Thomas Wright, an expert on international relations, says the “great dramas of the 21st century will play out in Asia rather than Europe.”
Mr. Wright is the executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and previously served as the senior researcher for the Princeton Project on National Security. I interviewed Mr. Wright about soft power in Asia, rising powers and international institutions.
He says that China has been a “responsible power but its rise makes its neighbors nervous” and as long as East Asian countries “want a significant US presence in the region the United States will remain a major Asian power.” With the global financial crisis, the “US led international order is facing the first great internally induced crisis in its history.” While the US-China relationship is “incredibly important” in addressing transnational threats, the “vital thing is to disaggregate the various challenges and tailor multilateral solutions that suit each.”
The recent survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on Soft Power in Asia found that the United States “is the region’s undisputed soft-power leader.” Despite China’s rise and perceived decline in America’s influence, the United States still ranked above China in soft power. Are you surprised by these findings? What is the significance of the relative soft powers in Asia?
I am personally not surprised by these findings although they do go against the conventional wisdom. The United States has long played a constructive role in Asia. It supports the status quo, and is democratic, open and far enough away not to be threatening. On the other hand the rise of China introduces a great unknown into regional politics. China has been a responsible power but its rise makes its neighbors nervous.
Soft power in East Asia matters because it tells us about what countries in the region want and as long as they want a significant US presence in the region the United States will remain a major Asian power.
Some argue that hard power is easier to measure than soft power. Do you agree? How can soft power be effectively evaluated?
It is true that hard power is easier to measure than soft power but only to a certain degree. While it is obviously easier to count tanks and aircraft carriers than measure the power of attraction we also know from wars like Iraq and coercive diplomacy like US-North Korea relations, that it is often difficult to predict how effective the instruments of hard power will be once they are employed.
To measure the soft power of the four major powers in Asia, the Chicago Council’s survey examined the attractiveness of different national cultures and values, the effectiveness of nations as regional leaders and problem-solvers, their attractiveness as trade partners, levels of human capital, the emergence of regional identities, as well as perceptions of growing economic and political integration in East Asia and the impact this has on underlying regional tensions.
You commented that the “center of gravity in international politics is moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific.” What are the implications for US foreign policy?
The implications are enormous because it implies that the great dramas of the 21st century will play out in Asia rather than Europe. Let me just focus on two implications that don’t get as much attention as they should.
The first has to do with strategic culture. The United States is used to great power politics in the Atlantic area and most US foreign policy experts have learned their trade from studying that experience. The United States must be careful not to assume that the lessons learned from that are transferable to Asia. India-China-Japan relations will not necessarily play out like Germany-France-Britain relations in the 19th century. So it will be important for the US foreign policy community to appreciate and understand the specific context of great power relations in the 21st century. Given that strategic misunderstanding and misperceptions can heighten the risk of conflict, it is tremendously important that America gets this right.
The second has to do with worse case scenarios. East Asia is probably the only place on the planet where one could imagine a major war or struggle on a par with the conflicts of the 20th century. Regional multipolarity, volatility in economics, rising nationalisms, historic animosities and grievances, legitimate differences of interests and dramatic power transitions make East Asia unique in the modern world. It falls to the United States, as the world’s strongest power and as a Pacific nation, to take the lead in managing this situation, reassuring all nations, dissuading and deterring aggression and guiding them to a mutually beneficial future. This may be America’s greatest foreign policy challenge of the next half century.
How important is the bilateral relationship between the United States and China for addressing transnational threats (climate change, nuclear proliferation, etc.)?
The US-China relationship is incredibly important in a wide range of areas. One is preserving peace and stability in East Asia. Another is the global economy and unwinding the massive financial imbalances that may have contributed to the international financial crisis. And then there are transnational threats although we should be careful not to lump them all in together. The US-China relationship will determine whether or not we are successful in tackling climate change although it may be more peripheral to non-proliferation where relations with Russia and Pakistan are probably more important. The vital thing is to disaggregate the various challenges and tailor multilateral solutions that suit each.
You have written several pieces on rising powers and international institutions. Last year, in a paper with G. John Ikenberry, you argued that the global order is “easier to join and harder to overturn.” In a recent brief for the Stanley Foundation, you wrote that “reform of international institutions should bring about more effective international cooperation on critical challenges in a way that does not inadvertently worsen tensions with other states.” What are your impressions of the recent G20 summit in London?
The G20 summit in London went better than expected but it was still not good enough. The US led international order is facing the first great internally induced crisis in its history. The global economy may be in a tailspin. Meanwhile, fundamental problems, like the financial imbalances between the United States and China, went ignored at the G20 as leaders focused on what united them. This is not the time to be papering over differences. We should be identifying where major countries disagree on important matters and then encouraging intensive diplomacy to reach some understanding about the path forward. This will probably mean multiple and flexible multilateral arrangements, some with a very small number of members, that allow a deepening of cooperation that ultimately works to the benefits of all countries.
