GREAT DECISIONS 2016 SPRING UPDATES
The rise of ISIS
By Loïc Burton
On March 22, terror struck Brussels with a twin blast at Zaventem Airport and the Maelbeek metro station, claiming the lives of 32 people and injuring over 300. The attacks claimed by ISIS came only a few days after a suicide bombing killed five and injured 36 in Istanbul—the fourth suicide bombing in Turkey in 2016.
The latest bombings have reheated the debate within the EU about tighter border controls—possibly foreshadowing the eventual breakdown of the Schengen Agreement. In addition, the attacks have hardened Europe’s determination to combat terrorism at home, with increased monitoring of ISIS fighters returning from the Middle East and improved intelligence sharing between EU members, and abroad, whether through ramping up aircraft deployments in the coalition against the Islamic State or by supplying weapons to local actors.
Experts have argued that ISIS’s increased activity abroad is a sign of weakness rather than strength. As the so-called caliphate begins to crumble—ISIS is thought to have lost around 20% of its territory in Syria and over 40% in Iraq since its peak expansion in August 2014—the group is allocating efforts and resources toward large-scale terrorist attacks abroad in order to influence the strategic calculations of the coalition member countries at a reduced cost. Since ISIS’s “winner’s message” of “remaining and expanding” sounds increasingly hollow, this tactical shift is one way to catch global headlines and retain its legitimacy and ability to recruit.
Although the increased operational tempo of terrorist attacks is the manifestation of the group’s faltering, the ISIS underlying ideology is not expected to wither away anytime soon. Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the Treasury Department, argues that “defeating the formal military presence of a terrorist group will not significantly mitigate the threat of lone wolf or small independent cells that are based in the West.”
In its heartland, ISIS is definitely in retreat. According to Pentagon officials, U.S. airstrikes have killed over 25,000 Islamic State fighters and deprived the group of millions of dollars in revenue. Financially debilitated, it has halved salaries of its civil servants and is releasing hostages for sums as low as $500. Indeed, ISIS has not scored a significant victory since taking Palmyra in May 2015. The ancient city was recaptured by the Syrian regime, supported by Russian airstrikes, on March 27, 2016, reducing ISIS’s ability to threaten Syria’s coastal regions.
In Iraq, after retaking Tikrit in March 2015 and Ramadi in December, the government in Baghdad declared on March 24 the beginning of operations to retake Mosul. The offensive to regain Iraq’s second largest city will not be easy. After some initial success reclaiming nearby villages, progress in the military campaign was stalled. More sober prognostics have now replaced the once optimistic talks of pushing ISIS out of Mosul by the end of the year—military analysts estimate that there is little prospect of an assault on the city before 2017.
With about 10,000 fighters and almost two years to erect a multilayered defense, a force of at least 40,000 would be needed to overcome the group, according to estimates. Indeed, the current under-strength Iraqi division supported by U.S. military advisers looks woefully inadequate for the task. Moreover, because of ethno-religious tensions, Kurdish Peshmerga seem uninterested in helping take a city that would never be part of an independent Kurdistan while Shi‘a-dominated militias—instrumental in retaking Tikrit—will probably be kept away for fears of sectarian reprisals following the conquest of the Sunni-majority city.
An important factor in the battle for Mosul is America’s involvement. The Pentagon wants to go beyond air strikes and the current deployment of military advisers and introduce additional special forces. However, this goes against Obama’s “no boots on the ground” pledge—although an increasingly tenuous promise, it rules out the deployment on the scale necessary to retake Mosul.
After attempting to train local forces—leading to the disastrous $500 million train-and-equip program for Syrian moderates that yielded little to no results—and bombing oil production facilities under Operation Tidal Wave II, the U.S. is now focusing on a leadership decapitation campaign, using special forces on the ground. In March, American forces killed Haji Iman, ISIS’s second-in-command, as well as Abu Omar al-Shishanim, the group’s “war minister.” Secretary of Defense Ash Carter explained current U.S. strategy: “we are systematically eliminating ISIL’s cabinet,” in order to “hamper the ability for them to conduct operations inside and outside of Iraq and Syria.” Although the leadership is capable of regenerating itself and operating on the ground, taking out leaders reduces the group’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks abroad as they require a more sophisticated network and superior coordination.
Talks of a new training program—allegedly more narrowly focused—and Obama’s decision to add 250 military personnel to the 50 already on the ground in Syria are the latest development in the U.S. effort to capitalize on the momentum in the campaign against the Islamic State. It remains to be seen whether or not these new policies achieve the desired outcome.
Recommended Readings
Max Fisher, “The Brussels attack is Europe’s new reality,” Vox (Mar. 22, 2016).
Eric Schmitt and Alissa J. Rubin “ISIS Spreading in Europe, U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns,”
The New York Times (Apr. 25, 2016).
“The last battle,” The Economist (Apr. 16, 2016).
The future of Kurdistan
By Loïc Burton
The Kurds are often hailed as the West’s most reliable partner in the fight against the Islamic State. From its victories in the border town of Kobani in Syria and in Sinjar in northern Iraq, the Kurds have taken advantage of the chaos in the region to get closer to achieving their dream of statehood.
On March 17, after the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—under the umbrella of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)—managed a streak of military victories, Kurdish leadership declared a federal region across much of northern Syria called Rojava. This in an attempt to formalize the semiautonomous zone controlled by Kurdish forces after five years of war, while falling short of complete independence from Damascus.
As a key ally in the coalition against ISIS, Syrian Kurds are in a much stronger position to bargain for their political autonomy. However this is anathema to both the Syrian and Turkish governments. The former—reinvigorated thanks to the Russian intervention—now believes that it could regain control over all of the country while the latter fears that increased Kurdish self-governance might increase tensions with its own Kurdish restive minority.
In Iraq, Masoud Barzani, president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, has announced his intentions of holding a referendum on independence by the end of the year—a first step toward achieving full-fledged statehood. However, some believe the referendum will be used to distract the population from more pressing problems such as the region’s flailing economy.
In February 2014, as a result of a dispute with Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was cut off from its share of the federal budget. In June, with the emergence of ISIS, security spending skyrocketed while an influx of 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons added pressure to its infrastructure and service delivery. The final blow occurred in mid-2014 with the global drop in oil prices hitting the region particularly hard—oil revenues account for as much as 80–90% of the KRG’s budget.
In addition to these recent developments, the KRG struggles with perennial issues. In a population of 5.2 million, 1.4 million are on the government payroll Moreover the practice of “ghost-employees”—arms of the government claim more staff than they actually have to inflate their budgets—is widespread. All these factors combined create an unsustainable economic situation and threaten to stall the momentum gained against ISIS: security services are currently only paid every four months.
Looking beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq, Turkey is the most concerned about the Kurds for the reasons aforementioned. As its fight against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party—to which the PYD has close ties—in Turkey’s southeast intensifies, Ankara has bombed Kurdish fighters in Syria and allegedly tacitly helped ISIS to prevent Syrian Kurds from forming a contiguous entity along its southern border.
Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter jet in November 2015 has put Ankara and Moscow at odds with each other. Since then, Russia has been much more inclined to support Syrian Kurds and the PYD, allowing the Rojava administration to establish its first overseas representative office in Moscow in February 2016.
Finally, the U.S. relation with the Kurds is complex: although the Kurds are reliable allies, Kurdish aspirations for autonomy complicate America’s strategic interests. Indeed, in addition to the risk of seeing the fragmentation of Iraq, American support for Syrian Kurds has increased tensions between the U.S. and Turkey—which allows the U.S. to use its military bases to conduct operations in the region. Kurds are independent political actors whose interests are not always aligned with Washington. The coming months are essential for the future of their polity and the region as a whole.
Recommended Readings
Anne Barnard, “Syrian Kurds Hope to Establish a Federal Region in the Country’s North,”
The New York Times (Mar. 16, 2016).
Zach Beauchamp, “America’s Kurdish problem: today’s allies against ISIS are tomorrow’s headache,” Vox (Apr. 8, 2016).
“Why Iraqi Kurdistan Is Struggling to Pay Its Bills,” Stratfor (Jan. 28, 2016).
Korean choices
By Matthew Barbari
The Kim Jong-un regime has continued to ramp up tensions in the Korean peninsula over the past few months. North Korea has conducted missile launches in defiance of sanctions placed by the UN and world powers. The latest missile tests—including a submarine-launched ballistic missile—come after the reported nuclear weapon test in January. The UN continues to debate over further sanctions or actions against North Korea, despite their previous efforts having little impact on deterring the regime from pursuing its nuclear ambitions.
South Korea’s president Park Geun-hye has been negotiating with China and Iran, two of North Korea’s largest economic supporters. Many experts believe that Park is attempting to weaken the North’s relations with those countries in order to gain an advantage in negotiations with Kim Jong-un. Her meetings with Chinese and Iranian leaders focused on economic ties: China is Seoul’s largest trading partner and Iran, as a crude oil exporter, interests South Korea, the world’s fifth largest importer. It is also noteworthy that Tehran is the primary collaborator with North Korea with regard to its nuclear program.
President Park has also opened negotiations with the U.S. over implementing the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, a system that would help defend South Korea from nuclear missile attacks. China is particularly concerned about South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD system since it would greatly bolster U.S. military capability in the region. Despite Park’s ability to open channels of communication with countries with which Seoul previously did not share economic or political ties, and her moves to strengthen the U.S.-RoK alliance, she is struggling at home. In the most recent parliamentary elections, South Koreans showed their disapproval of the president’s policies.
Park’s Saenuri party lost its majority in parliament—winning only 122 of the 300 seats. The rival Minjoo party managed to gain 123 seats, with other smaller parties capturing the rest. It is the first time in 16 years that no party controls a majority of seats in parliament. This does not bode well for president Park, who is up for reelection in 2017. With a sluggish economy and the perception that the sanctions and Park’s strong rhetoric have failed to prevent the North from testing weapons, many South Koreans feel that change is needed.
With Park now focusing on foreign policy and building strong relationships in Asia and beyond, she hopes to revive the economy and reengage in negotiations with Pyongyang in order to show South Koreans that she still is the right person to lead them. However, much of her public support will depend on how many more tests Kim Jong-un’s regime conducts in the future.
Recommended Readings
Choe Sang-Hun, “After South Korea Spurns Park Geun-hye, She May Press Agenda Abroad,” The New York Times (Apr. 14, 2016)
Daniele Ermito, “The Twilight of President Park’s Trustpolitik,” Foreign Policy Blogs (Feb. 29, 2016)
Donald Kirk, “S. Korea President’s Mission to Iran Busts Up ‘Axis of Evil’ Before N. Korea Party Congress,” Forbes (May 3, 2016)
The UN post-2015
By Matthew Barbari
With Ban Ki-Moon’s term as Secretary-General (SG) ending this year, many candidates have been put forward to replace him. Due to the tradition of rotating the region from which the SG is selected, this year the spotlight has been placed on Eastern Europe. There are also calls for a woman SG—the first since the organization’s creation in 1945.
As stated by UN General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft, this election will be the most transparent to date. In the past, the election process was conducted behind closed doors and under the watchful eyes of the UN Security Council. While this election has already had public nominations as well as informal discussions between the General Assembly and each of the candidates, it is still ultimately the responsibility of the Security Council to select the SG.
Irina Bokova of Bulgaria is a popular choice to replace Ban Ki-Moon as she fills three essential requirements: she is from the region whose “turn” it is to hold the position, she has experience working in the system—going into her sixth year as the Director-General of UNESCO—and is one of the leading women in the UN. She is also the most favored candidate by Russia, who holds sway due to its veto power in the Security Council.
The prime minister of Moldova, Natalia Gherman, is also a popular candidate as she is both a woman and from Eastern Europe. However, her inexperience within the UN makes her bid less likely, despite the support she receives from Western countries such as the UK and U.S.
While Vuk Jeremic would continue the trend of having a man at the organization’s highest office, he does have years of relevant experience working as the President of the UN General Assembly and as Serbia’s minister of foreign affairs.
Many General Assembly members have voiced their dissatisfaction toward the current crop of Eastern European nominees. As a result, this has led to growing support for two candidates from outside the region, claiming that geography should not play a role in the selection process—especially if it leads to a subpar candidate.
Helen Clark, the current Administrator for the United Nations Development Programme and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, is a name that has been floated around. She has strong connections to the U.S. and UK, as well as China. In addition, she has years of experience at the UN, with many seeing her as a more qualified leader than other candidates.
Another “outside candidate” is Antonio Guterres who served as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and is a former Prime Minister of Portugal. Guterres has an impressive resume, and is the most well equipped candidate to face the current refugee crises, which are a main concern for Europe and the Middle East.
The major roadblock to him or Clark is the UN tradition of selecting an SG from a certain region, as well as a possible veto from Russia, which wants to see an SG that is amenable to its interests. While Moscow has publically stated that it would not veto a candidate selection solely on the geographical criteria, this strategy was previously employed by Beijing, helping Ban Ki-Moon back in 2007, when China threatened to veto any candidate who was not from Asia. The Security Council is expected to select its nominee in July with the election in the General Assembly happening in September.
Recommended Readings
Somini Sengupta, “At U.N., Ambassadors Hold Auditions for Next Secretary General,” The New York Times (Apr. 15, 2016).
Reid Standish, “Will the Next U.N. Secretary-General Be From Eastern Europe?” Foreign Policy (Apr. 29, 2016).
“Selecting a new UN Secretary-General: a job interview in front of the whole world,” UN News Centre (Apr. 8, 2016).
Cuba and the U.S.
By Matthew Barbari
At the Summit of the Americas in April 2015, President Obama made a promise to visit Cuba before the end of his presidency. On March 21–22, 2016, he made good on his promise, flying to Havana to meet the Cuban people, discuss U.S.-Cuba relations with President Raúl Castro and even attend a historical baseball game between the Tampa Bay Rays and the Cuban National Team. The trip was the first visit by a sitting U.S. president to the island since Calvin Coolidge and allowed Obama to speak candidly with President Castro in front of the Cuban media—touching upon thorny issues such as the country’s human rights record.
The trip was the high point of Obama’s efforts to normalize relations with the island. On March 15, the White House announced that travel restrictions for U.S. tourists to Cuba would be loosened. The two countries also restored official diplomatic channels with the opening of embassies in August 2015 in their respective capitals.
In the last month, however, Cuba’s former leader Fidel Castro spoke publically for the first time in years. During his speech, Castro—who is 89—mentioned that the sprit of the revolution would outlive him, putting him at odds with a complete normalization of relations with the U.S. He also criticized President Obama for his attacks on Cuba’s human rights record as well as the U.S.’s continued use of the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. While Raúl has been more open to engaging the U.S., many believe that as long as a Castro is running Cuba, relations cannot be fully normalized.
After the trip, President Obama called on the U.S. Congress to begin the process of lifting the embargo by repealing many of the measures restricting U.S. trade and relations with the island. While there has been a shift in public opinion toward ending the embargo, very little progress has been made in Congress so far. In the current conjuncture, it is very likely that the next administration will continue President Obama’s push.
Donald Trump has stated that he is in favor of renegotiating relations with Cuba, separating himself from the majority of the Republican Party establishment. Trump has mentioned that he would be open to investing in Cuba, as long as there is a significant improvement in human rights. While Trump has previously stated he was against ending the embargo, he has changed his mind since them—preferring a deal that would be more favorable for the U.S.
Hillary Clinton—aligned with Obama’s policies—stated that she would continue his push if she were to be elected. While Clinton has also had a history of speaking out against Cuba—such as her pro-embargo comments during the 2008 presidential campaign—it is worth mentioning that Obama was also pro-embargo when he first ran for office.
While both candidates seem to have changed their views on the issue, so has the country as a whole—the U.S. public approval of the embargo has dropped dramatically over that same period. President Obama has begun the process of warming relations between the U.S. and Cuba, but there is still much standing in the way before we see an end to the embargo.
Recommended Readings
“Fidel’s last stand,” The Economist (Apr. 30, 2016)
Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Damien Cave, “Cuba Meeting Between Obama and Castro Exposes Old Grievances,” The New York Times (Mar. 21, 2016).
Danielle Renwick, Brianna Lee and James McBride, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 24, 2016).