EU learns from its mistakes.